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The report examines the responses of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to the Boko Haram insurgency. It highlights the role of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in coordinating military action and the use of national strategies like Nigeria's Operation Lafiya Dole and Cameroon's RMIA4. The authors argue that while military cooperation has improved, non-military responses remain ad-hoc. Security restrictions, such as curfews and trade bans, have negatively impacted local livelihoods, potentially alienating civilians. The report also discusses the challenges of reintegrating ex-militants and the politicization of reconstruction efforts in Borno state ahead of the 2019 elections.

In August 2016, Boko Haram split into two factions: ISIS-WA, led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi and influenced by Mamman Nur, and JAS, led by Abubakar Shekau. The rupture was driven by Shekau's dictatorial leadership and a fundamental ideological dispute over the targeting of Muslim civilians. JAS continues to employ indiscriminate violence and suicide bombings against civilians, while ISIS-WA focuses on large-scale assaults against security forces and attempts to cultivate local support. Both groups rely on local extortion, cattle rustling, and kidnapping for finance, with limited evidence of practical external support despite ISIS-WA's formal alliance with the global Islamic State network. The report concludes that ISIS-WA represents a more significant long-term threat due to its superior military coordination and strategic efforts to win 'hearts and minds' among vulnerable populations.