How a Boko Haram faction entrenched itself near Nigeria’s capital

This research paper by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) examines the establishment and operations of a Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) cell in the Shiroro area of Niger State, Nigeria. The document details how the cell, led by Abubakar Saidu (alias Sadiku), has successfully expanded outside the Lake Chad Basin by forming strategic, flexible alliances with local Fulani bandits, tolerating their non-religious vices in exchange for weapons, fighters, and local knowledge.

• The JAS Shiroro cell in Niger State represents the group's most successful expansion outside the Lake Chad Basin, achieved by blending jihadist ideology with local Fulani banditry. The cell maintains a strategic foothold by tolerating bandits' use of alcohol, drugs, and prostitution, which contradicts JAS's strict religious code, in exchange for weapons and terrain knowledge.
• Led by Abubakar Saidu (alias Sadiku), the cell was established starting in 2014 after Sadiku was sent by Abubakar Shekau to connect with remnants of the Darul Islam group in Niger State. The cell operates from forest camps such as Kugu and Dogon Fili, launching attacks on civilians and security forces in the Rafi, Munya, and Shiroro local government areas.
• The Shiroro cell utilizes a non-traditional command structure based on 'kachallas' (warlords) and maintains a supply chain for weapons and finance linked to Bakura Doro on Lake Chad’s Barwa Island. Weapons are transported via boats hidden in grass and fish, supplemented by locally seized arms and Sahelian smuggling networks.
• There is emerging evidence of coordination between the Shiroro cell and other armed groups, including the Lakurawa (a Sahelian-rooted Fulani group) and the 2022 Kuje prison attack which involved ISWAP, JAS, and Ansaru. Additionally, the 2022 Kaduna train attack was reportedly executed by Sadiku’s fighters using IEDs from Borno and partnering with bandits.
• The document argues that Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy is overly focused on the Lake Chad region and fails to account for the threat in Niger State, which serves as a corridor between north and south Nigeria and borders Benin.

APA

Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). How a Boko Haram faction entrenched itself near Nigeria’s capital. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-a-boko-haram-faction-entrenched-itself-near-nigeria-s-capital

Chicago

Institute for Security Studies. How a Boko Haram faction entrenched itself near Nigeria’s capital. n.d. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-a-boko-haram-faction-entrenched-itself-near-nigeria-s-capital.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=How a Boko Haram faction entrenched itself near Nigeria’s capital |url=https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-a-boko-haram-faction-entrenched-itself-near-nigeria-s-capital |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesndhow, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{How a Boko Haram faction entrenched itself near Nigeria’s capital}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-a-boko-haram-faction-entrenched-itself-near-nigeria-s-capital}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }