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The East African Community (EAC) has expanded its membership to include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia, aiming to increase its geopolitical influence and market size. However, this growth strains the bloc's institutional capacity, particularly regarding financial sustainability, bureaucratic efficiency, and the harmonisation of economic policies among fragile states. The inclusion of conflict-prone members introduces significant security risks, though it also provides opportunities for collective regional stability and trade integration through frameworks like the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement.

The document outlines a methodological framework for gender mainstreaming within Senegal's climate adaptation planning. It identifies specific entry points across 14 process steps—from launch to notification—and provides seven key tools, including gender analysis and gender-responsive budgeting. It highlights the disproportionate impact of climate change on women in Senegal and offers a series of national and international best practices to ensure equitable benefits from adaptation measures.

The document advocates for model investment contracts as a tool for governments, particularly in developing countries, to bridge gaps in domestic legislation and ensure balanced, consistent, and sustainable agricultural investments.

The document examines the Trump administration's efforts to secure critical minerals and reduce dependence on China, focusing on proposed deals in Ukraine and the DRC. It argues that these 'minerals-for-security' arrangements face significant feasibility hurdles and risk mirroring neocolonial patterns. The author recommends that African nations adopt 'strategic neutrality' and focus on domestic value addition to maximize their agency in the global energy transition.

The Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF), the operational arm of the IMF's Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST), provides long-term concessional loans to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) to implement macro-critical climate reforms. While the RSF creates fiscal space and improves investment conditions, its impact is often hindered by limited engagement with sectoral ministries, overlapping climate initiatives, and inconsistent coordination with development partners like the World Bank and regional development banks. The document recommends institutionalizing inter-ministry platforms, aligning RSF reforms with national climate plans, and utilizing joint diagnostic tools. It also highlights the role of IMF Climate Finance Roundtables in aligning investments with national priorities, though these have yet to mobilize significant private capital. Case studies from Bangladesh, Barbados, and Senegal illustrate both the potential and the challenges of these coordination mechanisms.

The report examines the role of green banks in bridging the USD 7.4 trillion annual climate funding gap. It identifies four main structures: standalone de novo banks, enhanced public development banks (PDBs), green facilities within PDBs, and country platforms. While standalone banks are more common in advanced economies, EMDEs frequently utilize green facilities as transitional mechanisms. The report emphasizes that success depends on financial, environmental, and political sustainability, and proposes three international support options: a new design initiative, expanding the FiCS Innovation Lab, or forming a coalition of existing initiatives.

The document analyzes pandemic preparedness in Africa, categorizing nations into scientifically advanced, policy-advanced, and fragile states. It argues that while global actors like the WHO promote standardized frameworks and securitization, these often clash with local needs for long-term health system strengthening. The author highlights a disconnect where funding is directed toward reactionary measures and 'pre-approved studies' rather than sustainable infrastructure, particularly in authoritarian or fragile states.

The report finds that human-caused climate change significantly increased extreme heat and health risks globally from December 2024 to February 2025. At least 1.8 billion people experienced temperatures at least twice as likely due to climate change every day of the period, with exposure peaking at 3 billion people on February 28, 2025. Africa was particularly affected, with 293 million people experiencing 30 or more 'risky heat days' added by climate change. The analysis also highlights that 110 out of 220 analyzed countries and 287 out of 940 cities saw the average person experience strong climate influence for at least one-third of the season.

This policy note examines the Compact with Africa (CwA), an initiative launched in 2017 to increase private investment and infrastructure in African countries through coordinated reform agendas and stakeholder cooperation.

The G20 Compact with Africa (CwA), initiated in 2017, aims to boost private investment and infrastructure in Africa through reform agendas in macroeconomic, business, and financing frameworks. While CwA countries often show stronger growth and trade performance, a direct causal link to investment flows remains unproven, and foreign direct investment to Africa rose only by $4.5 billion between 2017 and 2023. To enhance the initiative, the author recommends that South Africa's G20 presidency facilitate the admission of interested countries such as Angola, Kenya, and Zambia, and elevate the African Advisory Group (AAG) to a permanent G20 working group. Additionally, the note suggests spotlighting critical minerals and energy investment, improving investment grades to reduce Africa's $75 billion risk premium, and implementing 'country platforms' to increase private sector engagement in reform agendas.

WRI has developed a cost-effective MRV framework and the TerraMatch platform to track land restoration progress. The process combines geospatial polygons, semi-annual field reports, and independent verification using AI-driven satellite imagery and employment records to measure tree counts, carbon stocks, and job creation.

In February 2025, M23 rebels captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province in the eastern DRC, following the previous seizure of Goma. The document argues that Rwanda's support for M23 is driven by a combination of national security concerns—specifically the threat posed by the Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)—and economic interests related to minerals like gold, tin, and tantalum. It further notes that rivalry with Uganda and a perceived weakness in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have emboldened Rwanda's actions. Despite calls from the US, France, the UK, and China for Rwandan forces to withdraw, the international response remains tepid, with few concrete sanctions or aid cuts implemented.

The report identifies a 'triple gap'—planning, finance, and data—in the transition of global agrifood systems. Top-down analysis estimates an annual need of USD 1.1 trillion to align with a 1.5°C pathway, while bottom-up estimates from NDCs total only USD 201.5 billion. Current annual climate finance flows of USD 28.5 billion are severely insufficient, requiring a 40-fold increase to meet top-down needs. The report highlights significant underestimations in national planning and a critical lack of granular data, particularly regarding adaptation and private finance.

The report maps nearly one hundred agreements on critical minerals between African states and global actors, highlighting the strategic competition for resources. It identifies a lack of transparency in these deals and notes that while China and Russia are prominent, other actors like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are expanding their footprints. The analysis emphasizes that these partnerships often reflect broader geopolitical and historical ties rather than just economic needs.

The document reports on interviews with 1,500 farmers in ten African mountain regions, identifying increased temperatures, reduced fog, and erratic rainfall as primary climatic changes. These changes have led to lower yields for maize, cassava, and coffee, as well as reduced milk production and increased soil erosion. Farmers are adapting through on-farm strategies like changing planting dates and adopting new crop varieties, though wealth and conflict significantly influence the capacity to adapt. The brief recommends improving access to credit and markets, enhancing knowledge exchange, and accounting for the impacts of violent conflict in adaptation planning.

The document argues that while green guarantees can mobilize up to five times more capital than loans, they are underutilized due to complexity, lack of technical assistance, high costs, and time horizon misalignments. It showcases case studies from the World Bank Group, Green Guarantee Company, TCX, GuarantCo, and a Sida-IFU partnership to demonstrate how streamlining processes, providing targeted technical support, subsidizing currency hedges, extending guarantee tenors to 20 years, and fostering bilateral cooperation can unlock private capital for the green transition in EMDEs.

This policy brief examines the gap between registered and off-register land rights in South Africa, defining land administration as the management function that executes land governance policies. It contrasts the formal common-law property system with customary and informal rights, noting that the latter lack formal registration, precise demarcation, and integrated information management. The brief evaluates two international models for bridging this gap: the World Bank and UN-Habitat's 'Fit-for-Purpose' approach, which emphasizes flexibility and affordability, and the 'Talking Titler' evolutionary design approach, which focuses on social networks and context-specific adaptability. While the Fit-for-Purpose model saw success in Rwanda, critics argue it may overlook local power dynamics in South Africa, suggesting that a more flexible, adaptive system may be necessary to address the country's complex land-rights situation.

The document advocates for integrating agroecology into the Water–Energy–Food (WEF) nexus to transform African food systems from industrial, extractive models to resilient, equitable ones. It highlights that while agroecology offers a science-based alternative, it is often fragmented and underfunded. The authors propose that philanthropic organisations, due to their risk tolerance and flexibility, can bridge these gaps by funding policy integration, capacity building, and research. The brief outlines the multi-scalar benefits of the WEF nexus—from the farm to the regional level—and provides case studies from Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda to demonstrate the efficacy of integrated resource management, such as solar-powered irrigation, in enhancing climate resilience.

The brief argues that agrochemical use and misuse are increasing across Africa due to corporate profit motives, weak regulation, and climate change, posing severe risks to human health and the environment. It recommends strengthening governance, increasing investment in agroecology, and leveraging financial tools to reduce synthetic chemical dependence.

The document argues that secure land tenure is a prerequisite for agroecological transitions in Africa, as it provides the security necessary for farmers to invest in long-term sustainable practices. It highlights how colonial legacies of land dispossession continue to create systemic inequalities and tenure insecurity across different African regions. The brief provides specific analysis of land systems in countries such as Kenya, South Africa, Benin, Uganda, and Malawi, noting that while some national policies recognize agroecology, institutional support often remains tied to industrial, input-intensive agriculture. It concludes with recommendations for donors to shift toward long-term, locally led, and gender-sensitive funding models that prioritize land rights and social equity.