The Gravity of Relations Between Juba and Khartoum

The document examines the complex interdependence between Northern and Southern Sudan as the South moves toward independence. It highlights the critical role of oil co-management, as Southern Sudan derives 98% of its income from oil exports that must travel through Northern infrastructure. The author argues that while the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) provided a path to secession, significant risks remain, including unresolved border disputes in Abyei, the potential for continued insurgency in the North, and the fragile internal governance of the South. Regionally, the document notes the potential for a new independent South Sudan to shift the balance of power within the Nile Basin Initiative, potentially challenging Egypt's historical dominance over Nile water rights.

• Southern Sudan is heavily dependent on Northern Sudan for its economic survival because 98% of its income comes from oil exports that are transported through the North to Port Sudan.
• Oil distribution is a primary point of tension and necessary cooperation, with 75% of Sudan's 5 billion barrels of oil located in the South, and China acting as the largest customer by purchasing 60% of it.
• Border demarcation remains a significant risk for conflict, particularly in Abyei where a postponed referendum and disputes between the nomadic Misseriya and the Dinka Ngok tribes over residency and voting rights persist.
• The independence of Southern Sudan is expected to destabilize Northern Sudan's internal politics by necessitating a new government and potentially emboldening resistance movements like the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).
• Southern Sudan faces severe internal fragility, including a lack of infrastructure—with only 40km of paved road—and widespread land disputes involving refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
• The emergence of an independent Southern Sudan could disrupt the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) by tipping the balance of power against Egypt, which currently relies on the Nile for over 95% of its water.

APA

South African Institute of International Affairs (2011). The Gravity of Relations Between Juba and Khartoum. https://saiia.org.za/research/the-gravity-of-relations-between-juba-and-khartoum/

Chicago

South African Institute of International Affairs. The Gravity of Relations Between Juba and Khartoum. 2011. https://saiia.org.za/research/the-gravity-of-relations-between-juba-and-khartoum/.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=The Gravity of Relations Between Juba and Khartoum |date=23 January 2011 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/the-gravity-of-relations-between-juba-and-khartoum/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2011gravity, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{The Gravity of Relations Between Juba and Khartoum}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2011}, month = jan, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/the-gravity-of-relations-between-juba-and-khartoum/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }