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The report examines the strategic partnership between Nigeria and China within the context of Nigeria's energy transition. It highlights a shift in Chinese engagement from 'debt-heavy, state-directed mega-projects' to 'smaller, more commercially oriented and locally embedded projects' under a 'BRI 2.0' approach. While Nigeria faces severe energy gaps—with peak generation at 5.7 GW against a 20 GW demand—it aims for universal electricity access by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2060. The report details specific collaborations in solar assembly, battery manufacturing, and green hydrogen, while advising Nigeria to 'stack' diverse capital sources from China, the EU, and the US to avoid geopolitical zero-sum traps. It concludes that Nigeria must strengthen institutional coordination to address asymmetries in bargaining power and ensure technology transfer.

The document analyzes the operational resurgence of IS-WAP, highlighting its use of surveillance and combat drones, its 'Burning of the camps' campaign targeting military bases, and its logistical ties with IS-SP. It argues that a deteriorating regional security architecture, exacerbated by political instability in Niger and the withdrawal of foreign troops, is facilitating the expansion of militant Islamist groups across the Sahel and towards coastal West African states.

The report analyzes how climate change acts as a driver of conflict in Nigeria, specifically through resource competition, livelihood loss, and displacement. It details the interaction between environmental stressors and security issues, such as farmer-herder clashes and recruitment into armed groups like Boko Haram. The document proposes a five-step sequence to mainstream conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into the National Adaptation Plan (NAP), ranging from institutional framework development to the inclusion of peacebuilding markers in monitoring and evaluation.

Nigeria ranks 162nd out of 181 countries on the 2025 WPS Index with a score of 0.495, which is below both the global average (0.650) and the Sub-Saharan Africa average (0.511). While the country has seen a turnaround in its ranking to 2017 levels, significant disparities persist between the North and South, particularly in education and exposure to conflict. The document highlights the role of National Action Plans (NAPs) and specific initiatives like the AGILE project and RESMAT, while noting that a lack of systematic monitoring and evaluation hinders the implementation of these frameworks.

The report finds that 676 million women, or 17% of the global female population, lived within 50 km of a deadly conflict event in 2024, more than doubling the number since 1990. It highlights that while high-intensity conflicts gain more media attention, medium-intensity protracted conflicts are strongly correlated with lower Human Development Index (HDI) scores. The brief identifies Bangladesh as having the highest absolute number of women exposed to conflict, while 100% of women in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel/Palestine were affected. Using Nigeria as a case study, it demonstrates significant subnational variation in conflict intensity and types of violence, including state-based, communal, and criminal violence.

The document examines the consequences of the US aid freeze and the shutdown of USAID for Nigeria, specifically focusing on the risks to public health and poverty levels. Using International Futures (IFs) modelling, it predicts that the reduction in aid could push 700,000 additional Nigerians into extreme poverty by 2030 and shrink the economy by US$237 million. The health sector is identified as the most vulnerable area, particularly the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. The author argues that while the abrupt cut is harmful to the destitute, it serves as a necessary wake-up call for the Tinubu administration to increase domestic funding for essential services, noting that other bilateral donors are unlikely to fill the gap due to their own budget cuts for defence.

Nigeria faces a growing threat from improvised landmines in its northeastern region, with casualties quadrupling between 2022 and 2024. Current clearance efforts, managed exclusively by the Nigerian Army, rely on slow and risky manual tools like handheld metal detectors. The document argues that integrating airborne remote sensing and AI—technologies that have shown success in NATO and Harvard University experiments—could accelerate detection and improve safety. However, implementation is hindered by stringent drone regulations from the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority and state security concerns regarding the dual-use of UAVs. The brief recommends that federal authorities grant special derogations for humanitarian trials and formalize these technologies within the national mine action strategy currently being developed with the ICRC.

The Borno Model represents a shift from militarized, coercive approaches to a more humane, locally-owned framework for managing defections from Boko Haram factions. While it has successfully processed 160,000 exits by March 2024 through inclusive family-based reception and community engagement, it faces critical challenges including severe under-funding of livelihood support, a lack of transparent operational guidelines, and design flaws that risk reuniting women with their former captors.

The report assesses the potential for dialogue and negotiation to resolve the Boko Haram conflict in the Lake Chad Basin. It finds that while the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is a more coherent and credible partner, its transnational ties to ISIL make it less likely to negotiate. Conversely, Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (JAS) is perceived as more motivated to negotiate due to military weakness and internal fragmentation, though it lacks centralized control. The study emphasizes a disconnect between hardline leadership and lower-ranking members, who are more open to exiting the group if economic needs and safety are guaranteed. It recommends a multi-faceted approach targeting individual commanders and the use of trusted intermediaries, such as traditional leaders and former associates, to build trust and facilitate demobilization.

The author contends that Nigeria's security crises are fundamentally linked to its economic situation, where systemic poverty—exacerbated by political mismanagement and state failure—drives citizens toward crime. The paper details regional security threats, from jihadist violence in the North-East to oil theft in the South-South, and identifies specific failures such as the ineffective fuel subsidy regime, lack of infrastructure investment, and high youth unemployment. It concludes that without a shift toward selfless leadership and growth-oriented policies, the 2023 elections are unlikely to break this cycle of instability.

The report examines Nigeria's food systems, highlighting a projected increase in chronic hunger and extreme poverty by 2030. It identifies livestock as the primary source of agricultural GHG emissions and notes significant climate vulnerabilities, particularly for rice yields. The analysis reveals a stark dietary divide between income groups, with wealthier households consuming more animal-based proteins. While national dietary guidelines and climate policies exist, the report finds a substantial gap in Official Development Assistance (ODA) required to meet SDG 2 targets.

The report highlights the critical role of youth-led organisations, particularly the YoNeLCR, in fostering resilience and peacebuilding in communities affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. It finds that the COVID-19 pandemic significantly hindered these efforts by limiting face-to-face community interaction and reducing donor funding, with some programme implementation dropping to less than 20% of usual levels. The document argues against the narrative of youth as merely victims or perpetrators, showcasing their roles as peace messengers, ICT innovators, and CSO leaders. It recommends that the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and African Union (AU) create formal plans to integrate youth-led organisations into regional stabilisation strategies.

The report identifies significant barriers to digitising cash transfers in Nigeria, including regulatory restrictions on agent e-float, low recipient digital literacy, and a lack of economic incentive for financial service providers (FSPs) to serve poor, rural populations. While mobile phone penetration is relatively high, most recipients use basic feature phones and prefer cash due to ease of access and lack of network reliability. The document proposes segmenting recipients by 'digital payment readiness' and digitising community savings groups as entry points for financial inclusion. It also highlights the inefficiency of current 'virtual accounts' that require 100% cash-out, arguing for a transition toward permanent digital wallets and merchant payment systems to reduce liquidity burdens and fraud.

The document highlights a critical lack of accurate health and mortality data for children under five in areas affected by Boko Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon. It identifies severe malnutrition, interrupted vaccination schedules, and psychological trauma as primary consequences of the conflict. The author argues that current counter-terrorism strategies often ignore or actively undermine child development, and recommends funding targeted research, empowering local community-based organisations, and ensuring the rights of children are upheld during security operations.

The report examines the responses of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to the Boko Haram insurgency. It highlights the role of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in coordinating military action and the use of national strategies like Nigeria's Operation Lafiya Dole and Cameroon's RMIA4. The authors argue that while military cooperation has improved, non-military responses remain ad-hoc. Security restrictions, such as curfews and trade bans, have negatively impacted local livelihoods, potentially alienating civilians. The report also discusses the challenges of reintegrating ex-militants and the politicization of reconstruction efforts in Borno state ahead of the 2019 elections.

In August 2016, Boko Haram split into two factions: ISIS-WA, led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi and influenced by Mamman Nur, and JAS, led by Abubakar Shekau. The rupture was driven by Shekau's dictatorial leadership and a fundamental ideological dispute over the targeting of Muslim civilians. JAS continues to employ indiscriminate violence and suicide bombings against civilians, while ISIS-WA focuses on large-scale assaults against security forces and attempts to cultivate local support. Both groups rely on local extortion, cattle rustling, and kidnapping for finance, with limited evidence of practical external support despite ISIS-WA's formal alliance with the global Islamic State network. The report concludes that ISIS-WA represents a more significant long-term threat due to its superior military coordination and strategic efforts to win 'hearts and minds' among vulnerable populations.

The document presents findings from a study of 50 peacebuilders in northern Nigeria, identifying religious and political factors as the primary drivers of Boko Haram recruitment. It argues that while military action is seen as having little impact on recruitment, a sustainable solution requires a combination of hard security and soft measures, including negotiation, amnesty, and national reconciliation.

The policy brief examines the broad economic relationship between China and Nigeria, highlighting significant investments in oil, infrastructure, and agriculture, while identifying the banking sector as an under-developed area for future cooperation. It details existing financial links, such as the involvement of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and First Bank, and suggests that current reforms in the Nigerian banking sector create opportunities for Chinese acquisitions and investments. The author notes that while past projects were often marred by corruption, the banking sector offers a new avenue for mutual economic benefit and regional expansion.

The document analyzes the regulatory reforms in the Nigerian banking sector and the broader scope of Chinese economic diplomacy in Nigeria, suggesting that the banking sector represents an understudied but promising area for further Sino-Nigerian cooperation.

The research examines how the JAS Shiroro cell has successfully expanded into Central Nigeria by blending jihadist ideology with local Fulani banditry. Led by Abubakar Saidu (alias Sadiku), the cell utilizes a flexible approach that tolerates the non-religious vices of bandits in exchange for weapons, fighters, and local knowledge. The group operates from forest camps, conducting attacks and kidnappings, while maintaining supply lines for weapons and finance from Lake Chad. The document also highlights emerging alignments with the Lakurawa group and the broader threat of coordination between various armed factions, arguing that Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy must expand beyond the Lake Chad Basin to address these regional dynamics.