The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China’s ‘developmental peace’ in Pakistan

The document argues that CPEC's first decade has failed to deliver broad-based development or stability in Pakistan, as state-led growth has not reduced conflict or poverty. It highlights how domestic political fragmentation, weak governance, and security threats—including attacks on Chinese personnel—have hindered progress. The brief notes a shift in Chinese strategy from government-to-government loans to business-to-business collaboration and warns that Pakistan's strategic balancing between China and the US complicates alignment. It concludes that the top-down, centralized approach has led to uneven benefits, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and recommends more inclusive, transparent, and community-based development strategies for the next phase.

• The 'developmental peace' approach, which links state-led growth to stability, has not resulted in broad-based development or a reduction in conflict within Pakistan during CPEC's first decade.
• CPEC Phase 1 succeeded in increasing electrification and expanding road networks, but failed to achieve large-scale industrialization or job creation due to poor planning, management capacity, and a weak economy.
• China is reducing its willingness to provide new development loans, shifting its strategy for CPEC Phase 2 from government-to-government financing to a business-to-business approach.
• Internal security issues and militant resistance, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, have delayed projects and targeted Chinese workers; 13 such attacks have been documented since 2017.
• The Gwadar port serves as a primary example of conflicting narratives: while the Pakistani government views it as a strategic achievement, local populations see it as an economic disaster that has failed to provide jobs or social benefits.
• Pakistan's geopolitical strategy involves a delicate balance of maintaining 'iron brother' ties with China for military support while simultaneously seeking stronger trade and security ties with the United States, including agreements on rare earth minerals.
• The centralized, top-down governance of CPEC has led to an uneven distribution of benefits, suggesting that the 'project by project model' is a primary cause of failure rather than the overall concept of developmental peace.

APA

Borchgrevink, K., & Strand, A. (2025). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China’s ‘developmental peace’ in Pakistan. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/46623e20-79b6-4660-ac2d-d348e3ce9b2f/PRIO Policy Brief 12 - 2025.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Borchgrevink, Kaja, and Arne Strand. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China’s ‘developmental peace’ in Pakistan. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2025. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/46623e20-79b6-4660-ac2d-d348e3ce9b2f/PRIO Policy Brief 12 - 2025.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

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BibTeX

@techreport{borchgrevink2025chinapakistan, author = {Borchgrevink, Kaja and Strand, Arne}, title = {{The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China’s ‘developmental peace’ in Pakistan}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2025}, month = dec, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/46623e20-79b6-4660-ac2d-d348e3ce9b2f/PRIO Policy Brief 12 - 2025.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }