Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram

In August 2016, Boko Haram split into two factions: ISIS-WA, led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi and influenced by Mamman Nur, and JAS, led by Abubakar Shekau. The rupture was driven by Shekau's dictatorial leadership and a fundamental ideological dispute over the targeting of Muslim civilians. JAS continues to employ indiscriminate violence and suicide bombings against civilians, while ISIS-WA focuses on large-scale assaults against security forces and attempts to cultivate local support. Both groups rely on local extortion, cattle rustling, and kidnapping for finance, with limited evidence of practical external support despite ISIS-WA's formal alliance with the global Islamic State network. The report concludes that ISIS-WA represents a more significant long-term threat due to its superior military coordination and strategic efforts to win 'hearts and minds' among vulnerable populations.

• Boko Haram officially split in August 2016 into two distinct groups: Islamic State-West Africa (ISIS-WA), led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), led by Abubakar Shekau.
• The split was primarily driven by Shekau's dictatorial leadership style, his failure to reverse territorial losses, and an ideological disagreement regarding the legitimacy of targeting Muslim civilians.
• JAS employs a broad definition of enemy combatants, viewing anyone who does not actively support the group as a government collaborator, which justifies indiscriminate suicide attacks using women and children against civilian soft targets.
• ISIS-WA adheres to stricter guidelines against targeting Muslim civilians, preferring less frequent but larger-scale assaults specifically targeting military installations and security forces.
• Geographically, JAS is primarily concentrated in south-central Borno around the Sambisa Forest and the Cameroonian border, while ISIS-WA established a stronghold in Lake Chad and the Niger border before expanding into Yobe State and south-central Borno.
• Both factions sustain themselves through local means, including extorting populations, taxing the trade of cattle and fish, and conducting high-profile kidnapping operations for ransom.
• Cattle rustling is a major financial source for both groups, with an estimated loss of 169,000 cows and 63,000 other livestock in Nigeria by January 2017, and losses exceeding XAF 80 billion in Cameroon over three years.
• Despite ISIS-WA's formal status as a wilayat of the global Islamic State, there is little evidence of practical, on-the-ground ties with external jihadist organizations or significant foreign-fighter involvement since the fall of Sirte in 2016.
• ISIS-WA is considered a more dangerous long-term threat than JAS because of its superior military coordination, its strategic attempt to win 'hearts and minds' of civilians, and its potential to receive future external support.

APA

Mahmood, O. S., & Ani, N. C. (2018). Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-2.pdf

Chicago

Mahmood, Omar S, and Ndubuisi Christian Ani. Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram. Institute for Security Studies, 2018. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-2.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Mahmood |first1=Omar S |last2=Ani |first2=Ndubuisi Christian |title=Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=July 2018 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-2.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{mahmood2018factional, author = {Mahmood, Omar S and Ani, Ndubuisi Christian}, title = {{Factional Dynamics within Boko Haram}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2018}, month = jul, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-2.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }