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The document introduces 'biocultural community protocols' as tools for Indigenous and local communities to articulate their customary laws, values, and decision-making processes to external actors. It provides a structured four-part framework for facilitators to guide communities through the process of documentation, implementation, and reflection. The toolkit emphasizes endogenous development, legal empowerment, and participatory methods—such as community mapping, participatory video, and 'Legislative Theatre'—to reduce power asymmetries and safeguard collective biocultural heritage against external threats like land grabbing and industrial resource extraction.

The document outlines a multi-step process for creating biocultural community protocols, starting with an assessment of appropriateness and moving through the 'mapping' of community identity, natural foundations, sociocultural aspects, economic principles, and political and legal frameworks. It emphasizes community-led decision-making, the protection of sensitive traditional knowledge, and the strategic consolidation of findings into a format that communicates clear messages to external decision-makers to achieve legal and political goals.

The document defines biocultural community protocols as participatory instruments used by Indigenous and local communities to document their customary laws, values, and decision-making processes. These protocols aim to bridge the gap between community worldviews and external actors—such as governments and companies—to prevent resource exploitation and ensure the respect of customary stewardship. The toolkit outlines a four-part process: understanding the community, documenting the protocol, using it for engagement, and reflecting on outcomes. It provides a wide array of participatory tools, including community sketch maps, trend line analysis, and participatory theatre, to empower communities through legal awareness and social mobilization.

The document outlines a three-stage process for creating biocultural community protocols: deciding on the appropriateness of a protocol, mapping the community's foundations (identity, natural, social-cultural, economic, political, and legal), and consolidating this information into a strategic tool for external engagement. It emphasizes that protocols are context-dependent and should be community-led, avoiding external coercion. The guide provides specific tools and questions to document traditional knowledge, customary laws, and biodiversity, while cautioning facilitators to safeguard sensitive information. It concludes that while individual protocols offer self-affirmation and local change, their collective aggregation can drive broader structural and legal shifts.

The document describes Biocultural Community Protocols (BCPs) as community-determined frameworks that define values, procedures, and priorities to guide engagement with governments, companies, and NGOs. It outlines how BCPs help communities secure customary rights and respond to threats like illegal mining or infrastructure projects. The briefing provides case studies from Ghana, Malaysia, Kenya, India, and South Africa, illustrating the use of BCPs for resource mapping, legal empowerment, and the protection of traditional knowledge and biodiversity. It also promotes a four-part Toolkit for Community Facilitators to support the endogenous development of these protocols.

The African Activists for Climate Justice (AACJ) project, implemented by a consortium including Natural Justice, Oxfam, and others, has worked in Senegal from May 2021 to December 2025 to democratize climate debate and promote inter- and intra-generational climate justice. Key achievements include the creation of six influential networks for women, youth, and local officials, the production of 18 community narratives (podcasts, videos, and comics), and the legal empowerment of communities facing extractive industries. The project has facilitated community participation in national policies such as the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and the National Adaptation Plan, while supporting legal actions and the recognition of Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs) in biodiversity legislation.

The guide explains how to use a map that identifies land parcels in Turkana, Samburu, Meru, Isiolo, Garissa, and Lamu counties earmarked for the LAPSSET Corridor Project. It details the project's components, the map's data sources from the National Land Commission (NLC), and the legal eight-step process for compulsory land acquisition and compensation in Kenya.

The research explores the role of the Norwegian-Somali community as a foreign policy actor, bridging the gap between 'ethnic lobby' literature and transnational migration studies. Through interviews and case analysis, the authors argue that the diaspora successfully influenced Norway's shift to criticize Ethiopia's 2006-2007 military intervention in Somalia and encouraged the creation of the Special Financing Facility (Trust Fund) to support the Somali government. The study identifies key enabling factors for this influence, including the diaspora's concentration in urban centers like Oslo, their high level of political engagement, and their ability to provide Norwegian decision-makers with direct access to Somali political elites. However, the authors note that the diaspora is not a unitary actor, with significant internal divisions based on clan and region, such as the Somaliland diaspora's unsuccessful lobbying for independent state recognition.

The study analyzes 285 conflict episodes to determine how natural resources affect the duration of postconflict peace. It identifies three primary mechanisms: distribution, financing, and aggravation. The findings indicate that while natural resource conflicts generally show shorter peace periods bivariately, only conflicts driven by disagreements over the distribution of resources and revenues significantly increase the risk of recurrence in a multivariate analysis. This suggests that resource-related grievances are a more persistent driver of conflict relapse than the mere opportunity to finance warfare.

The research argues that the 'unitary actor assumption' in civil war studies overlooks the critical role of internal fragmentation. By analyzing self-determination movements from 1960 to 2005, the author finds that movements with more internal factions are significantly more likely to experience the onset of civil war and to remain in active conflict. This is attributed to the fact that multiple factions create uncertainty for states regarding the movement's preferences and capabilities, and make it difficult for any single faction to provide a credible commitment to a settlement.

The report finds that 2025 was the third most violent year since 1989, with 245,000 battle-related deaths. It highlights a record high of 65 state-based conflicts and a concerning doubling of international conflicts to eight in 2025. While non-state conflicts decreased slightly, one-sided violence surged to 76,500 fatalities, primarily driven by massacres in Sudan.

The research examines the determinants of external state support for rebel groups using a new dataset of 403 organizations. It argues that support is not merely a function of the civil war's general characteristics but depends on the specific attributes of the rebel group and the international relations of the target state. The findings indicate that moderately strong groups with transnational constituencies are most likely to receive aid, particularly when the target state is involved in an international rivalry or receives its own external support. Conversely, very strong or very weak groups, and those in democratic states, are less likely to be supported.

The research demonstrates that states experiencing civil wars are significantly more likely to be involved in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Using data from 1946 to 2001, the authors find that this 'civil peace' effect is comparable in magnitude to the 'democratic peace' effect. Analysis of over 400 MIDs reveals that the increased risk is driven by states attempting to influence the outcome of civil wars through direct intervention, externalization (such as cross-border counter-insurgency), and unintended spillovers, rather than by opportunistic attacks on weakened states or diversionary wars to consolidate domestic power.

The study finds no general statistical relationship between forest resources and the onset or duration of civil wars at the national level. While some disaggregated results suggest that proximity to the coast may prolong conflicts in forested zones, the authors conclude that the perceived link between forests and conflict is largely driven by a few specific cases, such as Burma, rather than a global pattern.

The study argues that while rising food prices create economic grievances, these only translate into urban unrest if societal organizations—such as civil society organizations (CSOs) and political parties—are present to provide mobilization structures and frame grievances. Using data from 41 African countries, the author finds that state repression of these organizations generally decreases the probability of unrest. Interestingly, the highest risk of unrest occurs in moderately repressive regimes that still allow some organizational activity, rather than in completely open societies, where citizens may prefer voting over protesting or where organizations provide alternative coping mechanisms.

The authors argue that non-violent direct action is more effective at undermining autocracies and significantly more likely to lead to democratic transitions than violent conflict. Using a multinomial logit model for the period 1900-2004, the study finds that non-violent campaigns substantially increase the probability of democratization, particularly when the state has a high proportion of democratic neighbors. Conversely, violent direct action is less effective at destabilizing regimes overall and makes transitions to new autocracies relatively more likely. The research suggests that non-violence promotes power dispersion and elite defection, whereas violence tends to centralize power and justify further repression.

The document examines the complex geopolitical landscape of the Middle East through a series of expert perspectives. Key themes include the failure of Western 'exceptionalism' in diplomacy, the systemic human rights abuses in countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the critical role of water scarcity as a driver of intra-state conflict. It provides detailed analysis of the 'bottom-up' stabilization efforts in Iraq via local ceasefires, the strategic threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation, and the use of public diplomacy by non-state actors like Hizbollah. Additionally, it addresses the stalled peace process between Israel and Palestine and the specific challenges of the Cyprus division.

The document argues that AI can strengthen the information basis for peace-building by enhancing conflict data collection, improving the accuracy of conflict forecasting, and supporting scenario modelling for anticipatory action. While acknowledging risks such as surveillance and disinformation, the author suggests that AI tools—including large language models and satellite imagery analysis—can help humanitarian actors and governments better anticipate and mitigate the impacts of armed conflict.

The authors use geo-coded data from 31 federal states to argue that both relatively rich and relatively poor regions are more prone to secessionist conflict than those with average wealth. The study also finds that the presence of politically excluded ethnic groups and the existence of regional autonomy further elevate the risk of violent secessionist conflict.

The Strategies of Resistance Data Project (SRDP) provides a global dataset of 1,124 organizations involved in self-determination disputes between 1960 and 2005. Unlike previous datasets that focus on mass campaigns or violent actors, SRDP uses the organization as the unit of analysis to track tactical shifts. Findings indicate that nonviolent tactics are more common than violence in these movements, and organizations are more likely to switch from violence to nonviolence than vice versa.