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ClientEarth argues that the JRC's preparatory study for textile ecodesign criteria under the ESPR is insufficient. The organization advocates for full alignment with REACH for reporting Substances of Very High Concern (SVHCs), the inclusion of all substances with harmonised classification and labelling (CLH), and the removal of exemptions for process chemicals. It further contends that the JRC has failed to implement legal requirements to reduce 'significant risks' to health and the environment and has overlooked the need for performance restrictions based on circularity concerns, such as the use of phthalates.

The ISP-CWP will hold its first Plenary session from February 2-6, 2026, in Geneva to finalize foundational governance elements. Key agenda items include the Rules of Procedure, a Conflict of Interest Policy, and the Work Program and Deliverables Process. The document warns that consensus-based decision-making may lead to 'lowest-common-denominator' outcomes and that restrictions on observer participation, the conflation of Indigenous Peoples with local communities, and the exclusion of gender-responsive science could undermine the Panel's legitimacy and effectiveness.

The document argues that Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are heavily reliant on carbon-intensive heavy industries but possess significant potential for clean industry due to renewable energy resources and carbon dioxide storage. It calls for EU industrial policy to shift toward a place-based approach that supports countries with high deployment potential regardless of their current innovation track record. Key recommendations for the EU include revising the Public Procurement Directive to include lifecycle emissions and redesigning the Innovation Fund for first-of-a-kind national deployments. For CEE national governments, the statement recommends earmarking EU ETS revenues for climate action, implementing Carbon Contracts for Difference, and conducting integrated infrastructure planning for hydrogen and carbon dioxide transport.

The document examines the transition of energy-intensive heavy industries toward net-zero emissions, highlighting how global trade dynamics and national policies in developed economies impact emerging markets. It identifies four primary technological levers for decarbonization: energy efficiency, alternative fuel use/electrification, material efficiency, and carbon capture and storage. The author argues that while developing countries with abundant renewables can become new green industrial hubs, they face significant risks from carbon border measures, green protectionism, and reduced access to secondary materials. The briefing emphasizes the need for international coordination on standards, technology transfer, and finance to ensure a just transition for emerging and developing economies.

The report identifies 601 International Climate Initiatives (ICIs) launched since 2013, noting that while the number of initiatives grew, productivity and performance have trended downwards since 2019. There is a significant underrepresentation of the Global South in terms of funding, leadership, and participation. Regarding the COP26 'Glasgow initiatives', the report finds they theoretically cover 75% of the 14 GtCO2e ambition gap for 2030, but current signatories would only provide 4 GtCO2e in additional reductions; an additional 7 GtCO2e could be achieved if more governments signed up.

The document argues that Green Public Procurement (GPP) can leverage the significant purchasing power of governments to stimulate demand for low-carbon materials in energy-intensive industries. It focuses on hard-to-abate sectors such as steel and cement, noting that five basic industrial materials account for 20% of global CO2 emissions. The brief, produced by UNIDO and the Leadership Group for Industry Transition, aims to provide methodologies for GPP design to help reach Paris Agreement targets.

The document highlights the necessity of public-private collaboration to decarbonize heavy industry, which contributes approximately 30% of global CO2 emissions. It identifies the Leadership Group for Industry Transition (LeadIT), launched by Sweden and India, as a key arena for international cooperation toward net-zero emissions by 2050. The brief examines specific policy tools such as green public procurement, carbon contracts for difference, and carbon border adjustments, while referencing implementation experiences in countries including South Korea, Denmark, Sweden, Canada, and the UK.

The document analyzes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the EU carbon market, noting a price drop of nearly 40% to just above €15/ton CO2 as of 25 March 2020. It argues that the current Market Stability Reserve (MSR) is unfit for handling sudden surpluses and proposes specific legislative reforms, including increasing the intake rate to 36% from 2024 and raising the linear reduction factor to at least 4.2%. The author warns against using the health crisis to weaken climate policies or provide unfounded subsidies to polluting sectors like aviation, steel, chemicals, and cement, urging governments to ensure post-pandemic recovery packages support the green transition.

A study by the Climate Policy Initiative and PUC-Rio finds that the Manaus Free Trade Zone (ZFM) has not resulted in efficiency gains for the region's industries. Despite significant tax expenditures—reaching R$ 27.8 billion for ZFM, Western Amazon, and Free Trade Areas in 2015—both energy and productive efficiency levels in the ZFM remained similar to the national average from 2003 to 2015. This lack of impact persists even in the most representative sectors, such as two-wheel vehicle production and audio and video, where tax benefits are most concentrated.

Carbon Market Watch argues that the EU should replace the free allocation of emission allowances in the EU ETS with a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to ensure polluters pay for their emissions. The organization asserts there is no evidence of carbon leakage and proposes that a CBAM should be used as a tool for international climate diplomacy, exempt Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, and be based on carbon performance benchmarks for sectors including steel, cement, chemicals, and power.

The production of basic materials accounts for approximately 25% of global CO2 emissions and 16% of EU GHG emissions. While industry commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050 is growing, current innovation funds and carbon pricing are insufficient to make climate-friendly technologies commercially viable. The Climate Friendly Material Platform proposes a policy package including a 'Climate Contribution' as an alternative to Border Tax Adjustments, Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCFDS), Contracts for Difference for Renewables, Green Public Procurement (GPP), and Product Carbon Requirements to stimulate investment and prevent the relocation of production to regions with less stringent climate policies.

The document asserts that carbon border taxes must be contingent on the removal of free pollution permits under the EU ETS to avoid double-protecting industry and to provide a real incentive for emissions reductions. It argues that carbon leakage is not evidenced and that free allocations have historically functioned as subsidies. The author suggests that border measures should be temporary, non-protectionist, and complementary to global climate policies, while advocating for the use of enforceable environmental chapters in trade agreements to drive global ambition.

The production of basic materials, including cement, iron, steel, aluminium, and chemicals, accounted for approximately 25% of global CO2 emissions in 2014. The author contends that deep decarbonisation has been limited by a lack of knowledge regarding climate-friendly alternatives and a policy focus on carbon leakage risks. To overcome this, the brief identifies three primary policy gaps: incomplete incentives for recycling, a lack of short- and long-term markets for climate-friendly options, and missing signals regarding the phase-out of carbon-intensive production. Proposed solutions include green public procurement, project-based carbon contracts for difference (CfD), and a consumption charge on basic materials integrated into the EU ETS. The document emphasizes that the European materials sector is in a 'precarious limbo' where investment decisions over the next 10 to 15 years will determine whether assets are closed or transitioned to climate-friendly options.

The document argues that WTO NAMA negotiations are largely ignoring environmental risks associated with tariff elimination in sectors like forestry and fisheries. It further cautions against the potential for non-tariff barrier (NTB) negotiations to undermine legitimate domestic environmental, health, and safety standards, while noting that developing countries often lack the capacity to meet these standards.

The undersigned authors express concern that a provisional agreement on RePowerEU would weaken the EU Innovation Fund by allowing Member States to use its grants (60%) and front-loading ETS allowances (40%) to raise revenues. They argue that reducing the fund contradicts the needs of Europe's industrial transformation, noting that the fund's first call in 2021 was oversubscribed by more than 20 times. The letter highlights that nearly 50% of emissions reductions needed for 2050 goals depend on technologies not yet deployed at scale, particularly for hard-to-abate sectors like cement, steel, and chemicals. The authors warn that while the United States is implementing massive investment plans, the EU risks losing its industrial base and jobs if it fails to lower the cost of next-generation decarbonisation technologies. Finally, they urge Member States to reject the European Commission's proposal to auction allowances from the Market Stability Reserve, as this could increase emissions and lower the carbon price signal.

The document outlines the role of CCUS in low-carbon scenarios, noting its potential to contribute 4% of global CO2 reductions by 2030 and 12% by 2050. It highlights that while CCUS has historically underperformed, investment is increasing, with a global market potentially reaching $4–$10 billion by 2026-27. Canada is positioned as having an early advantage due to expertise in enhanced oil recovery (EOR), geological storage in Alberta and Saskatchewan, and early adoption in coal-fired electricity and oil sands. Notable investments include $685 million for a network in Norway and significant funding for Direct Air Capture (DAC) from the US, UK, and private entities.

Carbon Market Watch argues that a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is preferable to the free allocation of allowances in the EU ETS, provided it is implemented without double protection. The organization recommends that CBAM cover cement, steel, chemicals, and power, and that its revenues be primarily disbursed as climate grants to developing countries. It further suggests that Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States be exempted from CBAM obligations to uphold the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

The document argues that the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) has functioned as a subsidy for high-emitting industries, providing €50 billion in windfall profits while failing to reduce emissions. The authors call for a full phase-out of free allowances by 2032, a 10% annual reduction starting in 2026, and the introduction of a fully operational Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) by 2026. They further propose making any remaining free allowances conditional on energy efficiency and decarbonisation plans, and revising benchmarks to include a minimum improvement rate of at least 0.4%.

The World Resources Institute (WRI) provides research and policy recommendations to support the United States' transition to a low-carbon economy. Its work spans industrial modernization in sectors like cement and steel, the deployment of renewable and clean firm power, and the development of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategies. WRI also focuses on systemic barriers such as permitting reform for energy transmission, the responsible sourcing of critical minerals, carbon pricing, and the electrification of transportation, including a specific initiative for electric school buses.