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The document distills the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 2025 advisory opinion to assist practitioners in seeking climate-related remedies. It establishes that State responsibility for climate harm is governed by customary international law and can trigger a full range of legal consequences, including cessation, non-repetition, and reparation (restitution, compensation, and satisfaction). The note clarifies that a plurality of contributors does not exempt individual States from responsibility and that scientific evidence allows for the determination of each State's total contribution to global emissions. It further outlines how these findings apply to human rights cases, corporate accountability litigation, and inter-State proceedings.

The document provides a structured analysis of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion (AO) delivered on 23 July 2025, specifically focusing on how its findings can be applied to climate adaptation litigation. It details binding obligations under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, the intersection of adaptation with human rights law, and the ICJ's rejection of arguments that the cumulative nature of climate change exempts individual States from responsibility. The guide also categorizes types of litigation—including human rights-based cases, national planning challenges, corporate accountability, and infrastructure projects—where these legal excerpts are most applicable.

The document translates the ICJ's 2025 advisory opinion into practical tools for climate litigation, focusing on government framework cases, adaptation, remedies, the right to a healthy environment, corporate conduct, climate finance, speculative interventions, and regulatory rollbacks.

The document explores how sunlight reflection methods (SRM), such as stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) and marine cloud brightening (MCB), interact with global security. While SRM could mitigate climate-driven security risks by lowering temperatures, it may introduce new tensions regarding its use and outcomes. The briefing distinguishes SRM from cloud seeding, noting that while the latter has a history of weaponisation (e.g., Operation Popeye), SAI and MCB are too imprecise for direct weapon use but could still be used for general disruption. It argues that large-scale deployment would be difficult to hide due to detectable infrastructure and atmospheric effects. Two hypothetical scenarios are presented: one involving military tensions in the Arctic over an SAI programme and another involving accusations of drought in South Asia. The authors recommend building trust, transparency, and using scenario gaming to manage these security challenges.

The author contends that recent violations of international law—including US actions in Venezuela and conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza—demonstrate the impotence of violence. The text advocates for a shift toward 'non-violence' as a political tool and a global common good, linking peace to social and environmental justice. It calls on the European Union to champion this approach by upholding the UN Charter, the Paris Agreement, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The author contends that recent military actions by the US, Russia, and Israel signal a collapse of international law and a return to the 'law of the strongest'. The text argues that violence is a symptom of powerlessness and suggests that Europe should instead promote a 'new' paradigm based on non-violence, the UN's 2030 Agenda, and the Paris Climate Agreement to achieve sustainable peace and climate justice.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, a divergence driven primarily by China and India. While new commissioning reached near-record levels of 97.4 GW, coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. The global pipeline is narrowing geographically, with only 32 countries proposing or building new plants in 2025, and 95% of all construction concentrated in China and India. Meanwhile, the U.S. and EU saw significant delays in planned retirements, though for different reasons: federal emergency orders in the U.S. and energy security concerns in the EU. Latin America reached 'No New Coal' status in 2025, while South Korea committed to a phaseout by 2040.

The Living Planet Report 2026 documents a 73% average decline in monitored vertebrate populations between 1970 and 2022. It identifies the energy, food, and financial systems as the primary drivers of this loss. The report introduces a framework of 'positive tipping points'—thresholds where beneficial change becomes self-amplifying—to accelerate the transition to a nature-positive economy. While the energy sector is already in an 'accelerating phase,' the food and finance sectors remain in the 'enabling phase.' The report emphasizes that achieving the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework targets by 2030 requires coordinated global action, subsidy reform, and the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in governance.

Ten years after its 2015 adoption, the Paris Agreement has shifted the projected global warming trajectory from 4.8 degrees C to between 2.3 and 2.9 degrees C, though it remains off track for the 1.5 degrees C goal. While clean technology growth has exceeded expectations—with electric vehicles now comprising a fifth of auto sales and solar and wind electricity generation tripling—current nationally determined contributions (NDCs) would deliver less than 14% of the emissions reductions needed by 2035. The author argues that the next decade requires a total economic transformation, a more aggressive approach to phasing out fossil fuels, and a remodeled multilateral process where COP decisions are not subject to a veto by a few nations. Key priorities include supporting the green transitions of large middle-income countries, which account for 60% of global emissions, and integrating climate commitments into national economic policies.

The report examines the state of play for e-commerce at the WTO, focusing on the multilateral Work Programme on Electronic Commerce (WPEC) and the plurilateral Joint Statement Initiative (JSI). It details the ongoing conflict over the moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, the substance of the proposed Agreement on Electronic Commerce (ECA), and the challenges regarding its legal incorporation into the WTO framework, particularly concerning the needs of developing countries and LDCs.

The document argues that CPEC's first decade has failed to deliver broad-based development or stability in Pakistan, as state-led growth has not reduced conflict or poverty. It highlights how domestic political fragmentation, weak governance, and security threats—including attacks on Chinese personnel—have hindered progress. The brief notes a shift in Chinese strategy from government-to-government loans to business-to-business collaboration and warns that Pakistan's strategic balancing between China and the US complicates alignment. It concludes that the top-down, centralized approach has led to uneven benefits, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and recommends more inclusive, transparent, and community-based development strategies for the next phase.

The report identifies a significant pipeline of planned coal capacity in South and Southeast Asia, primarily driven by a small group of parent companies and funded by a concentrated network of Asian and international banks. It argues that existing bank policies are largely superficial, focusing on project-level restrictions while allowing corporate finance to continue flowing to coal developers.

The Glaciers to Farms (G2F) Program is a 10-year, multi-sectoral adaptation initiative designed to address the impacts of glacial retreat and water insecurity in Central and West Asia. Requesting USD 250 million from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to leverage a total of USD 3.5 billion, the program integrates science-based risk planning, investment in climate-resilient infrastructure, capacity building for agricultural MSMEs, and a regional knowledge platform. It targets 13.6 million direct beneficiaries and 31.5 million indirect beneficiaries, focusing on the Naryn, Pyanj, Kura-Aras, and Swat river basins. Key interventions include multi-hazard early warning systems, nature-based solutions for watershed restoration, and the development of innovative finance mechanisms like sustainability-linked bonds.

Ten years after the Paris Agreement, solar energy has transitioned from a marginal source to the fastest-growing electricity source globally, with leadership shifting from advanced economies to emerging markets. Brazil, China, and India have been central to this shift, collectively accounting for 60% of new solar capacity since 2015. The report highlights how national commitments (NDCs), international financing, and industrial policies—such as Brazil's renewable energy auctions and China's manufacturing scale—have drastically reduced costs and increased global deployment. By 2025, the world reached 2.2 TW of solar capacity, with the focus now shifting toward energy storage and grid reliability to ensure 24/7 availability.

The report details the transition of solar leadership from mature to emerging economies following the 2015 Paris Agreement. It highlights the exponential growth of solar power globally, rising from 1% of generation in 2015 to 8.8% in the first half of 2025. The document specifically examines the roles of Brazil, China, and India, noting that these three countries account for 60% of all new solar capacity since 2015. It attributes this surge to national targets (NDCs), international climate finance, and the establishment of the International Solar Alliance (ISA).

The policy brief examines how water scarcity empowers non-state armed groups, delegitimizes state authority, and fuels transboundary disputes, while proposing that the US utilize its technological leadership and mediation experience to maintain geopolitical stability.

The statement calls for COP30 in Belem to establish an action plan for a just transition to 100% renewable energy, specifically targeting the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs). It argues that current MDB models prioritise private profit and increase debt in the Global South, citing examples of harmful green hydrogen and hydropower projects. The authors propose three shifts: an immediate end to fossil fuel and 'false solution' finance, the provision of grants instead of debt-creating instruments, and a move toward small-scale, community-owned renewable energy projects to ensure energy sovereignty.

The report argues that the end of fossil fuel advertising is inevitable and that marketing agencies must proactively 'off-ramp' these clients to avoid financial and reputational damage. It estimates that the top 29 oil majors spent $6.97 billion on media, creative, and PR in 2024, with $3.03 billion going to major holding companies and $3.94 billion to independent agencies. The document highlights the risks of retention, citing Havas' loss of B Corp certification and Edelman's 5% revenue decline in 2024. It proposes a phased exit strategy ending in 2030, suggesting agencies pivot toward high-growth sectors including healthcare (projected $36.4 billion marketing value by 2030), renewables, and the circular economy (a $4.5 trillion global opportunity by 2030).

The G20 is assessed as an effective tool for short-term macroeconomic crisis response but a failure in delivering structural economic justice. While it mobilised trillions during the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, it has consistently prioritised creditor interests and market stability over the needs of the Global South. The report highlights systemic failures in international financial architecture reform, sovereign debt restructuring, and climate finance, where funding remains insufficient and skewed toward profitable mitigation. However, recent Global South presidencies (Indonesia, India, Brazil, and South Africa) have successfully introduced new priorities, such as taxing the super-rich and the care economy. The authors recommend that the G20 redefine 'crisis' to include social and ecological threats and adopt justice-based metrics for success.

The guide argues that fossil fuel subsidies (FFSs) are misaligned with climate and fiscal goals and proposes a three-step approach to phase them out: establishing a whole-of-government coordination mechanism, categorizing subsidies into three timelines based on risk and feasibility, and executing detailed implementation plans with clear accountability. It emphasizes that while developed countries should lead with faster reforms, developing countries may require longer timelines and more robust social protection measures to ensure a just transition.