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Private equity firms continue to finance LNG terminals despite increasing market volatility, geopolitical conflicts, and strong community opposition. The document highlights that these investments face risks from unstable long-term demand, project cancellations, and the incompatibility of LNG expansion with 1.5°C climate goals.

The author analyzes the shift from a period of 'climate cultural hegemony' following the 2015 Paris Agreement to a current phase of 'ecological backlash' driven by fossil capital and reactionary politics. To counter this, the text proposes a strategic shift where the energy transition is viewed not only as an ethical necessity but as a matter of national and continental sovereignty. Key recommendations include accelerating large-scale renewable projects, relocalizing the extraction of critical raw materials within Europe to reduce dependence on third countries like China, and diversifying strategic alliances through multilateralism.

The report posits that Asia is leading a 'Great Convergence' with the West by leveraging its position as the world's manufacturing hub to drive an electric energy transition. It highlights that Asia has driven three quarters of global electricity growth since 2000 and now produces the majority of the world's solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles. The document argues that while a lack of oil and gas was previously a weakness, it has become a strategic advantage in an era where energy is defined by technology rather than commodities. This transition is further accelerated by 'fossil shocks,' including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the 2022 energy crisis, which push the region toward energy security through electrotechnology.

The report warns that climate change is increasing the probability of simultaneous crop failures in major global breadbaskets, which could trigger food price spikes, social unrest, and geopolitical instability. Using France, Germany, and India as examples, it projects significant increases in crop failure risks by 2040 and highlights how extreme heat undermines both agricultural yields and the labor and infrastructure necessary for food security. For Europe, these failures could be exploited by Russia through hybrid warfare and disinformation, while destabilizing import-dependent NATO and EU partners. The authors recommend that NATO and the EU integrate food security into resilience frameworks, protect agricultural aid, coordinate trade responses to avoid export bans, and increase investment in climate-smart agricultural R&D.

The report argues that the expanded BRICS bloc is not a coherent actor but a collection of competing interests, where fossil-industrial interests often conflict with climate rhetoric. It categorizes members into five functional actor groups and proposes a five-axis 'Climate and Energy Compass' and a focus on climate finance reform to facilitate a just and sovereign energy transition.

The report examines the 'electrotech fast-track' for 74 Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) nations, arguing that rapid cost declines in solar, batteries, and electric end-use technologies allow these countries to bypass the 'fossil detour'. It highlights that 46% of CVF nations, by electricity demand, have already surpassed the US in solar penetration. The document details how solar is now less capital-intensive than fossil fuels and how decentralized solar-battery systems are becoming cheaper than grid extension for remote areas. It further argues that transitioning to electrotech reduces the $155 billion annual fossil fuel import drain and leverages CVF nations' strategic assets in critical minerals and manufacturing to gain geopolitical influence.

In 2025, African nations faced a fragmented global order characterized by US strategic retrenchment and intensifying competition over critical minerals. The year was marked by the first G20 summit on African soil in South Africa, which pushed for reforms in sovereign credit rating practices and international financial support. While some states like Nigeria and Kenya increased domestic resource mobilization to counter US aid cuts, others in the Horn of Africa became focal points for geopolitical rivalry involving Israel and Gulf Arab states. Additionally, the Lobito Corridor emerged as a key site for US and EU efforts to counter Chinese dominance in critical mineral supply chains, though this development is accompanied by governance risks in the DRC and Zambia.

In 2025, African states navigated a multipolar landscape marked by a transactional US approach under the second Trump administration, which led to aid cuts and a push for domestic resource mobilisation in countries like Nigeria and Kenya. The AU-EU partnership faced skepticism over the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), while South Africa's hosting of the G20 Summit resulted in the G20 Africa Engagement Framework and proposals to reform sovereign credit rating practices. Geopolitical competition intensified in the Horn of Africa, exacerbated by Israel's recognition of Somaliland, and along the Lobito Corridor, where the US and EU compete with China to secure critical mineral supply chains and midstream processing capacity.

The report argues that South Africa must elevate the Southern Ocean and Antarctica in its strategic planning, as the region is critical for global climate regulation, food security, and maritime safety. While South Africa is the only African state party to the Antarctic Treaty, its diplomatic engagement has been inconsistent. The document highlights rising risks from climate change, such as sea-level rise threatening African coasts, and geopolitical tensions, including Russia's seismic surveying and the blocking of Marine Protected Areas by China and Russia. It suggests South Africa leverage its non-claimant status and role as a logistical gateway to enhance its influence, while warning that its under-resourced navy may struggle with increasing search and rescue demands from growing Antarctic tourism and rerouted shipping traffic around the Cape of Good Hope.

Russia is attempting to leverage historical liberation-era ties and anti-Western rhetoric to maintain influence in Southern Africa, but faces significant constraints. While it maintains security cooperation and diplomatic links with several SADC members, its economic footprint remains modest, accounting for barely 1% of the region's external trade in 2024. The document highlights a gap between Moscow's symbolic gestures—such as debt forgiveness and limited grain shipments—and tangible developmental results, noting that sanctions and economic weakness hinder its ability to compete with China, the EU, and the US.

South Africa holds approximately 80% of global Platinum Group Metals (PGMs), which are essential catalysts for PEM electrolysers and fuel cells used in green hydrogen production. While this provides a strategic opportunity for re-industrialisation and decarbonisation, the transition faces severe constraints, including an outdated electricity grid, water scarcity in high-resource areas, and a significant skills gap. The shift also threatens the coal and internal combustion engine automotive sectors, risking large-scale job losses in regions like Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape. Geopolitically, South Africa must navigate competition between China and Western powers, particularly as the US has withdrawn support for the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP). The paper argues that for the transition to be 'just', the government must integrate mineral beneficiation with social safeguards, regional SADC integration, and comprehensive workforce reskilling.

The document analyzes the evolution of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in the UN Security Council, noting a shift from consensus-based norm expansion to a period of 'backlash' and 'pushback' since 2019. It identifies specific threats to norms regarding sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and women's civil society participation, often driven by actors like Russia, China, and the US (under the Trump administration). Despite these challenges, the authors highlight the role of elected members (E10) in maintaining progress through 'shared commitments' and the integration of WPS language into day-to-day Council decisions. The paper argues that while the Council's overall legitimacy is declining due to stalemates over conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, it remains a critical arena for defending women's rights against global authoritarian trends.

Following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions, Russia has pivoted its fossil fuel exports toward Asia. While this has partially offset revenue losses from the European market, the report argues that Russia remains locked in a hydrocarbon-centric model that is increasingly misaligned with the decarbonisation trajectories of its primary Asian customers. China and India have leveraged discounted Russian oil and coal to support economic growth while simultaneously diversifying their energy portfolios and expanding renewable capacity. Vietnam has seen modest growth in Russian coal and nascent LNG trade, balancing energy security with sustainability goals. The report highlights structural bottlenecks, such as limited rail capacity for coal and the risks of a 'shadow fleet' for oil, as significant constraints on Russia's long-term export viability.

The report analyzes Russia's strategic use of climate-related disinformation to advance geopolitical goals. It details how the Kremlin exploits climate disasters in the West to stoke polarization, suppresses domestic environmental activism to prevent unrest, and manipulates narratives in the Arctic and Africa to secure economic and political influence. The document highlights the intersection of Russian influence with far-right rhetoric and the emerging threat of AI-driven disinformation, while arguing that subnational and international cooperation is essential to counter these efforts as US federal defenses weaken.

The document argues that CPEC's first decade has failed to deliver broad-based development or stability in Pakistan, as state-led growth has not reduced conflict or poverty. It highlights how domestic political fragmentation, weak governance, and security threats—including attacks on Chinese personnel—have hindered progress. The brief notes a shift in Chinese strategy from government-to-government loans to business-to-business collaboration and warns that Pakistan's strategic balancing between China and the US complicates alignment. It concludes that the top-down, centralized approach has led to uneven benefits, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and recommends more inclusive, transparent, and community-based development strategies for the next phase.

The report analyzes the competition between China and Western powers (US and EU) for Africa's critical minerals, specifically focusing on the Lobito and TAZARA corridors. It argues that African nations can avoid 'extractivism' by coordinating regional processing hubs and leveraging the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to build a domestic e-mobility value chain.

Russia is attempting to form a non-Western climate coalition through BRICS, the SCO, and the EAEU to define 'sovereign' climate priorities that protect its fossil fuel exports. The document argues that Russia's approach is obstructionist, relying on the recalculation of forest carbon sinks to meet neutrality goals on paper rather than implementing genuine mitigation. While Russia pushes for shared carbon markets and 'technological neutrality' to prolong fossil fuel use, its Asian partners have largely rejected deep regulatory harmonisation. Meanwhile, Russian non-fossil fuel exporters maintain independent ESG agendas to remain competitive against foreign carbon border adjustments, despite the government's lack of a domestic carbon price.

The paper examines how the geopolitical contest between the US and China over critical minerals creates a strategic window for African countries to diversify investors and build domestic green value chains.

The Lobito Corridor is positioned as a transformative route for critical raw materials (CRMs) from the Copperbelt of the DRC and Zambia to the port of Lobito in Angola, aimed at supporting the global green energy transition. While it promises significant reductions in transport time and costs, and has attracted up to USD 6 billion in funding from the US, EU, and other institutions, the project faces substantial risks. These include geopolitical competition with China, which dominates regional mining and infrastructure, and concerns over 'modern plundering' where raw materials are exported without local value addition. Furthermore, the project faces sustainability challenges regarding human rights in cobalt mines, land tenure disputes, and the regulation of artisanal and small-scale mining. The re-election of Donald Trump is identified as a major risk factor that could lead to the freezing of US federal and USAID funding, potentially shifting the project's control toward Chinese interests.

The East African Community (EAC) has expanded its membership to include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia, aiming to increase its geopolitical influence and market size. However, this growth strains the bloc's institutional capacity, particularly regarding financial sustainability, bureaucratic efficiency, and the harmonisation of economic policies among fragile states. The inclusion of conflict-prone members introduces significant security risks, though it also provides opportunities for collective regional stability and trade integration through frameworks like the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement.