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The report analyzes four decarbonization pathways for California's cement sector, all incorporating carbon capture and storage (CCS) to address process emissions. Pathways involving limestone calcined clay cement (LC3) and alternative fuels (woody biomass or engineered municipal solid waste) demonstrate the lowest lifetime carbon abatement costs, around $100 per metric ton of CO2. In contrast, full electrification combined with CCS is the most expensive at $479 per metric ton. While all pathways significantly reduce emissions relative to a baseline, the report highlights that energy costs are the primary driver of lifetime expenses. Qualitatively, the transition to these technologies is expected to provide net air quality benefits by reducing SO2 and particulate matter, although amine-based CCS may slightly increase VOC emissions.

The report analyzes four technology pathways for decarbonizing California's cement industry—CCS only, electrification with CCS, blended cement (LC3) with CCS, and blended cement with alternative fuels and CCS. It finds that while significant reductions are possible, reaching net-zero will require higher capture rates, grid decarbonization, and additional carbon removal. To bridge cost and regulatory gaps, the authors recommend establishing a State Revolving Loan Fund, implementing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and creating statewide Best Available Control Technology (BACT) guidelines for CCS projects.

The document argues that relying solely on voluntary corporate credits is insufficient for scaling CDR and proposes three diversified demand pathways: credit purchasing through government procurement and compliance markets, demand for differentiated low-carbon products enabled by carbon accounting and 'Buy Clean' policies, and 'flipping the script' by funding services where CDR is a co-product, such as wildfire prevention or waste management.

Carbon Market Watch proposes that the EU replace 'net' climate targets with three distinct targets for emissions reductions, land-based sequestration, and permanent carbon dioxide removals (CDR). The guide argues that current EU governance is inadequate, noting that the Carbon Removal and Carbon Farming (CRCF) Regulation lacks rigour and the Net-Zero Industry Act's goal of 50 Mt of geological CO2 storage does not specify the volume for permanent removals. To implement this, the author suggests integrating permanent removal targets into the Effort Sharing Regulation and strengthening the Governance Regulation to require credible feasibility and sustainability assessments by March 2027. Proposed target designs include a 'floor' for minimum delivery and a 'ceiling' to prevent over-reliance on CDR, with targets expressed in absolute volume (MtCO2) and as a percentage of 1990 gross emissions. Financing should be shared between the public sector and high-polluting companies through progressive taxation or direct removal obligations.

The briefing proposes a 'new carbon economy' to manage carbon as a valuable resource rather than just a waste product. It identifies five core activities—point source capture, carbon dioxide removal, utilization, storage, and transportation—and argues that a lack of coordination between these sectors is currently delaying infrastructure investment and risking the misallocation of resources. The author asserts that a broad coalition of experts and civil society is needed to define a strategic vision for this system to ensure it supports decarbonization without extending the life of fossil fuel power plants.

Austria aims for climate neutrality by 2040, relying on industrial carbon removals (up to 6.3 Mt CO2eq) and land sinks, yet lacks a legally binding national climate law. While the 2024 Carbon Management Strategy (CMS) provides a transparent roadmap, significant delivery risks exist regarding the technical feasibility and timing of CO2 transport and storage infrastructure. Furthermore, there is high uncertainty regarding the long-term performance of the LULUCF sector and a lack of safeguards to prevent BECCS deployment from degrading the natural land sink.

The document argues that while the European Commission's impact assessments are detailed, the resulting policies are opaque and rely on optimistic, potentially unfeasible projections for carbon dioxide removals (CDR). It identifies critical risks, including the overestimation of Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage (DACCS) capacity, the potential for Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) to undermine land sinks, and a lack of transparent financing roadmaps. The report further criticises the introduction of international carbon credits in final proposals without prior impact assessments, which may reduce domestic ambition.

Finland relies on Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), biochar, and land sinks to reach its 2035 carbon neutrality target, but faces significant delivery risks. The government has disregarded scientific advice from the Finnish Climate Change Panel to moderate logging levels to restore the declining land sink, which currently shows rising net emissions. While the government is pursuing BECCS, it lacks domestic geological storage and must rely on international transport and storage, which are constrained by limited capacity in Northern Europe. Furthermore, current financial allocations for BECCS are significantly lower than the estimated needs to achieve projected removal volumes.

The French government's strategy for climate neutrality relies on a combination of vulnerable land sinks and industrial carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies. While France has binding gross-emission-reduction targets, its land sink has declined by more than 20 Mt CO2eq over the last decade due to a forestry crisis. To compensate, the Draft Third National Low Carbon Strategy (SNBC3) increases reliance on industrial removals, including Direct Air Capture and Carbon Storage (DACCS) and Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS). However, the report finds that projections for these technologies are inconsistent and lack foundational assessments regarding energy demand, land-use impacts, and domestic CO2 storage capacity. Furthermore, France plans to increase wood harvesting to 60 million m3 by 2030, which may further erode the forest carbon sink.

The document examines Ireland's climate strategy, highlighting a systemic over-reliance on carbon dioxide removals (CDR) and afforestation to bridge gaps in emission reductions. It identifies significant delivery risks for industrial removals like BECCS, which may not be operational until the mid-2030s, and notes that afforestation targets are consistently missed. The report criticizes the lack of transparency regarding residual emissions and the potential for 'temperature neutrality' goals to lower overall climate ambition.

The report finds that Italy's long-term climate strategy prioritises carbon removals and capture technologies over structural emission reductions, creating a risk of mitigation deterrence. While Italy aims for carbon neutrality by 2050, it lacks national legislation to enforce this goal and relies on EU-level targets. The study highlights significant transparency gaps, noting that industrial carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies like BECCS and DACCS are often conflated with carbon capture and storage (CCS). Furthermore, the report warns that planned increases in forest harvesting to 40-45% by 2030 could shrink or eliminate the land sink, despite government goals to restore it to a historic maximum of 45 Mt CO2eq by 2050.

The report finds that European governments are increasingly integrating carbon dioxide removals (CDR) into their climate strategies, often as a substitute for deep emission reductions. Analysis of the European Commission and six countries reveals a pattern of 'overreliance,' characterized by fragmented planning, a lack of feasibility assessments for engineered removals, and land-sink projections that ignore climate risks or contradict existing forestry policies. The report warns that betting on uncertain future technologies and unstable land sinks risks delaying essential decarbonization and undermining climate targets.

The document argues that EU member states' National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) and Long-Term Strategies (LTS) lack transparency and rigorous assessment regarding the deployment of permanent carbon dioxide removals (CDR). Carbon Market Watch warns that relying on unproven CDR volumes risks deterring essential emissions reductions. To remedy this, the author proposes making Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) funding contingent on reporting quality, introducing dedicated CDR sections in planning templates, and legally defining 'overreliance' on CDR as 'insufficient ambition' within the Governance Regulation.

A technical assessment of 25 BiCRS protocols reveals that only 28% are satisfactory, with 72% scoring below satisfactory. The report identifies critical flaws in greenhouse gas accounting, particularly regarding system boundaries, biomass production emissions, and the treatment of uncertainty. It recommends adopting comprehensive system boundaries, standardizing the treatment of biomass baselines, and implementing robust measurement, monitoring, reporting, and verification (MMRV) to protect market and climate integrity.

Ember argues that large-scale biomass power is incompatible with UK carbon budgets due to high emissions and import reliance. It recommends capping generation at Drax and Lynemouth, shifting to domestic feedstock, and scaling up low-carbon alternatives like wind, solar, and batteries.

The report defines clean firm generation as dispatchable, low-emission electricity sources that do not rely on weather, including nuclear fission, fusion, geothermal, and carbon-capture-enabled fossil or bioenergy. It argues that integrating these technologies can significantly lower the total amount of wind, solar, and storage capacity needed, thereby reducing land use, critical mineral requirements, and overall system costs. The authors identify a 'missing middle' or 'valley of death' in financing for these capital-intensive projects and propose a multi-layered policy approach—combining RD&D, direct procurement, and technology-neutral targets—to achieve systemic bankability.

The EU's 2040 climate target aims for a 90% net reduction in emissions compared to 1990 levels. However, the author contends that this target is a dilution of ambition because it allows 5% of the reduction to be met through international carbon credits and relies on a 'net' framework rather than separate targets for emissions reductions and carbon removals. This design creates a risk of 'mitigation deterrence,' where the expectation of future carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies—such as BECCS and DACCS—justifies slower near-term decarbonization. Despite broad stakeholder support for separate targets, including from some business associations and CDR developers, the European Commission opted for a single net target to simplify governance and maintain industrial competitiveness. The document warns that integrating CDR into the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) could further allow large emitters to avoid direct cuts.

The report argues that the UK risks spending billions in public funds on unproven carbon removal technologies, such as power-BECCS and DACCS, which face significant delays and high costs. It highlights that a single project at Drax biomass power station could require £30 billion in subsidies, exceeding the entire national carbon capture and storage budget. The analysis notes that no commercial-scale project has yet begun construction or captured carbon, and warns that power-BECCS may not deliver genuine removals due to feedstock and supply chain emissions. The author recommends prioritising proven decarbonisation methods like renewables and heat pumps over these high-risk technologies.

In 2025, Europe transitioned toward commercial-scale CCS deployment, marked by the first fully operational value chain at Norway's Brevik cement plant. While ten projects reached final investment decisions (FID) between December 2024 and October 2025—adding approximately 4 Mt CO2/year of capture and 14 Mt CO2/year of storage capacity—deployment remains far below the trajectories needed for 2040 and 2050 climate targets. Progress is heavily reliant on blended finance and corporate carbon dioxide removal (CDR) offtake agreements, particularly with Microsoft. Geographically, CCS is expanding from Northern European hubs into Southern and Central & Eastern Europe, with new projects in Spain, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary. Policy advancements include the Net-Zero Industry Act's 2030 injection target and Germany's 2025 legislation classifying CO2 transport and storage as projects of overriding public interest.

The document identifies a significant divergence between climate and development policy in Africa, noting that NDCs focus on sectoral mitigation while NDPs prioritize economic growth and poverty alleviation. It warns that aggressive energy transitions to reach net-zero by 2050 could reduce cropland availability by 31%, potentially undermining the agricultural sector which employs 60% of the continent's workforce. Financially, the brief highlights a massive gap, with climate finance requirements for Africa projected at $2.7 trillion by 2030, nearly equaling the continental GDP.