Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups

The research examines the determinants of external state support for rebel groups using a new dataset of 403 organizations. It argues that support is not merely a function of the civil war's general characteristics but depends on the specific attributes of the rebel group and the international relations of the target state. The findings indicate that moderately strong groups with transnational constituencies are most likely to receive aid, particularly when the target state is involved in an international rivalry or receives its own external support. Conversely, very strong or very weak groups, and those in democratic states, are less likely to be supported.

• External support is most likely for rebel groups of moderate strength; the strongest and weakest groups are less likely to receive assistance. Very weak groups are seen as unworthy investments, while the strongest can rely on domestic resources and prioritize autonomy.
• Rebel groups with transnational constituencies—including those with ethnic, religious, or ideological ties across borders—are significantly more likely to receive external state support.
• Insurgent groups are more likely to receive external assistance if the state they are fighting is engaged in an international rivalry, as sponsoring rebels is a tactic to undermine enemies without initiating full-scale interstate war.
• Counterbalancing interventions are common, where external states support rebel groups specifically because the target government is already receiving external assistance.
• Contrary to the authors' initial hypothesis, the ability to control territory did not decrease the likelihood of foreign support; instead, it was found to be positively related to receiving support, possibly because it proves the group's viability.
• General country-level characteristics, such as GDP per capita and overall military capacity (CINC), are not reliable predictors of whether rebel groups receive external support.
• Democratic states are generally less likely to be the target of externally sponsored rebel groups compared to non-democracies.
• The presence of a strong central command did not increase the likelihood of receiving support, contradicting the expectation that such structures make rebels more reliable agents for state patrons.

APA

Salehyan, I., Gleditsch, K. S., & Cunningham, D. (n.d.). Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/ba2631d9-71a0-4297-9b5f-93d7d52b73ac/Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David Cunningham. Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups. Peace Research Institute Oslo, n.d. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/ba2631d9-71a0-4297-9b5f-93d7d52b73ac/Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Salehyan |first1=Idean |last2=Gleditsch |first2=Kristian Skrede |last3=Cunningham |first3=David |title=Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/ba2631d9-71a0-4297-9b5f-93d7d52b73ac/Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{salehyanndexplaining, author = {Salehyan, Idean and Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede and Cunningham, David}, title = {{Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/ba2631d9-71a0-4297-9b5f-93d7d52b73ac/Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }