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This briefing examines the risks and logistical challenges surrounding Sudan's first multi-party elections since 1986, scheduled for 11 April 2010. The authors argue that the elections, mandated by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), are occurring too late in the interim period to effectively influence the January 2011 self-determination referendum for Southern Sudan. The document highlights significant political risks, including the boycott of the presidential race by Yassir Arman, disputes over the 2008 population census, restrictive security laws, and the extreme complexity of the voting process for a largely illiterate population.

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  • The 11 April 2010 elections were intended to provide a democratic mandate for the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and allow elected officials to encourage Southern Sudanese to choose unity over independence in the January 2011 referendum. However, the authors suggest the elections were largely imposed by international actors, as the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) originally opposed national elections during the interim period.
  • Significant political risks threaten the credibility of the elections, including a boycott of the presidential race by Yassir Arman—supported by the SPLM—due to security concerns, irregularities in electoral management, and ongoing conflict in Darfur. Additionally, the NCP and SPLM remain in a deadlock over the 2008 population census; the SPLM alleges the NCP inflated figures for northern 'Arab' tribes in Darfur to reduce the South's proportional population share.
  • The electoral process is described as overly complex and potentially unfeasible, particularly in South Sudan. Voters there must complete 12 separate ballots despite a reported literacy rate of only 24% (12% for women). Mock voting indicated that it could take an illiterate person up to 90 minutes to vote, creating opportunities for technical irregularities or post-election manipulation.
  • Human rights and legal frameworks in Sudan are viewed as unconducive to a fair democratic process. A December 2009 law failed to significantly reform security legislation, maintaining wide-ranging search, arrest, and seizure powers for the armed forces. Furthermore, millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Darfur are effectively marginalized because the Election Act does not allow them to vote in their places of origin.

Cite the original document

APA
Mwanika, P. N., & Heleta, S. (2010). The Sudan Election Countdown. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-sudan-election-countdown
Chicago
Mwanika, Philip Njuguna, and Savo Heleta. The Sudan Election Countdown. Institute for Security Studies, 2010. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-sudan-election-countdown.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Mwanika |first1=Philip Njuguna |last2=Heleta |first2=Savo |title=The Sudan Election Countdown |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=April 2010 |url=https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-sudan-election-countdown |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{mwanika2010sudan, author = {Mwanika, Philip Njuguna and Heleta, Savo}, title = {{The Sudan Election Countdown}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2010}, month = apr, url = {https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-sudan-election-countdown}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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