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In 2025, global coal power capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants act as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This gap is most prominent in China and India, where record-high completions coexist with falling generation due to rapid wind and solar expansion. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, and Latin America reached a state of no new proposals, some regions like the US and EU delayed planned closures due to energy security and political intervention. South Korea has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out, contrasting with Japan's more gradual approach focused on ammonia co-firing and efficiency improvements.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as new plants in China and India are increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Latin America and the Caribbean achieved a status of 'No New Coal Plants' in 2025, though several countries, including Brazil and Chile, experienced setbacks in their decommissioning schedules.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants are increasingly used as backup reserves rather than primary energy sources. This divergence is most acute in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling generation due to the rise of wind and solar power. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects declined from 38 to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Regionally, Latin America reported no new projects, while Russia and Kazakhstan continue to integrate coal into their long-term energy security strategies despite international financing constraints and sanctions.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while coal-generated electricity decreased by 0.6%, reflecting a shift where coal serves as backup capacity rather than a primary source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling production due to the rise of renewables. While the number of countries planning new coal projects fell to 32 in 2025, some nations like the US and EU delayed plant closures for energy security. In Turkey, planned coal capacity has plummeted from 57.5 GW in 2015 to 0.7 GW by 2025, though tensions remain between social demand for transition and government policies such as guaranteed purchase mechanisms for coal plants through 2030.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, driven largely by record additions in China and India. These countries are building coal plants for system reliability and energy security, even as renewables displace coal's role in meeting demand. The report notes a geographic narrowing of coal expansion, with only 32 countries proposing or building new plants, and highlights the specific challenges facing Ukraine's energy recovery following Russian attacks on its infrastructure.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. While the number of countries pursuing new coal projects dropped to 32, China and India continue massive expansions. In Indonesia, the growth of captive coal plants for nickel and aluminium processing contradicts national climate commitments, with the RUPTL 2025-2034 continuing to plan for on-grid coal investment despite a formal moratorium.

The document analyzes the stagnation of African agricultural productivity, attributing it to historical factors like slavery, colonialism, and a lack of tenure reform. It contrasts a 'Current Path' forecast—characterized by increasing food import dependence and low yields—with an 'Agriculture scenario' where targeted interventions in AgTech, irrigation, and soil health lead to significant poverty reduction and GDP growth. The report emphasizes the need for food self-sufficiency and value addition within Africa over a reliance on raw commodity exports.

The report describes a 'narrowing funnel' in sub-Saharan African education, where high initial primary enrolment is offset by significant 'leaks' at each subsequent level, leading to very low tertiary graduation rates. It contrasts these outcomes with North Africa and global benchmarks, noting that sub-Saharan Africa is forecast to miss several 2030 Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets. The analysis highlights a growing intergenerational education gap and predicts that the attainment gap between sub-Saharan Africa and other developing regions will widen by 2030.

The research paper examines the failure of Zimbabwe's land redistribution programme and 'command agriculture' policies, noting that these actions destroyed the country's most productive sector. It highlights a transition from being a net food exporter before 1990 to importing nearly 22% of total food demand by 2019, while extreme poverty rose from 10% in 2000 to 37% in 2020.

The document describes El Niño as a natural climate phenomenon characterized by warmer-than-average sea surface temperatures in the equatorial Pacific. It argues that climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of extreme El Niño events, particularly Central-Pacific (CP) events, and complicating their prediction. For 2026, there is a 61% chance of an El Niño emerging between May and July, with some models suggesting it could be the strongest in 140 years. The briefing details global teleconnections, noting that El Niño typically causes droughts in southern Africa, Australia, and India, while increasing flood risks in East Africa and the Americas. These shifts significantly impact global agriculture, reducing yields for maize, rice, and wheat while often increasing soybean yields. Regional analysis highlights specific risks, such as increased cholera in East Africa, hydropower reductions at Kariba Dam in Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the Amazon becoming a net carbon source during Eastern-Pacific (EP) events.

The document analyzes the strategic interests of the EU and Indonesia in Africa's critical raw materials sector, arguing that their differing strengths—the EU's financial and regulatory capacity and Indonesia's downstream industrialisation experience—could be combined through triangular cooperation to support African development and reduce mutual dependence on China.

The report highlights how Africa's infrastructure deficit, particularly in roads and aviation, increases transport costs and hinders investment. It notes a significant funding gap and a failure to implement regional air transport agreements, while acknowledging the role of China's Belt and Road Initiative in recent infrastructure development.

The AfCFTA faces significant implementation hurdles due to the extreme economic disparity between member states, which may lead to 'winners and losers' where advanced economies benefit while least developed countries (LDCs) face initial welfare losses. Key challenges include the loss of critical tariff revenues for some governments, weak institutional capacities in LDCs, and limited commitment to the free movement of labour. To mitigate these risks, the agreement employs special and differential treatment, granting LDCs and a specific 'Group of 6' (G6) longer phase-out periods for tariff liberalisation, though the authors argue that additional support from the AU Secretariat and private finance is necessary to bridge the development gap.

The document examines the diverse nature of Africa's manufacturing sector, noting that most countries remain outliers with low manufacturing shares of GDP. It highlights a trend of 'premature deindustrialization' in low-income countries and the significant role of Chinese private enterprises in meeting domestic demand. While most of the continent relies on raw material exports, a few countries like Eswatini and South Africa show higher industrial competitiveness.

The report details the disproportionate burden of climate change on Africa, noting that since 1984, the continent has faced 1,865 climate-related disasters resulting in US$53 billion in losses. It highlights a critical lack of financial protection, with only 9% of disaster losses insured. Regional analysis shows water-related disasters as the primary threat, with severe flooding in East Africa and historic droughts in Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. The document also links climate change to the spread of diseases like cholera and malaria, and the risk of desertification in the Sahel and West Africa.

The document concludes that Africa is positioned for a manufacturing surge if it can overcome structural bottlenecks through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), infrastructure investment, and smart industrial policy. It contrasts a 'Current Path' with a 'Manufacturing scenario' where, by 2043, the continent achieves higher GDP and employment by transitioning from a raw material exporter to a producer of value-added goods like electronics, pharmaceuticals, and electric vehicles.

Non-tariff barriers, including regulatory procedures, corruption, and technical standards, significantly constrain African trade. While reforms like the One-Stop Border Framework at the Beitbridge border post and East African Community initiatives have drastically reduced processing times, overall progress in eliminating these barriers remains slow due to entrenched local practices and vested interests.

The Manufacturing scenario projects a structural economic transformation for Africa by 2043, increasing the manufacturing sector's GDP share to 18.1% and adding US$282.8 billion to the continent's total GDP. This shift is expected to generate 34.6 million additional jobs, primarily unskilled roles in agro-processing and services, while increasing government revenue by US$81.6 billion. The scenario forecasts a reduction in extreme poverty, lifting 19.11 million more people out of poverty by 2043 than the Current Path, and predicts a long-term decrease in income inequality through the expansion of the middle class.

The document analyzes Africa's economic trajectory, noting that while the absolute size of the economy is growing, its share of global GDP remains stagnant at around 3% despite a rapidly increasing population. It highlights a widening gap in GDP per capita between Africa and the rest of the world, attributing this to a reliance on raw material exports, the 'resource curse', and a slow recovery from COVID-19. By 2043, Nigeria is projected to become the world's third-largest country by population, and the five largest African economies are expected to be Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

The document outlines a forecasting scenario for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) using the International Futures (IFs) platform. It details the specific interventions used to simulate the agreement's impact—including import tax reductions and productivity increases—and specifies the tariff phase-out timelines for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), non-LDCs, and the G6 countries. The authors characterize the scenario as an optimistic forecast that depends on political commitment and stakeholder engagement.