RUSSIA’S NON-WESTERN CLIMATE COALITION GENUINE CONSENSUS OR JUST HOT AIR?

Russia is attempting to form a non-Western climate coalition through BRICS, the SCO, and the EAEU to define 'sovereign' climate priorities that protect its fossil fuel exports. The document argues that Russia's approach is obstructionist, relying on the recalculation of forest carbon sinks to meet neutrality goals on paper rather than implementing genuine mitigation. While Russia pushes for shared carbon markets and 'technological neutrality' to prolong fossil fuel use, its Asian partners have largely rejected deep regulatory harmonisation. Meanwhile, Russian non-fossil fuel exporters maintain independent ESG agendas to remain competitive against foreign carbon border adjustments, despite the government's lack of a domestic carbon price.

• Russia seeks to establish a non-Western climate coalition via BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to define 'sovereign' climate priorities and protect its fossil fuel-export-based economy from the global low-carbon trend.
• Russia intends to achieve its 2060 carbon neutrality goal primarily through the recalculation of forest carbon absorption rather than genuine emission reductions, with 2020 figures more than doubling to meet 2050 targets on paper.
• The Russian government promotes 'technological neutrality' to justify the continued use of fossil fuels as legitimate climate measures and to prevent 'discrimination' against its energy sectors.
• Russia's efforts to create shared carbon markets and harmonise climate regulations have been largely unsuccessful, as Asian partners prefer sharing experiences over adopting Russia's opaque regulatory systems.
• Russian climate projects suffer from a lack of 'additionality' and transparency, making them unlikely to comply with Paris Agreement requirements or be recognised by foreign regulatory systems.
• The Sakhalin regional ETS pilot, launched in September 2022, relies heavily on carbon sinks (90% of results) and has a limited impact on total emission reductions, contributing only 1.2% of reductions against the 2021 baseline.
• Non-fossil fuel exporting companies in Russia continue to implement independent ESG and climate agendas to maintain competitiveness and prepare for carbon border adjustments like the EU's CBAM.
• The Russian government's obstructionist approach and the absence of a domestic carbon price harm the competitiveness of its own non-fossil fuel export industries.

APA

Korppoo, A., & Alisson, A. (2025). RUSSIA’S NON-WESTERN CLIMATE COALITION GENUINE CONSENSUS OR JUST HOT AIR? Climate Strategies. https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/RUSSIAS-NON-WESTERN-CLIMATE-COALITION-Genuine-Consensus-or-Just-Hot-Air-1.pdf

Chicago

Korppoo, Anna, and Alex Alisson. RUSSIA’S NON-WESTERN CLIMATE COALITION GENUINE CONSENSUS OR JUST HOT AIR? Climate Strategies, 2025. https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/RUSSIAS-NON-WESTERN-CLIMATE-COALITION-Genuine-Consensus-or-Just-Hot-Air-1.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Korppoo |first1=Anna |last2=Alisson |first2=Alex |title=RUSSIA’S NON-WESTERN CLIMATE COALITION GENUINE CONSENSUS OR JUST HOT AIR? |publisher=Climate Strategies |date=August 2025 |url=https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/RUSSIAS-NON-WESTERN-CLIMATE-COALITION-Genuine-Consensus-or-Just-Hot-Air-1.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{korppoo2025russias, author = {Korppoo, Anna and Alisson, Alex}, title = {{RUSSIA’S NON-WESTERN CLIMATE COALITION GENUINE CONSENSUS OR JUST HOT AIR?}}, institution = {Climate Strategies}, year = {2025}, month = aug, url = {https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/RUSSIAS-NON-WESTERN-CLIMATE-COALITION-Genuine-Consensus-or-Just-Hot-Air-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }