Managing exits from violent extremist groups: lessons from the Lake Chad Basin

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The document examines the 'third generation' DDRRR processes used in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to manage exits from Boko Haram. It argues that effective disengagement requires understanding individual motivations to create tailored incentives, implementing gender-sensitive screening to distinguish between victims and active combatants, and ensuring regional coordination to prevent isolated national approaches. The brief highlights the need for predictable legal frameworks and active community engagement to prevent the perception of blanket amnesties and reduce social tension during reintegration.

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  • Effective disengagement strategies depend on understanding the specific reasons individuals join and leave violent extremist groups to avoid 'one-size-fits-all' policies. In the Lake Chad Basin, recruitment drivers included protection, economic promises, and ideological conviction, while reasons for leaving included disillusionment, military pressure, and a reluctance to kill civilians.
  • The Lake Chad Basin states were unprepared for massive waves of defection from Boko Haram, leading to DDRRR processes being implemented under pressure and lacking early regional coordination.
  • Current DDRRR programming in the Lake Chad Basin often incorrectly treats all women as victims, ignoring those who voluntarily joined Boko Haram as recruiters, combatants, or spies. This lack of nuanced screening can lead to inadequate rehabilitation and may push some women to return to the group.
  • There are significant gaps and a lack of predictability in the legal frameworks governing DDRRR in the Lake Chad Basin, which can discourage further defections. While Niger amended its penal code in 2018 to exempt certain ex-associates from prosecution, overall outcomes for those disengaging remain unpredictable.
  • DDRRR processes often lack public support because communities perceive them as providing blanket amnesty to Boko Haram members. This opposition is exacerbated when communities are not consulted or when the benefits provided to ex-associates outweigh those given to the affected community members.

Cite the original document

APA
Hoinathy, R., Samuel, M., & Olojo, A. (2023). Managing exits from violent extremist groups: lessons from the Lake Chad Basin. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policy-brief-173.pdf
Chicago
Hoinathy, Remadji, Malik Samuel, and Akinola Olojo. Managing exits from violent extremist groups: lessons from the Lake Chad Basin. Institute for Security Studies, 2023. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policy-brief-173.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Hoinathy |first1=Remadji |last2=Samuel |first2=Malik |last3=Olojo |first3=Akinola |title=Managing exits from violent extremist groups: lessons from the Lake Chad Basin |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2023 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policy-brief-173.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{hoinathy2023managing, author = {Hoinathy, Remadji and Samuel, Malik and Olojo, Akinola}, title = {{Managing exits from violent extremist groups: lessons from the Lake Chad Basin}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2023}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policy-brief-173.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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