The Bear Down South: Russia’s Relations with Southern Africa

Russia is attempting to leverage historical liberation-era ties and anti-Western rhetoric to maintain influence in Southern Africa, but faces significant constraints. While it maintains security cooperation and diplomatic links with several SADC members, its economic footprint remains modest, accounting for barely 1% of the region's external trade in 2024. The document highlights a gap between Moscow's symbolic gestures—such as debt forgiveness and limited grain shipments—and tangible developmental results, noting that sanctions and economic weakness hinder its ability to compete with China, the EU, and the US.

• Russia's influence in Southern Africa is primarily based on symbolism and historical rhetoric rather than tangible benefits, facing three main obstacles: over-reliance on symbolism, economic weakness exacerbated by sanctions, and negative perceptions among civil society regarding the war in Ukraine.
• Diplomatic engagement since 2022 has focused on countering international isolation, with South Africa serving as the pivotal state. While Russia will have embassies in 13 of 16 SADC member states upon opening a new embassy in Comoros, high-level visits often serve as 'political signaling exercises' with few tangible agreements.
• Voting patterns at the UN General Assembly regarding Ukraine reveal mixed influence: most SADC countries abstained, while Zimbabwe occasionally supported Russia. Conversely, Comoros and Seychelles voted against Russia in every resolution, and Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Mauritius, and Zambia showed pro-Western alignment.
• Russia's economic presence is minimal compared to other global powers; in 2024, it represented barely 1% of Southern Africa's external trade, while China and the EU accounted for over 22% and 15% respectively. Trade is characterized by imbalances, with imports from Russia often far exceeding exports.
• Sanctions, specifically the exclusion from the SWIFT system, have hampered Russia's ability to fund major projects, exemplified by Gazprombank's failure to deliver planned funding for the Mossel Bay gas refinery in South Africa in 2025.
• Security cooperation is a relative strength for Russia, though its share of arms imports to Africa fell from 26% (2018-2022) to 17% (2019-2023). Angola, previously a major client, shifted toward US and NATO procurement in late 2022.
• Russia uses education and media as soft power tools, allocating 4,816 scholarships for African students for the 2025-2026 academic year. However, SADC member states are underrepresented, providing only about 10% of the 35,000 total African students in Russia in 2022-2023.

APA

South African Institute of International Affairs (2026). The Bear Down South: Russia’s Relations with Southern Africa. https://saiia.org.za/research/the-bear-down-south-russias-relations-with-southern-africa/

Chicago

South African Institute of International Affairs. The Bear Down South: Russia’s Relations with Southern Africa. 2026. https://saiia.org.za/research/the-bear-down-south-russias-relations-with-southern-africa/.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=The Bear Down South: Russia’s Relations with Southern Africa |date=26 February 2026 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/the-bear-down-south-russias-relations-with-southern-africa/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2026bear, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{The Bear Down South: Russia’s Relations with Southern Africa}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2026}, month = feb, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/the-bear-down-south-russias-relations-with-southern-africa/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }