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The report examines the challenges and opportunities for African energy exporters facing the EU Methane Regulation, which imposes extraterritorial monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) standards on imports. While Africa accounts for nearly 13% of global methane emissions, the continent faces significant financing gaps and technical barriers to compliance. The authors argue that while the regulation threatens export revenues, it provides a strategic opportunity to adopt low-cost abatement technologies. Key recommendations include mobilising innovative financing like transition bonds, establishing local independent verification capacity, and harmonising MRV standards to maintain market access to the EU.

The document examines the convergence of trade and climate policies, highlighting how unilateral trade measures and green industrial policies in advanced economies create systemic barriers for developing nations. It identifies critical gaps in policy, governance, and knowledge, and proposes a framework for multilateral dialogues under the UNFCCC to ensure a just transition.

The July 2025 ICJ Advisory Opinion affirms that states have a legal obligation to prevent significant environmental damage and provide financial support to developing countries, a duty embedded in customary international law. The brief argues that this ruling provides a legal foundation for reparative justice—including restitution and compensation—and reinforces the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). It highlights that while the Baku to Belém (B2B) Roadmap aims for US$1.3 trillion annually by 2035, it currently lacks binding targets and transparency. The document urges that COP30 use the ruling to ensure developed countries lead in delivering at least US$300 billion per year by 2035, primarily through grants and concessional resources, to support ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the Global Goal on Adaptation.

The report analyzes the competition between China and Western powers (US and EU) for Africa's critical minerals, specifically focusing on the Lobito and TAZARA corridors. It argues that African nations can avoid 'extractivism' by coordinating regional processing hubs and leveraging the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to build a domestic e-mobility value chain.

The document evaluates the first decade of the Paris Agreement, arguing that climate finance delivery has been characterized by "incremental promises, contentious negotiations, evolving priorities and an erosion of trust amongst Parties." It highlights a significant investment deficit in Africa, where the region receives only 3% of global climate finance flows despite its high vulnerability. The brief critiques the delayed and contested achievement of the US$100 billion annual goal, the underfunding of adaptation and loss and damage, and the over-reliance on debt-creating loans over grants. It calls for a shift toward public-led, concessional finance and systemic reforms to the global financial architecture to ensure equity and transparency ahead of COP30.

The report examines four EU climate regulations—the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), the EU ETS for Shipping, and Methane Regulations—and their disproportionate effects on African economies. It highlights risks such as GDP reduction, loss of export revenue, and increased maritime costs, while calling for financial support, technical capacity building, and a shift toward global rather than unilateral regulatory frameworks.

The report argues that allowing African exporters to use Article 6 carbon credits to reduce their EU CBAM liabilities would address equity concerns, retain climate finance within Africa, and provide policy flexibility. It notes that current CBAM regulations only permit deductions for explicit carbon prices (taxes or ETS), making Article 6 credits ineligible. The document highlights the significant economic risks CBAM poses to African GDP and the specific challenges African nations face in implementing traditional carbon pricing due to their emissions profiles and administrative constraints. It concludes with recommendations for the EU to amend its regulations to include high-integrity international credits, specifically those from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Africa, to align with the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC).

The document argues that traditional nationalistic industrial models must shift toward collaborative frameworks to avoid excluding developing nations from green value chains. It suggests strategies such as disaggregating energy-intensive production to regions with abundant renewables, moving from 'technology transfer' to 'sharing of know-how', and utilizing industrial clusters to reduce costs and aggregate demand. The paper emphasizes the role of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in providing concessional capital and the potential for 'climate-smart' public-private partnerships, including philanthropic funding, to bridge financial gaps. It highlights the importance of regional trade frameworks and the need to recycle revenues from carbon border measures back into developing economies to catalyze green industrialisation.

The document examines the differing motivations for green industrialisation between African nations, which prioritise economic diversification and job creation, and high-income countries, which focus on decarbonisation and geopolitical competitiveness. It highlights the financial gap facing developing countries, noting that adaptation finance needs are projected to reach USD 215-387 billion annually until 2030. The author argues that while developed nations use industrial policies to secure critical raw materials and maintain a competitive edge, Africa seeks to transition from raw material exports to value addition. To bridge these gaps, the paper recommends that the G20 facilitate affordable green technology transfer, coordinate non-debt-creating climate finance, and support the establishment of mineral value chains close to their source in Africa.

The document analyzes proposed EU amendments to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) intended to simplify compliance for EU importers. While the briefing notes that changes to the scope and payment timing may have minimal material impact on African exporters, it warns that modifications to 'default values' for embedded emissions and carbon pricing could negatively affect exporters. Specifically, the shift toward global averages for the most carbon-intensive countries rather than EU-specific benchmarks may increase costs for African producers lacking reliable data. The report concludes that the amendments primarily benefit EU importers and may penalize African exporters who lack the administrative capacity to provide actual installation data.

The report examines the potential effects of International Maritime Organization (IMO) candidate mid-term GHG measures on African economies. Using a CGE model, it finds that a USD100/t carbon levy would generally reduce GDP and household incomes across Africa, increase global food prices, and reduce the supply of maritime services. A case study of Ghana highlights existing freight cost imbalances and the risk of a stranded fleet of older vessels. The authors argue that for such measures to be equitable, revenues must be redistributed as direct grants (not loans) for out-of-sector climate resilience and mitigation, based on criteria including climate vulnerability and historical emissions contributions.

The author contends that EU climate policies, including CBAM, EUDR, and maritime regulations, are unilaterally imposed and threaten African economic development. The text highlights risks such as an $11 billion annual loss for exporters under EUDR and a potential 0.91% reduction in Africa's GDP due to CBAM. It further criticizes the EU-ETS and FuelEU Maritime for increasing freight costs for African consumers and extracting USD 3–5 billion annually without reinvesting in African sustainability. The document recommends that the EU redirect revenues from CBAM and the Innovation Fund to support Africa's green transition and align maritime measures with the IMO's Net-Zero Framework.

The author argues that the FfD4 outcome document, the 'Compromiso de Sevilla', prioritises consensus over transformation and fails to provide the necessary commitments to support developing countries. Key criticisms include the weakening of trade facilitation commitments, the lack of a review mechanism for special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions, and insufficient action against unilateral trade-distorting measures like the Carbon Border Adjustment mechanism (CBAM). The text further highlights a lack of meaningful obligations for value addition in critical minerals and commodities, as well as a failure to address systemic challenges regarding technological monopolies and the need for co-development agreements to support climate-resilient development.

The report finds that while there is some progress in governance—such as the African Union's permanent seat in the G20 and a third chair for Africa on the IMF Executive Board—most substantive financial reforms are lagging. It highlights a critical gap in climate finance, noting that Africa receives only 20% of global adaptation flows despite needing US$277 billion annually. The document argues that the current GFA is 'ill-equipped' to handle Africa's debt crises and high borrowing costs, with the cost of capital in Africa being 5% or higher than in other regions. Key areas of 'no progress' include the overhaul of the G20 Common Framework for debt treatment and the reform of the IMF quota system. The report recommends prioritizing the reduction of borrowing costs, enhancing transparency in 'new and additional' climate finance, and establishing an African Credit Rating Agency to counter subjective international assessments.

The document examines the disproportionate distribution of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) under the IMF quota system, noting that Africa received only 5% of the 2021 allocation. It proposes that G20 countries reallocate a minimum of USD 50 billion to African Financial Institutions (AFIs), specifically highlighting the African Development Bank's (AfDB) Hybrid Capital Instrument (HCI) as a risk-free mechanism to leverage funds for climate adaptation, mitigation, and food security. The paper also recommends expanding the list of African prescribed holders of SDRs to include institutions like Afrexim Bank and the Trade Development Bank to increase financing options.