The Fall of Bukavu: Rwanda, M23 and the Battle for Influence in the Eastern DRC

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In February 2025, M23 rebels captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province in the eastern DRC, following the previous seizure of Goma. The document argues that Rwanda's support for M23 is driven by a combination of national security concerns—specifically the threat posed by the Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)—and economic interests related to minerals like gold, tin, and tantalum. It further notes that rivalry with Uganda and a perceived weakness in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have emboldened Rwanda's actions. Despite calls from the US, France, the UK, and China for Rwandan forces to withdraw, the international response remains tepid, with few concrete sanctions or aid cuts implemented.

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  • M23 rebels captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province, in mid-February 2025, following the seizure of Goma the previous month. The group is estimated to have 6,000 personnel supported by 4,000 Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) troops.
  • Rwanda's support for M23 is linked to economic interests in minerals, specifically gold, tin, and tantalum. In 2023, gold was Rwanda's largest export, valued at $885 million and accounting for 65% of its total exports, despite minimal local production.
  • From a security perspective, Rwanda uses proxy groups in the eastern DRC to monitor and suppress opposition movements and to counter the Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). This strategy of targeting dissidents has also been observed in Mozambique.
  • The resurgence of M23 was triggered by rivalry between Rwanda and Uganda for influence in the eastern DRC, specifically following the 2021 deployment of Ugandan troops under Operation Shujaa and a 2019 road-building project to increase trade between Uganda and the DRC.
  • The international response to the crisis has been weak; while the US, France, the UK, and China called for Rwandan withdrawal, no targeted sanctions or aid cuts have been implemented. Within the EU, countries like Belgium, Germany, and Sweden are more aggressive, while Lisbon and Paris are more cautious.

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APA
Buchanan-Clarke, S. (2025). The Fall of Bukavu: Rwanda, M23 and the Battle for Influence in the Eastern DRC. Good Governance Africa. https://gga.org/the-fall-of-bukavu-rwanda-m23-and-the-battle-for-influence-in-the-eastern-drc/
Chicago
Buchanan-Clarke, Stephen. The Fall of Bukavu: Rwanda, M23 and the Battle for Influence in the Eastern DRC. Good Governance Africa, 2025. https://gga.org/the-fall-of-bukavu-rwanda-m23-and-the-battle-for-influence-in-the-eastern-drc/.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Buchanan-Clarke |first1=Stephen |title=The Fall of Bukavu: Rwanda, M23 and the Battle for Influence in the Eastern DRC |publisher=Good Governance Africa |date=22 February 2025 |url=https://gga.org/the-fall-of-bukavu-rwanda-m23-and-the-battle-for-influence-in-the-eastern-drc/ |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{buchananclarke2025fall, author = {Buchanan-Clarke, Stephen}, title = {{The Fall of Bukavu: Rwanda, M23 and the Battle for Influence in the Eastern DRC}}, institution = {Good Governance Africa}, year = {2025}, month = feb, url = {https://gga.org/the-fall-of-bukavu-rwanda-m23-and-the-battle-for-influence-in-the-eastern-drc/}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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