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One year after the death of Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia's foreign policy remains focused on domestic stability and regional security, particularly in the Horn of Africa. While the country has seen significant economic growth and maintains a strategic alliance with the US to combat terrorism, its diplomatic effectiveness is hindered by a gap between its stated commitment to democracy and its domestic political reality. The author argues that embracing genuine democratic reforms would improve Ethiopia's international prestige and its ability to act as a regional broker for peace and stability.

The document analyzes China's multifaceted engagement in Sudan from 2005 to 2011, highlighting a transition from a predominantly bilateral relationship with Khartoum to a more complex triangular relationship involving the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). While China's role was heavily driven by oil interests and a preference for bilateralism, it increasingly adopted a 'peace through development' approach, providing infrastructure projects and humanitarian aid in Darfur and Southern Sudan. The paper notes a strategic recalibration as Beijing moved from supporting Sudanese unity to recognizing South Sudan's independence to protect its investments and maintain regional stability.

China is increasingly engaging in post-conflict settings in Africa, though it lacks a uniform policy framework. Its approach is characterized by a preference for non-interference, a belief in indigenous African agency, and the prioritization of economic modernization and infrastructure over political reform. In Sudan, China has transitioned from a political patron of Khartoum to a more complex role involving participation in UN and AU peacekeeping missions, providing humanitarian aid in Darfur, and establishing diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Sudan. While China's bilateral model offers rapid infrastructure delivery and financing, the document suggests that future success depends on aligning Chinese assistance with African-led strategies and enhancing synergies between bilateral and multilateral efforts.

One year after the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the author contends that South Africa must translate the success of the event into diplomatic action. By utilizing its positions in SADC, the AU, and the UN Security Council, South Africa is urged to address critical issues such as the Zimbabwe stalemate, crises in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire, and conflicts in Somalia, Darfur, and Abyei, thereby challenging 'Afro-pessimism' through substantive political leadership.

The document examines the historical and contemporary drivers of conflict in Sudan, arguing that the centralisation of power in Khartoum and the economic neglect of peripheral regions created a pattern of resistance. It distinguishes between the 'high politics' of oil, which fueled the second civil war and secessionist movements, and the 'low politics' of subsistence resources, such as land and water, which continue to drive local-level violence between pastoralists and farmers. The author concludes that the stability of both Northern and Southern Sudan depends on their ability to move away from elite-driven power concentration and establish inclusive governance and resource-sharing frameworks.

The document examines the complex interdependence between Northern and Southern Sudan as the South moves toward independence. It highlights the critical role of oil co-management, as Southern Sudan derives 98% of its income from oil exports that must travel through Northern infrastructure. The author argues that while the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) provided a path to secession, significant risks remain, including unresolved border disputes in Abyei, the potential for continued insurgency in the North, and the fragile internal governance of the South. Regionally, the document notes the potential for a new independent South Sudan to shift the balance of power within the Nile Basin Initiative, potentially challenging Egypt's historical dominance over Nile water rights.

The seminar highlighted the economic interdependence of Northern and Southern Sudan, noting that while oil and water resources are critical for the viability of both regions, they could serve as unifying factors for peace. Key challenges identified include the governance of the oil sector, the distribution of Nile basin water, the status of the Abyei region, and the presence of Darfur rebels in the South.

The briefing examines the tensions between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) ahead of the 2011 referendum. It highlights disputes over voter registration, the status of the Abyei region, and post-referendum arrangements regarding oil revenue and borders. The author notes that while South Sudan possesses significant oil and mineral wealth, it faces challenges regarding governance, infrastructure, and ethnic stability. The document also details the role of international actors, such as the US and AUHIP, in attempting to prevent a return to armed conflict.

The document analyzes the mediation efforts of Thabo Mbeki, chair of the AU High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, in negotiations between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). It outlines four potential post-referendum scenarios ranging from complete separation to a unified Sudan, while highlighting critical challenges such as oil governance, border disputes, and the risk of unilateral actions. The brief emphasizes that the outcome of the referendum will serve as a test case for the African Union's approach to secession and colonial borders across the continent.

The document argues that China shifted from providing unconditional support to the Sudanese government to adopting a more activist role, applying direct pressure on Khartoum to cooperate with the international community and the International Criminal Court. This transition was driven by international pressure, the need to be seen as a 'responsible stakeholder', and the realization that official Sudanese rhetoric differed from the reality in Darfur. Despite this shift, the author notes that Darfurian armed resistance movements and some civil society organizations continued to view China with distrust, occasionally targeting Chinese oil interests.

The document analyzes China's 'exceptionalism' in Africa, a policy framework based on the 1955 Bandung conference principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and mutual benefit. While this approach seeks to differentiate China from Western powers by emphasizing political equality and a non-donor-recipient model, the author identifies three primary challenges to its sustainability: the tension between non-interference and the protection of economic interests, the gap between nominal sovereign equality and actual power asymmetry, and the lack of central government control over autonomous sub-state and private actors.

The document examines the viability of Sudan's April 2010 elections, arguing that they are plagued by democratic closure, security concerns, and extreme logistical complexity. It highlights the boycott of the presidential race by Yassir Arman and disputes over the 2008 census as key risk factors. The author suggests that the elections should have been postponed or simplified, as the complexity of the ballots—particularly in South Sudan—and the proximity to the January 2011 self-determination referendum undermine their purpose of promoting national unity.

The report analyzes the complex relationship between Egypt and the Sudan (North and South) ahead of the 2011 Southern Sudan referendum. It highlights Egypt's strategic interests in Nile water security, regional stability, and trade, while warning that a flawed referendum or failed secession negotiations could lead to renewed civil war or state collapse. The document argues that Egypt must move beyond its preference for Sudanese unity to constructively engage with both Northern and Southern Sudanese entities to ensure a peaceful transition and maintain its influence in the Nile Basin.

The document examines the historical and political drivers of violence in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan, specifically contrasting the conflict formation of the 1980s with the post-2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) era. It argues that while resource scarcity is often cited as a cause of Sahelian conflict, the violence in the Nuba Mountains is rooted in a long history of systemic marginalisation by an Arab-Muslim dominated state hierarchy. The author details the role of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in launching a 'jihad' against the Nuba in the 1990s, involving forced Islamisation and the use of 'murahaleen' militias. The paper concludes that the CPA has failed to address Nuba demands for self-determination, leaving the region volatile ahead of the 2010 elections.

The report details a seminar on Sudan's political transition under the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Discussions focused on the challenges of upcoming elections, the resolution of the Abyei border dispute via the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the ongoing instability in Darfur. Speakers highlighted the CPA's limitations, including its lack of representativeness and unresolved issues regarding oil revenue sharing and the separation of religion and state.

The document analyzes the intractable political crisis in Chad, arguing that international efforts have often prioritized regime stability over long-term peace and democratic institutional building. It examines the roles of President Idriss Déby, armed rebel groups, and external powers like France, the US, and Sudan. The report evaluates specific initiatives, including the 13 August 2007 political accord and the Dakar Agreement, concluding that implementation has been piecemeal and hampered by a lack of political will and coordinated mechanisms.

The paper analyzes the legal precedents established by the ICC's pursuit of President Bashir, including the first summons of a sitting Head of State and the use of a UN Security Council referral under Resolution 1593. It explores the tension between state sovereignty and international justice, the potential for the Security Council to defer prosecutions under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, and the humanitarian crisis resulting from the Sudanese government's expulsion of aid agencies. The author argues that regional bodies like the African Union and the Arab League should prioritize human rights and the fight against impunity over defensive views of sovereignty.

The report argues that climate change acts as a 'threat multiplier' in Africa, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities such as poverty and poor governance to potentially trigger violent conflict. It identifies four primary areas of concern: increased water scarcity, decreased food security, large-scale climate-induced migration, and the erosion of state fragility. While acknowledging that environmental stress is rarely the sole cause of war, the document highlights how shifts in precipitation and temperature can intensify competition over resources and destabilize fragile states. The authors propose four strategies to mitigate these risks: improving climate projections, reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, implementing conflict-sensitive adaptation policies, and integrating climate risks into all levels of governance.

The report argues that climate change acts as a 'threat multiplier' in Africa, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities such as poverty and poor governance. It identifies four primary drivers of instability: increasing water scarcity, reduced food security, large-scale climate-induced migration, and the overall impact on state fragility. While climate change can intensify conflicts, the document emphasizes that non-climatic factors—specifically governance and institutional capacity—determine whether these challenges lead to violent conflict. The authors propose four strategies for mitigation: improving climate projections, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, implementing adaptation measures, and integrating climate risks into all levels of governance.

The document analyzes the risks associated with the International Criminal Court's potential indictment of President Omar Al Bashir, including the possible collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the destabilization of Sudan's internal political dynamics. It highlights tensions within the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and suggests that the Doha Agreement between the government and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) may be a strategic move to avoid indictment rather than a sustainable peace effort.