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The report argues that the IMF's 'climate turn' is contradictory, as its conventional lending programmes (Upper Credit Tranche) often prioritize fiscal consolidation and extractive industries, undermining the climate goals of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF). Through case studies in Ecuador, Egypt, the DRC, Tanzania, and Pakistan, the document demonstrates how IMF-mandated expenditure compression and reliance on fossil fuel exports create structural climate vulnerabilities. Key findings indicate that while the IMF has improved its climate analysis, this does not translate into programme design, which continues to favor private investment and cost recovery over the public investment needed for a just transition.

Between FY23 and FY25, Pakistan experienced a rapid surge in distributed solar deployment, reaching an estimated 38 GW by June 2025. This transition has driven a 21% increase in national electricity demand, which was met entirely by solar generation as grid generation slightly declined. Distributed solar has significantly increased Pakistan's electrification rate to 21.7%, nearly matching the global average of 22.0%. The report highlights sector-specific impacts: in agriculture, solar tubewells have largely displaced diesel pumps; in industry, solar has filled the gap left by declining captive gas and coal use; and in the residential sector, it has unlocked suppressed demand for cooling appliances. Economically, the shift has avoided over $12 billion USD in fossil fuel imports by February 2026 and provided a cheaper alternative to grid and diesel power.

An analysis of 14 major economies outside the traditional UNFCCC contributors reveals that they provided approximately $102 billion in voluntary climate finance from 2013 to 2023. The study highlights a shift toward a multipolar finance reality, where emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) are increasingly active, though their contributions remain fragmented in official reporting. The report emphasizes the need for inclusive reporting frameworks and the scaling of triangular partnerships and de-risking mechanisms to mobilize further private capital to meet global climate goals.

Japan has become a major global LNG trader, significantly increasing its resales of US-sourced LNG to Asian markets between 2021 and 2025. This trade pattern, supported by Japanese government initiatives and financing, contributes to substantial lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions. The analysis shows that 16.5 billion kg of US LNG resold by Japan to Asia released 63.5 billion kg of CO2, with methane leaks and combustion being the primary drivers. The document argues that promoting LNG infrastructure in Asia risks locking in fossil fuel dependence and exacerbating climate-induced disasters in a region already vulnerable to extreme weather.

The report posits that Asia is leading a 'Great Convergence' with the West by leveraging its position as the world's manufacturing hub to drive an electric energy transition. It highlights that Asia has driven three quarters of global electricity growth since 2000 and now produces the majority of the world's solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles. The document argues that while a lack of oil and gas was previously a weakness, it has become a strategic advantage in an era where energy is defined by technology rather than commodities. This transition is further accelerated by 'fossil shocks,' including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the 2022 energy crisis, which push the region toward energy security through electrotechnology.

As of March 31, 2026, the GCF has total pledged amounts of USD 30.0 billion, with USD 24.0 billion in committed funding. The Fund's accredited entity network has grown to 168 entities, with a strong emphasis on Direct Access Entities (DAEs). The portfolio shows a shift toward adaptation, which now represents 59% of funding in grant equivalent terms. The GCF is managing a pipeline of 139 concept notes and 51 funding proposals. However, several projects face implementation challenges, including the Mali solar rural electrification project, which is awaiting formal termination following the government's decision to cancel co-financing.

The IEU report for February to May 2026 outlines the progress of several independent evaluations, including those on gender, the Project Preparation Facility, and the private sector. It highlights the ongoing Third Performance Review (TPR) and the LORTA impact evaluation programme, which supports 23 evaluations. The Unit also reports on its strategic engagement with other multilateral climate funds, the use of AI in evaluation synthesis, and its budget expenditure, which stood at 19% (USD 1.5 million) of the annual budget as of 30 April 2026.

The report identifies several disruptive factors that could alter global trajectories, including the potential implosion of major powers like the US or China, the risks of generative AI, and the accelerating biosphere crisis. It highlights Africa's extreme vulnerability to climate change and warns that AI may exacerbate economic inequality and state surveillance. The text also notes a growing divide between the West and the Global South, driven by perceived self-centeredness during the COVID-19 pandemic and differing geopolitical responses to conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza.

Rooftop solar capacity in the Philippines has likely doubled between April 2025 and April 2026, reaching approximately 1,300 MW. This growth is driven by surging electricity prices, which have reduced payback periods for residential, commercial, and industrial users to between 2.3 and 3.1 years. The report highlights a massive influx of solar panel imports from China and the emergence of domestic manufacturing. To further scale rooftop solar to a target of 3,500 MW with 4,500 MWh of battery storage within 24 months, the author recommends expanding low-interest loan schemes, legalising 'plug-and-play' solar kits under 800 watts, and implementing a distributed grid-battery project.

The document outlines the lethal nature of extreme heat, noting that over 540,000 people die annually worldwide, with 13,000 estimated annual deaths in 17 Latin American countries. It highlights that heat exacerbates cardiovascular, respiratory, and mental health issues, disproportionately affecting vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, and outdoor workers. The text links the increasing intensity and frequency of heatwaves to the burning of fossil fuels and notes that 71% of the global workforce is exposed to excessive heat. It suggests reporting on solutions like public cooling centers, urban greenery, and labor protections rather than using leisure-related imagery.

The Asia-Pacific region is experiencing rapid renewable energy growth and rising electricity demand, which increases grid variability. Simultaneously, escalating climate extremes—such as heatwaves, droughts, and floods—create operational disruptions. The report argues that traditional reactive repairs and infrastructure hardening are insufficient, advocating for 'systemic adaptation' that accounts for cross-sector interdependencies. AI is presented as a critical tool to scale this adaptation by fusing fragmented datasets, orchestrating siloed analytical models, and augmenting decision-making under complexity.

The study finds that anthropogenic climate change approximately tripled the probability of the April 2026 heatwave in northwestern India and Pakistan, making it about 1°C hotter than it would have been in a preindustrial climate. Analysis indicates that extreme heat is occurring earlier in the season, with the likelihood and intensity of April events increasing more rapidly than those in May. This trend extends the period of dangerous heat exposure for hundreds of millions of people, compounding risks to health, agriculture, and the economy. The report also highlights systemic vulnerabilities, noting that heatwaves are not officially declared disasters in India and Pakistan, which limits access to relief funding.

The report argues that the Article 6.4 Sustainable Development (SD) Tool is primarily procedural and fails to protect Indigenous Peoples and local communities due to an overreliance on national laws, narrow definitions of Indigenous status, and a restrictive approach to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). Geospatial analysis reveals that hundreds of projects in the Article 6 pipeline—including both new notifications and transitioning Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects—overlap with or are in close proximity to Indigenous and community lands, particularly in Asia. Documented cases in India, Kenya, Colombia, and Brazil demonstrate that these gaps have already led to involuntary resettlement, inadequate compensation, and long-term land conflicts.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as coal plants increasingly serve as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record-high new capacity is being offset by the rapid expansion of wind and solar energy. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, significant expansion continues in China and India, which together account for 95% of global coal capacity under construction. In the US and EU, energy security concerns and government interventions have delayed planned retirements of coal units.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting new demand despite record coal plant commissioning. Globally, the number of countries proposing new coal plants dropped to 32. In Indonesia, coal expansion continues through 'captive' plants for nickel and aluminium industries, reaching 20 GW, while national energy plans (RUKN and RUPTL) are criticized for maintaining fossil fuel dependency and lacking a clear phase-out roadmap despite official net-zero commitments.

In 2025, global coal power capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants act as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This gap is most prominent in China and India, where record-high completions coexist with falling generation due to rapid wind and solar expansion. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, and Latin America reached a state of no new proposals, some regions like the US and EU delayed planned closures due to energy security and political intervention. South Korea has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out, contrasting with Japan's more gradual approach focused on ammonia co-firing and efficiency improvements.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as new plants in China and India are increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Latin America and the Caribbean achieved a status of 'No New Coal Plants' in 2025, though several countries, including Brazil and Chile, experienced setbacks in their decommissioning schedules.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants are increasingly used as backup reserves rather than primary energy sources. This divergence is most acute in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling generation due to the rise of wind and solar power. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects declined from 38 to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Regionally, Latin America reported no new projects, while Russia and Kazakhstan continue to integrate coal into their long-term energy security strategies despite international financing constraints and sanctions.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while coal-generated electricity decreased by 0.6%, reflecting a shift where coal serves as backup capacity rather than a primary source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling production due to the rise of renewables. While the number of countries planning new coal projects fell to 32 in 2025, some nations like the US and EU delayed plant closures for energy security. In Turkey, planned coal capacity has plummeted from 57.5 GW in 2015 to 0.7 GW by 2025, though tensions remain between social demand for transition and government policies such as guaranteed purchase mechanisms for coal plants through 2030.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, driven largely by record additions in China and India. These countries are building coal plants for system reliability and energy security, even as renewables displace coal's role in meeting demand. The report notes a geographic narrowing of coal expansion, with only 32 countries proposing or building new plants, and highlights the specific challenges facing Ukraine's energy recovery following Russian attacks on its infrastructure.