policy-briefing-25-35374d5cedaf2589.pdf

This policy briefing by the South African Institute of International Affairs analyzes the 2011 referendum in Southern Sudan and the mediation efforts led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. It examines the potential post-referendum scenarios, the internal challenges facing Southern Sudan, and the broader implications for the African Union regarding colonial borders and secession.

• Former South African President Thabo Mbeki, as chair of the African Union (AU) High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, is mediating post-referendum talks between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). These talks, launched in Khartoum on 10 July 2010 and anchored in the Mekelle Memorandum of Understanding signed on 23 June 2010, aim to address structural imbalances in the Sudanese state and are organized into four working groups focusing on citizenship, security, financial/economic/natural resources, and international treaties/legal issues.
• Thabo Mbeki outlined four possible scenarios for relations between Northern and Southern Sudan following the January 2011 referendum: 1) complete separation into two independent states with severed ties; 2) two independent states with an open border and a framework for cooperation; 3) a confederalist option where two independent states share government institutions; and 4) a unified Sudan focusing on Southern development and the stabilization of Darfur.
• Southern Sudan faces significant internal political and economic challenges regardless of the referendum outcome. These include food insecurity, a lack of physical infrastructure, insecurity in rural areas caused by ethnic clashes, tensions between nomads and sedentary agriculturalists, and a heavy economic dependence on oil, which accounts for 90% of the Government of Southern Sudan's (GoSS) foreign earnings.
• The referendum process is complicated by several short-term risks and requirements. The Southern Sudan Referendum Act requires a 60% voter turnout for validity and a 50+1% majority for the outcome. Concerns exist regarding the lack of progress on a special referendum for the Abyei region, the potential for the referendum to be postponed, and ongoing disputes over the exact location of the North-South border.
• The potential secession of Southern Sudan serves as a test case for the African Union's approach to colonial borders and internal historical conflicts. The document notes that similar secessionist pressures exist in other African territories, specifically Somaliland, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Katanga), and Ethiopia (the Ogaden).
• International actors are adjusting their diplomatic engagements in response to the potential for Southern Sudanese independence. Egypt, previously an opponent of independence, has begun engaging with the GoSS, partly due to concerns over the Nile Basin Initiative and water supply. China has opened a consular office in Juba and hosted GoSS officials in Beijing.

APA

South African Institute of International Affairs (n.d.). policy-briefing-25-35374d5cedaf2589.pdf. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Policy-Briefing-25.pdf

Chicago

South African Institute of International Affairs. policy-briefing-25-35374d5cedaf2589.pdf. n.d. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Policy-Briefing-25.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=policy-briefing-25-35374d5cedaf2589.pdf |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Policy-Briefing-25.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairsndpolicybriefing2535374d5cedaf2589pdf, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{policy-briefing-25-35374d5cedaf2589.pdf}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Policy-Briefing-25.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }