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The report identifies four technical pillars for industrial decarbonization in East Asia: energy and material efficiency, electrification with renewable energy, CCUS, and green hydrogen/clean feedstocks. It highlights significant barriers, including high fossil fuel dependence, insufficient clean power infrastructure, a lack of fit-for-purpose finance, and a skills gap in the workforce. The document proposes a comprehensive policy package focusing on industry-power co-optimization, cluster-based financing, and vocational training to achieve net-zero targets by 2050 or 2060.

The report provides a comprehensive roadmap for industrial decarbonization in East Asia, focusing on China, Indonesia, and Viet Nam. It proposes a six-tier technical strategy ranging from energy efficiency to green hydrogen and clean feedstocks. The analysis highlights that while efficiency and 'easy electrification' are cost-effective, deeper decarbonization requires massive investments—USD 1.7 trillion cumulatively through 2050 for industry alone across the three nations—and a fully decarbonized power grid. It recommends a policy package centered on carbon pricing, renewable energy procurement, and workforce reskilling to overcome high upfront costs and technical barriers.

The report tracks G20 climate commitments from 2008 to 2024, noting a shift from general statements to specific goals like phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies and implementing the Paris Agreement. It highlights the disruptive impact of US withdrawals from the Paris Agreement under the Trump administration and the challenges of institutional memory within the G20. For its 2025 presidency, South Africa focuses on 'solidarity, equality and sustainability', with specific priorities for Africa-focused energy access, climate-resilient agriculture, and scaling adaptation finance.

The report details the G20's shifting focus on food security from 2020 to 2025, highlighting key declarations and initiatives from various presidencies. It compares G20 efforts with G7 initiatives and other global actors like the FAO and WFP, while outlining South Africa's specific priorities for its 2024-2025 G20 presidency, including inclusive market participation and climate resilience.

The Production Gap Report 2025 finds that governments are planning more fossil fuel production than in 2023, with projected 2030 levels exceeding 1.5°C-consistent pathways by over 120%. While some countries are advancing clean energy transitions, 17 of 20 profiled major producers still plan to increase the production of at least one fossil fuel by 2030, undermining global climate commitments.

The appendix outlines the technical process for estimating the 'government plans and projections' (GPP) pathway using data from 19 major producer countries, which accounted for approximately 81% of global fossil fuel production in 2022. It describes the harmonization of diverse national data into exajoules (EJ) per year and the use of IEA's Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) to scale these figures to a global estimate. The document also explains the conversion of energy units into physical units and extraction-based greenhouse gas emissions using specific emission factors for coal, oil, and gas.

The report finds that human-induced climate change significantly increased the frequency and intensity of extreme heat globally from May 2024 to May 2025, affecting billions of people and making all 67 identified significant heat events more likely. It highlights the disproportionate impact on vulnerable populations and the systemic failure to accurately document heat-related mortality, while advocating for a combination of urban heat action plans and aggressive fossil fuel mitigation.

Carbon Market Watch condemns FIFA's hosting decisions for the 2030 and 2034 World Cups, asserting that the events will cause severe environmental damage. The organization highlights the failure of the 2022 Qatar World Cup's carbon neutrality claims and warns that the 2030 tournament's multi-continental structure and Saudi Arabia's 2034 bid—which includes building 11 new stadiums—will lead to massive emissions from construction and air travel. The statement also links these decisions to the influence of polluting corporate sponsors like Aramco and raises concerns over migrant worker deaths in host nations.

The document examines China's role as the dominant economy in the expanded BRICS bloc, arguing that China views the group as a tool to counter Western hegemony and advance its own geopolitical goals, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. While the bloc has achieved significant milestones through the New Development Bank and advocacy for climate justice, the paper highlights severe internal tensions—particularly between China and India—and regional rivalries among new members like Iran and Saudi Arabia that may hinder the bloc's cohesion.

The document examines the potential for rechannelling Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) from wealthy IMF member states to Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), specifically the African Development Bank (AfDB), to address Africa's annual financing gap of over $400 billion. It details a proposal where SDRs would serve as hybrid capital, allowing the AfDB to leverage funds up to four times on capital markets. The brief identifies significant political and legal barriers, including the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary financing prohibition and the lack of formal commitment from major holders like China, Japan, and the US. It recommends that South Africa's G20 presidency use diplomacy to seek ECB clarification, coordinate a Liquidity Support Agreement (LSA) with bilateral partners, and explore innovative fiscal tools such as SDR bonds or direct allocations to prescribed holders.

The document analyzes the factors driving the high demand for BRICS membership, introducing the concept of 'magnetic pull'—where ideas about development and systemic reform act as coalition magnets. It traces the group's expansion from South Africa's entry in 2010 to the 2023 enlargement (adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE) and the 2024 introduction of a 'Partner Country' category. While the group's appeal is rooted in South-South cooperation and de-dollarization, the author notes challenges to internal cohesion and the limits of its attraction, as seen in Argentina's rejection of membership.

The research paper examines the gap between constitutional human rights declarations and actual implementation within BRICS nations. It argues that the organisation, now expanded to include several non-democratic states, may function as a shield for autocratic regimes to avoid Western-led human rights sanctions while pursuing economic and geopolitical influence. The author highlights systemic violations across member states, including democratic backsliding in Brazil and India, war crimes in Russia, state-sponsored forced labour in China, and systemic corruption and xenophobia in South Africa, concluding that BRICS members often instrumentalise human rights rhetoric to assert regional dominance.

The document argues that the regionalization of the conflict in Yemen has created a fragmented mediation landscape where the United Nations' influence has diminished. Saudi Arabia's simultaneous roles as a conflict party and mediator have constrained the space for other actors and led to agreements that address immediate threats rather than underlying intra-Yemeni grievances. The author identifies a 'two-part dilemma' for mediators: deciding which actors to engage (regional rivals versus domestic parties) and determining whether to seek a narrow ceasefire or a comprehensive political solution. Ultimately, the paper concludes that military regionalization has impeded conflict ripeness, excluded non-armed civil society groups, and resulted in fragmented outcomes that fail to address the nature of the Yemeni state.

The document examines the transition of energy-intensive heavy industries toward net-zero emissions, highlighting how global trade dynamics and national policies in developed economies impact emerging markets. It identifies four primary technological levers for decarbonization: energy efficiency, alternative fuel use/electrification, material efficiency, and carbon capture and storage. The author argues that while developing countries with abundant renewables can become new green industrial hubs, they face significant risks from carbon border measures, green protectionism, and reduced access to secondary materials. The briefing emphasizes the need for international coordination on standards, technology transfer, and finance to ensure a just transition for emerging and developing economies.

Global Energy Monitor (GEM) identifies that five major oil and gas plant owners failed to disclose 10.7 million tonnes of CO2 emissions in 2022, resulting in an annual social cost of $2 billion. The report highlights how companies use the 'operational control' and 'financial control' approaches of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol to exclude assets from their reporting boundaries. Specifically, the Saudi Electricity Company failed to disclose over 7 million tonnes of CO2 from three plants, representing $1.3 billion in annual climate costs. Other analyzed entities, including Egyptian Electricity Holding Company, Calpine Corporation, Chubu Electric Power Co. Inc., and Entergy Corporation, also exhibited gaps between their reported emissions and their actual asset ownership.

The CCPI 2025 reports that while 61 of 64 assessed countries increased their renewable energy share over five years, the top three ranks remain vacant as no country performs well enough to meet Paris Agreement goals. Denmark ranks 4th, while oil and gas producers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Russia are the lowest performers. The G20, responsible for over 75% of global emissions, shows poor overall performance with only the UK and India ranking as high performers.

The New Development Bank (NDB) has expanded its mandate to support climate action and sustainable development but faces challenges including aligning financing with local currency and non-sovereign lending.

Non-CO2 emissions account for approximately 25% of global greenhouse gas emissions, yet they are frequently overlooked in NDCs, which often lack gas-specific quantitative targets. While some countries like Côte d’Ivoire and Japan provide good practice examples of quantitative targets, major emitters including China, Russia, India, and Brazil generally only include non-CO2 gases as part of overall GHG targets. China, whose current NDC covers only CO2 despite non-CO2 gases making up 18% of its national emissions, has indicated it will include these gases in its updated NDC. The brief argues that the 2025 NDC update cycle is a critical opportunity for major emitters, particularly China, to adopt sector-specific targets and align with international initiatives like the Global Methane Pledge and the Kigali Amendment to maintain the 1.5°C warming limit.

The re-election of Donald Trump may slow US clean technology deployment through the potential repeal of Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) funds and EV tax credits, potentially shifting leadership to emerging economies. The global market for six key technologies—solar PV, wind turbines, EVs, batteries, electrolysers, and heat pumps—is projected to exceed USD 2 trillion by 2035, with global trade reaching USD 575 billion. China currently leads with 70% of the market for these technologies, though it faces risks from proposed US tariffs of 60% on all imports and 100% on EVs. Other nations may benefit: India could become a net exporter of clean technologies by 2035 with annual exports of USD 30 billion, and Brazil is well-positioned in wind turbine blade production, currently accounting for 5% of the global market. In the Global South, renewable energy potential is 400 times greater than fossil fuel production, and solar is expected to have lower upfront costs than coal in Vietnam from 2024 and in India from approximately 2027.

The report highlights that G20 fossil fuel reserves contain over a trillion tons of CO2 equivalent, which would exceed the 2ºC carbon budget if fully extracted. It notes that emissions from G20 fossil fuel extraction nearly doubled between the 1992 Rio Summit and 2020. Despite this, the document argues that G20 economies have become less dependent on fossil fuel rents over the last three decades, making them better equipped to transition. It specifically identifies the USA, Canada, Australia, the UK, Germany, and Italy as being best placed to transition first and fastest.