Search Climate Insights Directory

The report argues that climate change will increasingly exacerbate risks to US national security by intensifying physical impacts and mounting geopolitical tensions over the energy transition. It identifies a likely increase in cross-border conflicts over water and migration, strategic competition in the Arctic, and the risk of unilateral solar geoengineering. The document highlights 11 highly vulnerable countries and two regions (Central Africa and Pacific island states) where climate-induced instability may necessitate increased US diplomatic, humanitarian, and military resources. It also notes that current global policies are insufficient to meet Paris Agreement goals, leading to competition over critical minerals and technologies.

In 2024, the United States had more than 4,085,300 climate jobs, with clean energy job creation outpacing fossil fuel job creation. Energy efficiency was the largest sector, supporting nearly 2.4 million jobs, while renewable energy supported 596,100 jobs, dominated by solar and wind. Clean energy storage and grid modernization supported 160,300 jobs. Clean vehicle employment fell by 3% between 2023 and 2024, though renewable fuels remained steady. The adaptation and resilience industry grew by 18% to $4.8 billion in 2024, despite a lack of formal tracking by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Federal legislation including the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) significantly drove investment, although some incentives were weakened or eliminated in 2025.

This fact sheet identifies 20 potential sources for hydrogen production and categorizes them by the technical process used to extract or create the gas, ranging from steam methane reforming and gasification to electrolysis and photobiological water splitting.

The House Committee on Appropriations proposed $1.87 billion for DOE Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy programs for FY 2008, a 52% increase over the Administration's request. The bill restores funding for geothermal and hydropower, increases budgets for solar, wind, and biomass, and boosts funding for building and vehicle technologies, while rejecting a request for the Asia Pacific Partnership.

The document outlines the technical processes Ember uses to assemble electricity data for 215 countries from 2000 to 2021. It describes the use of multiple sources—including the EIA, Eurostat, and IRENA—to reconcile annual and monthly data, disaggregate thermal generation, and estimate emissions using IPCC factors. The guide also provides a detailed country-by-country breakdown of the specific sources and adjustments applied to each territory's data.

In 2021, wind and solar power reached a record 10.3% of global electricity generation, with total clean energy accounting for 38%. However, a 5.4% surge in global electricity demand—driven largely by economic growth in Asia—led to a record increase in coal power, which grew by 9.0% to reach 10,042 TWh. Consequently, power sector CO2 emissions rose by 7% in 2021, the largest percentage increase since 2010, surpassing pre-pandemic levels.

The document outlines Ember's methodology for assembling electricity data for 215 countries. It describes the use of multiple sources—including Eurostat, ENTSO-E, the Energy Institute, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration—to reconcile annual and monthly time series. The guide explains how Ember handles data gaps through ARIMA-based projections, disaggregates thermal generation using IEA and EI ratios, and calculates lifecycle emissions using IPCC and UNECE factors. It also provides a comprehensive country-by-country breakdown of the specific sources and adjustments applied to each national dataset.

The document argues that expanding fossil gas production in Africa is a 'fallacy' that risks creating stranded assets, increasing national debt, and exacerbating climate vulnerability. It highlights that gas reserves are concentrated in a few nations, meaning expansion will not benefit the continent broadly. Furthermore, it asserts that fossil gas infrastructure often involves high foreign ownership and poor contractual terms, pulling wealth out of Africa. The report contrasts this with the potential of renewables, noting that Africa possesses vast solar and wind resources that could provide cheaper, more accessible energy and more sustainable jobs. Environmental risks cited include the destruction of biodiversity hotspots, such as mangroves and coral reefs, and the health impacts of gas flaring and fracking. The briefing concludes that Africa should leapfrog extractive energy systems in favor of a clean, distributed energy future supported by international climate finance.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a global infrastructure and economic cooperation framework led by China, focusing on energy and transport connectivity across Asia, Europe, and Africa. While marketed as a 'win-win' development strategy, the document argues it often serves Chinese domestic interests, such as exporting industrial overcapacity and asserting geopolitical influence. The briefing highlights significant environmental risks, particularly the funding of coal-fired power plants and large hydropower projects, and a lack of transparent environmental, social, and governance (ESG) safeguards. It identifies a 'debt trap' risk for recipient countries and calls for a shift toward a 'Green BRI' aligned with international sustainability standards.

The document analyzes the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a strategic tool for China to export industrial overcapacity and expand global influence. It highlights a systemic lack of transparency, the dominance of state-owned enterprises, and significant environmental risks, particularly through the financing of coal and hydropower projects. While China promotes a 'Green BRI' and 'ecological civilization,' the report argues that actual implementation often lacks rigorous safeguards, leading to 'debt traps' and biodiversity loss. It calls for international civil society to push for binding treaties on multinationals and the adoption of higher environmental and social standards.

The Nigerian Green Bond Market Development Programme (NGBMDP) aimed to develop a non-sovereign green bond market in Nigeria between 2018 and 2021. The programme successfully facilitated the issuance of 4 corporate green bonds and 2 sovereign green bonds, raising a total of ₦58.51 billion in sovereign issuances and ₦32.83 billion in corporate issuances. Key achievements include the training of over 500 capital market professionals, the development of mandatory Nigeria Green Bond Guidelines by the SEC in December 2018, and the certification of local verifiers such as Rubicola Consulting Limited and Agusto & Co. Limited. The programme also supported the launch of the FMDQ Green Exchange in November 2021 to improve transparency and ESG reporting. Despite these gains, the report notes that the market remains in its infancy, with a heavy reliance on public sector financing and a need for a larger pipeline of bankable green projects.

The Green Buses project aims to transition Kathmandu Valley's public transport from fossil fuel dependence to a zero-emission eBRT system. The proposal requests USD 164 million from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as part of a total indicative cost of USD 243 million. The project consists of three components: strengthening the policy and institutional framework via the creation of the Kathmandu Valley Public Transport Authority (KVPTA), constructing climate-resilient infrastructure including a 27 km Ring Road corridor and charging stations, and implementing a financial mechanism to support private operators in procuring a fleet of approximately 100 electric buses. The project expects to mitigate 870,000 tCO2e over 20 years by replacing conventional minibuses with electric alternatives powered by Nepal's hydropower-dominant grid.

The Accreditation Panel (AP) assessed PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur (PT SMI), a state-owned Indonesian entity, for GCF accreditation. While PT SMI has a track record in financing renewable energy and climate-resilient infrastructure, the AP found it only 'partially meets' several GCF fiduciary and environmental and social standards due to a recent transition in its business model. Consequently, the AP recommends accrediting PT SMI for 'small' project sizes and 'medium' environmental and social risk (Category B/I-2), rather than the 'large' size and 'high' risk (Category A/I-1) categories requested. Accreditation is conditional upon the applicant fulfilling several requirements, including formalizing its procurement framework, enhancing grant management, and demonstrating full application of its 2016 environmental, social, and gender guidelines.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) Accreditation Panel recommends the accreditation of the Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe (IDBZ) as a national direct access entity for 'small' projects (above US$ 10 million up to US$ 50 million) with a medium environmental and social risk category (B/I-2). While the IDBZ demonstrated strong alignment with GCF's gender policy and environmental and social standards, the assessment identified several fiduciary gaps. These include a lack of evidence regarding the effectiveness of its internal audit function, the operational status of its Investigations, Integrity & Loss Control Division, and the public disclosure of procurement and project evaluation data. Accreditation is recommended subject to specific conditions to be met before and after the first funding proposal and disbursement.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) Accreditation Panel recommends the accreditation of Joint Stock Company TBC Bank (APL113), a leading Georgian banking group, for medium-sized projects with high environmental and social risk (Category I-1). While the bank fully meets basic fiduciary, environmental, and social standards, the panel identified gaps in its procurement oversight of executing entities, public information disclosure for on-lending operations, and a track record of gender assessments in climate projects. These gaps are addressed through specific conditions for accreditation.

The document outlines the GCF's strategy for decarbonizing the energy sector through renewable energy (RE) and energy efficiency, specifically detailing the criteria and activities eligible for the Simplified Approval Process (SAP). It emphasizes three main axes of intervention: large-scale low-carbon electricity deployment, expanding energy access in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and implementing innovative climate mitigation solutions. The guide provides a framework for measuring impact using quantitative and qualitative indicators, lists specific eligible and ineligible activities—such as excluding large-scale solar plants and most hydropower due to high environmental and social risks—and presents three project scenarios involving solar water heaters, rural energy kits, and solar-powered agricultural systems.

Mongolia's progress toward a green economy was ranked 3 out of 10 in a 2018 report. The country faces significant environmental hurdles, including air pollution, land degradation, and water mismanagement, with 70% of its land lacking groundwater access. While the government has implemented the National Green Development Policy and Sustainable Development Vision 2030, a gap remains between official narratives and actual implementation. Transition efforts involve tax exemptions for renewables, the operation of 12 renewable energy sites (wind, hydro, and solar), and international support from entities like the Green Climate Fund and ADB to develop low-carbon eco-districts in Ulaanbaatar.

In 2025, the BRICS nations experienced their largest power capacity expansion on record, characterized by a 'split transition' where both fossil fuels and renewables reached historic highs. While 125 GW of new coal, oil, and gas capacity was added, solar and wind additions totaled 497 GW. This growth was heavily concentrated in China and India, where record renewable deployment began to reduce coal-fired generation despite continued coal capacity expansion. In contrast, other BRICS members like Russia and Iran remain overwhelmingly fossil-based, while Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, and the UAE show varying degrees of renewable growth and fossil fuel reliance.

Colombia is planning at least nine major LNG import terminal projects and expansions between 2026 and 2030, which could create a capacity of 2,500 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d). This capacity is more than double the 1,000 MMcf/d gas demand projected by the Unidad de Planeación Minero Energética (UPME) for 2030. The report argues that overbuilding LNG infrastructure risks creating stranded assets, increasing dependence on volatile global markets, and undermining the country's roadmap to reduce fossil fuel dependence and emissions by 90% by 2050.

Global Witness reveals that the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG), largely funded by UK aid, committed $749.8 million to fossil fuel projects between 2002 and 2018. The report highlights the use of highly polluting heavy fuel oil (HFO) in West Africa and the continued funding of gas plants in Togo and Cote D'Ivoire in 2019. It further criticizes PIDG's investments in diesel-powered telecommunications towers and high-carbon industrial projects, while noting that 43% of its renewable energy spending went to biomass and hydropower. The document calls for an immediate end to all UK overseas fossil fuel investments across all government departments and agencies.