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The Center for International Environmental Law asserts that ocean protection is impossible without confronting the expansion of offshore oil and gas, which it identifies as the primary driver of the climate crisis. The organization calls on governments at the 11th Our Ocean Conference in Kenya to halt new offshore licensing, end public subsidies for expansion, and reject speculative marine geoengineering technologies that risk irreversible ecosystem damage. It further argues that states have binding legal duties under international law to prevent climate harm and protect the marine environment, which necessitates a coordinated phaseout of fossil fuel demand and supply.

Colombia is planning at least nine major LNG import terminal projects and expansions between 2026 and 2030, which would create a capacity of approximately 2,500 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d). This figure is more than double the government's projected gas demand of 1,000 MMcf/d for 2030. The report warns that such an overbuild could lead to stranded assets, lock the country into long-term fossil fuel contracts, and divert resources from renewables and energy efficiency. While the country faces a domestic gas deficit and energy security challenges exacerbated by El Niño and geopolitical tensions, the document suggests that near-term needs could be met without overbuilding infrastructure, aligning instead with a roadmap to reduce fossil fuel dependence and emissions by 90% by 2050.

GreenLatinos asserts that international climate spaces, such as UN COPs and specialized conferences, are critical for shaping policies and funding that affect Latino communities. The organization highlights the importance of the Belém–Antalya Mechanism and the Santa Marta Fossil Fuel Phaseout Conference in building momentum for a just transition and fossil fuel phaseout, while criticizing the lack of U.S. federal leadership under the Trump Administration.

The Center for International Environmental Law asserts that the UNFCCC is currently hindered by a consensus model that allows a small number of countries to obstruct progress. Citing the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in Santa Marta and the UN General Assembly's resolution on the ICJ climate Advisory Opinion, the authors argue that climate action is moving beyond the UNFCCC and that the body must evolve to incorporate majority voting, address corporate capture, and operationalize legal obligations to prevent climate harm.

The document examines how the reliance on consensus in the UNFCCC has led to a 'race to the bottom,' resulting in watered-down agreements on fossil fuels, science-based targets, and loss and damage. It proposes two procedural pathways for reform: adopting the long-delayed draft Rules of Procedure or amending the Convention itself. To support this, the author provides a comparative analysis of other UN institutions and multilateral environmental agreements—such as the Montreal Protocol and the Green Climate Fund—that successfully utilize voting to break deadlocks and advance substantive goals.

In 2025, global coal capacity additions reached 97.4 GW, the second-highest on record, primarily driven by China and India, even as global coal-fired electricity generation declined by 0.6%. The report highlights a decoupling where coal is increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation, as wind and solar displace coal. While China and India dominate new development, coal activity elsewhere is shrinking and becoming more isolated. However, net capacity outside China rose by 5 GW due to a slowdown in retirements and rebounds in India.

In 2025, global coal power capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants act as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This gap is most prominent in China and India, where record-high completions coexist with falling generation due to rapid wind and solar expansion. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, and Latin America reached a state of no new proposals, some regions like the US and EU delayed planned closures due to energy security and political intervention. South Korea has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out, contrasting with Japan's more gradual approach focused on ammonia co-firing and efficiency improvements.

GreenLatinos advocates for a just transition away from fossil fuels that integrates the needs of Latino communities in the U.S. and Latin America. The organization emphasizes that U.S. demand for oil and gas drives extraction and instability in Latin America, while U.S.-based Latino neighborhoods suffer from the proximity of refineries and industrial facilities. Through its Latino Climate Justice Framework, GreenLatinos seeks to build cross-border solidarity, apply international resistance strategies to U.S. energy justice fights, and ensure frontline Latino leadership in global climate solutions.

The Santa Marta conference on fossil fuel phaseout shifted the global conversation from whether to transition to how to implement it, establishing three workstreams for national roadmaps, financial restructuring, and trade alternatives. While the summit is praised for providing civil society and Indigenous Peoples more direct access to decision-making, the author warns that the process risks becoming 'consultation theatre' unless participation is substantive and roadmaps include accountability mechanisms and the engagement of major emitters.

The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) advocates for a managed, financed, and equitable fossil fuel phaseout during the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in Santa Marta, Colombia. CIEL proposes a binding Fossil Fuel Treaty to fill governance gaps and argues that states have a legal obligation, supported by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), to phase out fossil fuels. Key priorities include dismantling Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, ending offshore oil and gas licensing, halting petrochemical expansion, and rejecting carbon capture and geoengineering. The document emphasizes that the transition must be funded by the largest cumulative polluters and grounded in human rights and Indigenous leadership.

The document asserts that private finance continues to bankroll the fossil fuel industry despite net-zero alliances, which have largely collapsed or been gutted due to industry backlash. It calls for regulators to mandate climate transition plans, exclude fossil fuel assets from central bank collateral frameworks, and pass legislation to choke off funding for fossil fuels. While some progress is noted in coal restrictions and specific European institutional investor pledges, the author maintains that binding regulation is essential to ensure private capital accelerates rather than obstructs the global energy transition.

The report examines how the petrochemical industry serves as a 'Plan B' for fossil fuel companies, creating physical and economic lock-in that threatens global decarbonization efforts. It highlights the rapid growth of plastics and ammonia production, the environmental and health costs of these chemicals, and the use of 'transition narratives' to justify new fossil infrastructure. The authors propose five strategic levers—financial strain, market uncertainty, greenwashing, human health impacts, and just transition frameworks—to curb this expansion and enable a full fossil fuel phaseout.

The document examines how the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system enables foreign investors, particularly from the fossil fuel industry, to claim compensation from states for climate policies. It highlights the 'regulatory chill' effect, where the threat of costly awards—which have increased from an average of $25 million (1994-2003) to over $250 million (2014-2023)—deters governments from phasing out fossil fuels. The briefing references July 2025 advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to affirm state duties to regulate polluting conduct. It concludes that current reform efforts, including the EU and UK withdrawals from the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), are insufficient due to sunset clauses and inadequate carve-outs, and recommends coordinated UN-level action to eliminate ISDS threats to climate and human rights obligations.

The report critiques 'coal transition offsets' (CTOs), specifically those promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation's Coal-to-Clean-Credit Initiative (CCCI) and Singapore's Traction Coalition. It argues that CTOs inherit the systemic failures of the broader carbon offset market, including non-additionality and over-crediting. Through analysis of pilot projects in the Philippines, the document demonstrates how CTOs may not actually accelerate plant closures and can create perverse incentives for policymakers to avoid mandating coal phaseouts. The author recommends shifting focus from individual plant buyouts to systemic energy reforms, such as grid modernization and the renegotiation of power purchase agreements (PPAs) to reduce the financial burden of retiring coal assets.

The report examines the ecological and human rights risks associated with atmosphere-based, marine, and land-based geoengineering. It argues that these speculative interventions could trigger ecosystem collapse, exacerbate ocean acidification, and violate the rights of millions, particularly Indigenous Peoples and rural communities. The author advocates for the enforcement of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity's moratorium on geoengineering and a shift toward proven climate solutions.

The briefing argues that nuclear power is an impractical solution for near-term climate targets in Europe and Australia due to systemic delays, high costs, and a high rate of project cancellations. In Europe, utility-scale wind and solar capacity under construction or in pre-construction outweighs nuclear by fourteen to one, and solar generation surpassed nuclear in the EU for the first time in mid-2025. In Australia, the document concludes that nuclear is unlikely to replace coal by 2038 because construction timelines—estimated by CSIRO to be at least five years longer than the global average—would require groundbreaking by the end of 2025. Globally, the Global Nuclear Power Tracker indicates that 38% of all proposed nuclear capacity (566 GW) has been cancelled.

The analysis of Ford, General Motors, Stellantis, Toyota, and Volkswagen reveals a general failure to set credible decarbonisation targets or address key transitions. Most companies lack ambition in emission reductions, and current battery electric vehicle sales trajectories are insufficient for 1.5°C alignment. While some progress exists in near-zero steel and aluminium procurement by Ford and General Motors, other critical areas like battery production emissions remain neglected.

The June roundup highlights a decline in oil production investment and a surge in clean energy spending, with solar investment nearly equaling oil production spending. It analyzes the resilience of oil markets despite conflict in the Middle East, the acceleration of peak oil demand due to electric vehicle adoption in China, and various national policy shifts in the UK, Canada, and the US. Additionally, it reports on 'world first' projects in hydrogen blending and carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the US and Norway.

The Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor 2025 finds that none of the 20 assessed companies demonstrate a climate strategy of 'reasonable' or 'high' integrity. The report highlights that 2030 emission reduction targets are increasingly 'unfit for purpose' due to structural obstacles, including incomplete emissions disclosures and sector-specific accounting malpractices. In the tech sector, soaring energy demand from AI and a reliance on outdated market-based accounting for electricity undermine target credibility. The automotive sector shows inadequate progress in phasing out internal combustion engines, while the fashion sector lacks commitments to reduce overproduction. The agrifood sector is criticised for relying on undefined land-based carbon removals to obscure a lack of structural emission reductions. The report argues for the adoption of transition-specific alignment targets to complement general GHG targets.

The report finds that the five largest incumbent light-duty vehicle manufacturers are making inadequate progress in transitioning to electric mobility. Most assessed companies have 2030 emission reduction targets that are critically insufficient and long-term net-zero pledges that lack concrete substantiation. While some companies have committed to procuring near-zero emission steel and aluminium, other critical transitions, such as reducing battery production emissions and improving electric vehicle efficiency, are largely neglected. The analysis highlights a significant gap between corporate pledges and the 1.5°C-compatible pathways required for the passenger transport sector.