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The document reports that Africa holds 111.4 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE) in proven oil reserves, representing 5% of the global total. Five countries—Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, and Angola—account for 80% of these reserves.

The briefing identifies four critical areas for COP28 success: adopting a transformational response to the Global Stocktake, accelerating systems transformation in energy, food, and cities, responding to severe climate impacts through the Loss and Damage Fund and adaptation frameworks, and delivering scaled climate finance to vulnerable nations.

The document analyzes the 'epidemic' of military takeovers in Africa, identifying governance dysfunction, democratic decline, civil-military tensions, and Islamist insurgencies as primary drivers. It argues that the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs) have relied on reactive, inconsistent, and ineffective blanket sanctions that fail to deter coup plotters. The author recommends a shift toward prevention, targeted sanctions, and the strengthening of civil-military relations and democratic legitimacy.

The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) recommends that the EU prioritise 'no regrets' industrial sectors for hydrogen deployment, utilize all clean production pathways (including 'blue' hydrogen), and site production close to consumption to minimize transport inefficiencies. The report emphasizes that public funding should be matched to projects that provide socio-economic benefits to local communities and that a comprehensive EU database should be established to ensure transparency and collaboration.

A World Weather Attribution study found that human-induced climate change significantly increased the likelihood and intensity of extreme rainfall events in the Mediterranean region in September 2023. In Libya, a 1-in-300 to 600 year event became up to 50 times more likely and 50% more intense compared to a 1.2C cooler climate. In a region encompassing Greece, Bulgaria, and Türkiye, similar events became up to 10 times more likely and 40% more intense. The study highlights that while climate change exacerbated the weather, the scale of the disaster—particularly in Libya—was compounded by state fragility, lack of dam maintenance, and inadequate emergency communication.

A coalition of over 200 civil society organizations has issued a formal call to governments attending COP28, arguing that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an unsuitable host due to systemic human rights violations and a conflict of interest involving the COP28 president. The letter demands that the UAE end unlawful surveillance, release prisoners of conscience, and abolish the Kafala system. It specifically highlights abuses of migrant workers at Expo City Dubai and the UAE's role in regional conflicts in Yemen and Libya. Furthermore, the organizations condemn the UAE's 'greenwashing' and the dual role of Sultan al-Jaber as both COP28 president and CEO of the state oil company ADNOC, calling for a global commitment to phase out all fossil fuels to maintain the 1.5C temperature goal.

The MENA region increased its operational utility-scale solar and wind capacity by 57% since May 2022, adding 6.9 GW. While prospective capacity has grown by 400% to 361 GW, 60% of these projects are earmarked for green hydrogen production or export rather than domestic decarbonization. Oil and gas power plants still provide over 90% of the region's electricity, and replacing them would require approximately 500 GW of additional solar and wind capacity. The report highlights a disparity in progress, noting that South America operationalized at least four times more capacity in the same period. Additionally, sovereign wealth funds from the UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing more heavily in renewables abroad (46 GW) than domestically (14 GW).

The conflict in Sudan, which escalated in April 2023 between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan's army and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo's Rapid Support Forces (RSF), is driven by a struggle for power and control over resources. This instability threatens regional security, specifically regarding the Nile River dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), and risks destabilising fragile neighbours like Chad and the Central African Republic. Internationally, the crisis intersects with Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 tourism goals and Russia's strategic interests, including a proposed naval base in Port Sudan and gold extraction by the Wagner Group. The author argues that lasting peace requires a long-term approach involving power-sharing and the gradual integration of armed groups into the national army.

The document evaluates the state of governance in Africa using indices such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). It finds that while some progress has been made in 'voice and accountability', overall governance trends have remained static or declined since 1996. The analysis suggests that while APRM members are statistically more likely to show governance improvement than non-members, the number of reviews undergone does not definitively correlate with better scores. The author argues that both the APRM and the AGR suffer from a lack of implementation of their recommendations and that the AGR risks duplicating the APRM's efforts.

The report finds that despite robust anti-money laundering policies, there are few financial investigations into migrant smuggling in Senegal and Sierra Leone due to resource gaps and the prevalence of cash-based, informal financial systems. Smugglers utilize 'pay-as-you-go' and 'full-package' models, moving funds through hawala systems and foreign currency black markets to avoid detection. Illicit proceeds are frequently laundered through real estate, the hospitality industry, and faith-based organisations. The study highlights significant institutional challenges, including underfunded Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), a lack of beneficial ownership registries in Senegal, and corruption within law enforcement in Sierra Leone.

The report finds that despite robust anti-money laundering policies, there are few criminal investigations into the financial proceeds of migrant smuggling in Senegal and Sierra Leone. Smugglers rely heavily on cash and informal transfer systems like hawala to move funds, which are then laundered through real estate, used car imports, and hospitality businesses. Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in both countries are underfunded and lack the specialized capacity to 'follow the money,' while corruption and a lack of witness cooperation further hinder prosecutions.

The report assesses the impact of EU migration interventions in the Sahel, specifically in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. It finds that the EU's focus on deterring northbound migration to Europe through border reinforcement and funding-based policies has prioritised security over human protection, undermined regional free movement, and ignored a massive internal displacement crisis. The author recommends a shift toward area-based assistance and a strategic recalibration that prioritises the needs of displaced persons over the goal of curbing irregular arrivals in Europe.

The report examines Algeria's agricultural stagnation, highlighting low productivity, heavy reliance on food imports, and severe water stress. It details how climate change—manifesting as rising temperatures, reduced rainfall, and sea-level rise—threatens food security and regional stability. The document argues that intensification and the removal of unsustainable water and energy subsidies are necessary to improve efficiency and transition toward cleaner energy.

The report identifies poor governance, hydrocarbon dependence, and an unsustainable subsidy system as primary barriers to Algeria's growth. It projects a modest GDP growth rate of 1.8% between 2020 and 2040 under the 'Current Path' but proposes an 'Algerian Dream' scenario based on four reform pillars: improved governance, economic transformation, investment in the knowledge economy, and a transition to sustainable agriculture and renewable energy.

The document traces the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, to the African Union (AU), launched in 2002. It highlights the historical tension between gradualist and radical approaches to African unity, exemplified by the Monrovia and Casablanca Blocs. While the AU has introduced significant institutions and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), the author argues that a pattern of policy non-implementation persists, leaving visions like Agenda 2063 largely aspirational.

The document evaluates the impact of AU governance tools, finding that while APRM members are statistically more likely to show governance improvements than non-members, neither the APRM nor the AGR has fundamentally reversed a general trend of stagnation or decline in African governance since 1996. It highlights a lack of resilience in governance scores following shocks and argues that the focus of these mechanisms must shift from providing recommendations to ensuring their implementation.

The author argues that German-African health cooperation is shaped by a colonial legacy and currently prioritizes European security and economic interests over African public health needs. While Germany promotes multilateralism and human rights, the document highlights contradictions in vaccine equity, intellectual property regimes, and the recruitment of African health workers. The author calls for a transition toward a partnership based on solidarity, climate and health justice, and respect for an 'African New Public Health Order'.

Tunisia faces stagnant economic growth, high youth unemployment, and a large informal sector despite strong human capital. The report identifies a 'Current Path' of slow growth and vulnerability to food price shocks and climate change, while proposing three alternative scenarios. These scenarios emphasize that improving governance, reducing inefficient subsidies, and enhancing education quality are foundational to any successful transition. The 'Sustainability & Equality' pathway is highlighted as the most effective for reducing extreme poverty and carbon emissions, while 'Going for Growth' offers the highest GDP increase through FDI and industrial promotion.

Tunisia has achieved high adult literacy and education levels, ranking ninth in Africa for average years of education. However, the system faces significant bottlenecks in upper secondary completion due to language policies requiring French for science subjects. Quality is declining, evidenced by falling PISA scores and a drop in baccalaureate pass rates from 52% in 2016 to 41% in 2018. There are also stark geographical disparities, with resources concentrated in Greater Tunis and coastal areas, leaving rural regions like Kairouan underserved. The report argues that the curriculum is disconnected from job market needs, contributing to economic instability and the historical drivers of the Freedom and Dignity Revolution.

The report analyzes Tunisia's demographic transition, noting a decline in fertility rates and an aging population. While the country experienced a peak demographic dividend in 2011, an opaque economic system has prevented these human capital gains from translating into income growth and formal employment. The report warns that a shrinking youth bulge may reduce social unrest, but an aging population will increase healthcare costs for non-communicable diseases.