The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict

The document argues that China shifted from providing unconditional support to the Sudanese government to adopting a more activist role, applying direct pressure on Khartoum to cooperate with the international community and the International Criminal Court. This transition was driven by international pressure, the need to be seen as a 'responsible stakeholder', and the realization that official Sudanese rhetoric differed from the reality in Darfur. Despite this shift, the author notes that Darfurian armed resistance movements and some civil society organizations continued to view China with distrust, occasionally targeting Chinese oil interests.

• Initially, China supported the Sudanese government's position and obstructed UN Security Council resolutions aimed at protecting the population in Darfur, believing the conflict was an internal affair.
• By mid-2004, China began shifting away from unconditional support for Khartoum due to international pressure and a desire to be viewed as a 'responsible stakeholder' in global affairs.
• China's diplomatic shift was evidenced by its abstention from several key UN Security Council votes, including Resolution 1556 (July 2004), Resolution 1564 (September 2004), and Resolution 1706 (August 2006).
• China provided financial assistance for water, electricity, and health services in the distressed region, totaling $11.65 million by June 2008, based on the belief that a lack of socio-economic development contributed to the conflict.
• In 2007, China applied direct pressure on President Omar al-Bashir to accept UN peacekeeping forces and cooperate with the international community, eventually voting for Resolution 1769 in July 2007 to authorize a 26,000-strong force.
• China appointed Liu Guijin as a special envoy for African affairs on 11 May 2007 and deployed 275 military engineers to the UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur.
• Regarding the International Criminal Court's (ICC) 2008 arrest warrant for President al-Bashir, China expressed concern that the move would obstruct peace efforts and urged the Sudanese government to engage in dialogue with the ICC.
• Armed resistance movements (ARMs) in Darfur, such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), remained critical of China and targeted Chinese oil interests, including attacks on the Defra and Rahwa oil fields in 2007.
• Western officials, including US President George W. Bush and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, acknowledged and commended China's evolving role as a principal stakeholder in resolving the Darfur crisis.
• The author concludes that China's impact as a mediator remains limited because it failed to establish balanced relations with all political forces in Sudan, focusing primarily on the Khartoum government.

APA

Ahmed, G. K. (2010). The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Occasional-Paper-67.pdf

Chicago

Ahmed, Gaafar Karrar. The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2010. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Occasional-Paper-67.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Ahmed |first1=Gaafar Karrar |title=The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=September 2010 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Occasional-Paper-67.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{ahmed2010chinese, author = {Ahmed, Gaafar Karrar}, title = {{The Chinese Stance on the Darfur Conflict}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2010}, month = sep, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Occasional-Paper-67.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }