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The report outlines a strategic roadmap for Niger's development, emphasizing the need to transition from a resource-dependent economy to a diversified one. It highlights critical vulnerabilities, including a 47.4% extreme poverty rate as of 2023 and significant food insecurity affecting 13% of the population in 2024. Key recommendations focus on leveraging a youthful demographic, scaling solar energy to improve a 21.5% national electricity access rate, and implementing climate-smart agriculture to combat desertification. The document also stresses the importance of governance reform following a history of five military takeovers and the need for regional security cooperation through the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission.

The report identifies a gap between the African Union's (AU) normative ambitions for civilian protection and operational reality, which is often dominated by military-heavy, counter-terrorism mandates. It argues that current community engagement is largely consultative and lacks agency. To improve outcomes, the report recommends shifting toward genuine community partnerships, reforming financing to support civilian roles, and integrating community-based early warning systems into mission responses.

The report examines the African Union's (AU) efforts to create a coherent foreign policy framework to navigate a fragmented international order, while highlighting the need for deeper economic integration similar to the EU. It details the evolving threat of Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin and the emerging extremist hub in the Borgu-Kainji axis. Additionally, it argues for a youth-focused approach to combat transnational organized crime, citing the rise of cybercrime and drug trafficking in West Africa. Finally, it outlines Burundi's priorities as AU chair, emphasizing water security, youth empowerment, and the urgent need for internal financial autonomy to ensure political sovereignty.

This policy brief argues that water and sanitation are strategic assets essential for Africa's peace, energy transition, and food security. It advocates for a Water-Energy-Food (WEF) nexus approach and Strategic Asset Management (SAM) to address a $1 trillion infrastructure investment gap by 2040 and mitigate the 'threat multiplier' effect of climate change. The brief recommends integrating water governance into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and strengthening transboundary cooperation across the continent's 63 shared river and lake basins to prevent conflict and promote regional stability.

The document analyzes how climate-induced stressors, such as desertification in the north and sea-level rise in the south, exacerbate security threats in Nigeria, including farmer-herder conflicts and insurgency. It evaluates the current security architecture, finding that while the National Security Strategy recognizes climate change, there is a significant lack of actionable integration within the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and other security agencies. The brief highlights gaps in institutional coordination, resource allocation, and risk assessment, while suggesting lessons from South Africa, Kenya, and Australia to build a more resilient, community-engaged policing model.

The document analyzes the rising trend of youth emigration from West Africa, driven by high unemployment, insecurity, and structural inequality. It highlights the resulting brain drain in critical sectors and suggests leveraging the digital economy and diaspora skills to create regional opportunities.

The document analyzes the operational resurgence of IS-WAP, highlighting its use of surveillance and combat drones, its 'Burning of the camps' campaign targeting military bases, and its logistical ties with IS-SP. It argues that a deteriorating regional security architecture, exacerbated by political instability in Niger and the withdrawal of foreign troops, is facilitating the expansion of militant Islamist groups across the Sahel and towards coastal West African states.

The Borno Model represents a shift from militarized, coercive approaches to a more humane, locally-owned framework for managing defections from Boko Haram factions. While it has successfully processed 160,000 exits by March 2024 through inclusive family-based reception and community engagement, it faces critical challenges including severe under-funding of livelihood support, a lack of transparent operational guidelines, and design flaws that risk reuniting women with their former captors.

The study finds that heavy precipitation events leading to severe flooding in Sudan are no longer rare in a climate 1.3°C warmer than pre-industrial levels, with such events now expected approximately every three years. Climate models indicate that human-induced warming has roughly doubled the likelihood of these events and increased their intensity by about 10%, with observed 30-day rainfall intensity in the study region increasing by 18% since 1981. The report emphasises that these climate risks are compounded by 'risk multipliers' including ongoing conflict, poverty, rapid urbanisation, and ageing infrastructure, which have created a displacement crisis in Sudan, Chad, and Nigeria. The authors argue that the transboundary nature of river systems in sub-Saharan Africa necessitates improved international coordination for flood management and early warning systems to mitigate future disasters as warming reaches 2°C.

The report assesses the potential for dialogue and negotiation to resolve the Boko Haram conflict in the Lake Chad Basin. It finds that while the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is a more coherent and credible partner, its transnational ties to ISIL make it less likely to negotiate. Conversely, Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (JAS) is perceived as more motivated to negotiate due to military weakness and internal fragmentation, though it lacks centralized control. The study emphasizes a disconnect between hardline leadership and lower-ranking members, who are more open to exiting the group if economic needs and safety are guaranteed. It recommends a multi-faceted approach targeting individual commanders and the use of trusted intermediaries, such as traditional leaders and former associates, to build trust and facilitate demobilization.

The document analyzes the 'epidemic' of military takeovers in Africa, identifying governance dysfunction, democratic decline, civil-military tensions, and Islamist insurgencies as primary drivers. It argues that the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs) have relied on reactive, inconsistent, and ineffective blanket sanctions that fail to deter coup plotters. The author recommends a shift toward prevention, targeted sanctions, and the strengthening of civil-military relations and democratic legitimacy.

The document examines the 'third generation' DDRRR processes used in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to manage exits from Boko Haram. It argues that effective disengagement requires understanding individual motivations to create tailored incentives, implementing gender-sensitive screening to distinguish between victims and active combatants, and ensuring regional coordination to prevent isolated national approaches. The brief highlights the need for predictable legal frameworks and active community engagement to prevent the perception of blanket amnesties and reduce social tension during reintegration.

The document examines the relationship between climate change and conflict in Africa, asserting that climate change functions as a 'risk multiplier' that exacerbates existing political, social, and economic tensions. It highlights that while some regions like the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and the Lake Chad Basin are particularly vulnerable, the path from climate impact to violence is indirect, often mediated by resource scarcity, forced migration, and institutional weakness. The report calls for the Global North to fulfill climate finance commitments and for African nations to adopt evidence-based, community-informed adaptation strategies that are sensitive to local conflict dynamics to prevent future instability.

The report examines the applicability of transitional justice in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), noting that while the region is not yet post-conflict, there is a need for mechanisms to address mass human rights abuses. It finds that LCB countries are at different stages of conceptualising these tools and that a balance between restorative and retributive justice is necessary. The document highlights the importance of local ownership, the role of traditional and religious conflict resolution mechanisms, and the need to address root causes of violent extremism such as structural inequalities.

The report examines the erosion of socio-economic resilience in the Lake Chad Basin due to the Boko Haram conflict. It details the disruption of fishing, agriculture, and livestock trade, the negative impact of state-imposed trade bans and extortion, and the specific vulnerabilities of women. It argues that the lack of state development presence pushes communities toward 'perverse social contracts' with violent extremist groups for survival.

The document argues that climate change acts as a 'threat multiplier' in Africa, where risks are amplified by existing governance deficits and poor development. It emphasizes that while climate-driven scarcity can fuel conflict, causality is complex and depends on political and historical contexts. The authors advocate for integrating climate action into the broader development agenda, transitioning from a narrative of vulnerability to one of economic opportunity through renewable energy and climate-resilient infrastructure. Key recommendations include strengthening the evidence base for climate security, increasing climate finance flows, and expanding climate diplomacy beyond the UNFCCC to platforms like the G20 and the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement.

The Goudoumaria reception centre in Niger provides socio-economic rehabilitation for Boko Haram defectors, but the programme faces significant challenges including funding shortages, inadequate vocational training, and gender-based stereotypes. While it has processed at least 375 individuals, issues such as long detention periods for the first cohort and a lack of psychosocial support for the second have hindered effectiveness. Economic instability and insufficient installation allowances have led some beneficiaries to return to Boko Haram, highlighting the need for improved monitoring and sustainable reintegration strategies to ensure regional stabilisation in the Lake Chad Basin.

The report highlights the critical role of youth-led organisations, particularly the YoNeLCR, in fostering resilience and peacebuilding in communities affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. It finds that the COVID-19 pandemic significantly hindered these efforts by limiting face-to-face community interaction and reducing donor funding, with some programme implementation dropping to less than 20% of usual levels. The document argues against the narrative of youth as merely victims or perpetrators, showcasing their roles as peace messengers, ICT innovators, and CSO leaders. It recommends that the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and African Union (AU) create formal plans to integrate youth-led organisations into regional stabilisation strategies.

The report finds that women associated with katiba Macina and Boko Haram provide strategic advantages through recruitment, logistics, and operational support. While association is often driven by marital ties, coercion, or the need for protection, the roles vary by group: Boko Haram utilizes women in combat and suicide missions, whereas katiba Macina relies more on women for community implantation and logistical supply, despite official denials of female combatant roles.

The document assesses the feasibility of dialogue between governments and violent extremist groups in the Lake Chad Basin based on a survey of 31 civil society organization representatives. While many respondents support exploring dialogue due to the failure of purely militarized responses, significant barriers exist, including deep mistrust, unclear extremist motivations, and ideological conflicts regarding the implementation of Sharia law. The brief recommends that governments conduct further research into actor motivations and initiate nationwide discussions to secure community buy-in.