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This policy brief by the Institute for Security Studies examines civil society perspectives on the viability of dialogue between governments in the Lake Chad Basin and violent extremist groups, specifically Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Based on a 2019 workshop with representatives from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, the document explores the tension between continued militarised responses and the potential for dialogue-based conflict resolution.

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  • Civil society representatives are deeply divided on the effectiveness and severity of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Approximately half of the respondents believe the force can secure peace, while others argue that its response has been too severe, potentially aiding the recruitment of Boko Haram fighters.
  • While a majority of civil society respondents believe the humanitarian crisis has reached a point where dialogue should be initiated, many remain skeptical that such a process would lead to a successful outcome due to significant structural and ideological challenges.
  • A primary obstacle to dialogue is the fundamental clash between the secular nature of the Lake Chad Basin states and the ideological demands of groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP, who seek the creation of an Islamic state and the implementation of Sharia law.
  • Mistrust and a lack of understanding regarding the motivations of extremist groups hinder dialogue. Respondents noted that these groups often lack clear formal representation or communication lines, making it difficult to establish a basis for negotiation.
  • Some local communities perceive any government attempt to negotiate with violent extremist groups as a sign of weakness or a victory for the terrorists, viewing dialogue as a form of capitulation.
  • The document recommends that governments in the Lake Chad Basin move beyond intercommunal dialogue to conduct nation-wide discussions and further research into the motivations of all actors to determine if dialogue is a viable option.

Cite the original document

APA
Mahdi, M. (2020). Dialogue with violent extremist groups. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-137.pdf
Chicago
Mahdi, Maram. Dialogue with violent extremist groups. Institute for Security Studies, 2020. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-137.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Mahdi |first1=Maram |title=Dialogue with violent extremist groups |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2020 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-137.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{mahdi2020dialogue, author = {Mahdi, Maram}, title = {{Dialogue with violent extremist groups}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2020}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-137.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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