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The Gravity of Relations Between Juba and Khartoum

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This research paper analyzes the geopolitical and economic complexities surrounding the potential independence of Southern Sudan following its 2011 referendum. It highlights the critical interdependence between Juba and Khartoum, particularly regarding oil infrastructure, border demarcation, and regional stability in the Nile Basin.

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  • The independence of Southern Sudan creates a state of mutual interdependence where decisions in Juba and Khartoum will continue to impact one another, described as two planets remaining in each other's gravitational fields.
  • Oil is the most critical area for cooperation and negotiation, as the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) derives 98% of its income from oil exports, 75% of Sudan's 5 billion barrels of oil are located in the South, and exports must travel through the North to Port Sudan.
  • China is the primary consumer of Sudanese oil, purchasing 60% of the output, which represents approximately 6% of total Chinese imports.
  • Border and citizenship issues remain volatile, with approximately 50% of Sudan's population living on the North-South border and unresolved demarcation in areas like Abyei posing a risk of conflict.
  • Southern Sudan faces severe internal challenges including a lack of infrastructure (only 40km of paved road), extensive land disputes involving refugees and IDPs, and internal political instability within the SPLM.
  • The independence of the South will destabilize Northern Sudan's political structure, requiring the formation of a new government as the SPLM withdraws its 28% share of cabinet positions, while the North continues to face insurgencies in Darfur.
  • Southern Sudan's potential alignment with the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and the Cooperative Framework Agreement could shift the balance of power regarding Nile water usage, challenging Egypt's historical veto rights and its reliance on the river for 95% of its water.

Cite the original document

APA
South African Institute of International Affairs (2011). The Gravity of Relations Between Juba and Khartoum. https://saiia.org.za/research/the-gravity-of-relations-between-juba-and-khartoum/
Chicago
South African Institute of International Affairs. The Gravity of Relations Between Juba and Khartoum. 2011. https://saiia.org.za/research/the-gravity-of-relations-between-juba-and-khartoum/.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=The Gravity of Relations Between Juba and Khartoum |date=23 January 2011 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/the-gravity-of-relations-between-juba-and-khartoum/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2011gravity, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{The Gravity of Relations Between Juba and Khartoum}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2011}, month = jan, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/the-gravity-of-relations-between-juba-and-khartoum/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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