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The report critiques the AIIB's Climate-Focused Policy-Based Financing (CPBF) instrument, arguing that it contains significant loopholes regarding fossil fuel finance and lacks robust safeguards for human rights and gender equality. Based on an analysis of programmes in Brazil and Bangladesh, the authors find that while CPBF loans are counted as 100% climate finance, the funds are fungible and not tracked for specific climate outcomes. The document recommends banning all fossil fuel finance, strengthening the Project-affected Peoples’ Mechanism (PPM), and aligning Paris alignment methodologies strictly with the 1.5°C goal.

The document outlines the drivers of saltwater intrusion, including sea-level rise and groundwater extraction, and details its impacts on agriculture, human health, and ecosystems. It suggests reporting strategies such as using visual tools to identify 'ghost forests' and distinguishing between 'solutions' and 'strategies' for adaptation.

A qualitative study in Kurigram, Bangladesh, finds that intersecting factors of marginalization and inequality make women fisherfolk particularly vulnerable to climate change. The research highlights that elite capture of inland fisheries by wealthy men restricts access to beels and erodes traditional ecological knowledge. The authors argue that current gender-sensitive disaster risk reduction efforts are insufficient and advocate for a shift toward transformative resilience and bottom-up fisheries governance.

Japan has become a major global LNG trader, significantly increasing its resales of US-sourced LNG to Asian markets between 2021 and 2025. This trade pattern, supported by Japanese government initiatives and financing, contributes to substantial lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions. The analysis shows that 16.5 billion kg of US LNG resold by Japan to Asia released 63.5 billion kg of CO2, with methane leaks and combustion being the primary drivers. The document argues that promoting LNG infrastructure in Asia risks locking in fossil fuel dependence and exacerbating climate-induced disasters in a region already vulnerable to extreme weather.

The report posits that Asia is leading a 'Great Convergence' with the West by leveraging its position as the world's manufacturing hub to drive an electric energy transition. It highlights that Asia has driven three quarters of global electricity growth since 2000 and now produces the majority of the world's solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles. The document argues that while a lack of oil and gas was previously a weakness, it has become a strategic advantage in an era where energy is defined by technology rather than commodities. This transition is further accelerated by 'fossil shocks,' including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the 2022 energy crisis, which push the region toward energy security through electrotechnology.

The GCF Accreditation Panel recommends the accreditation of HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation (APL180) for 'small' individual projects with a maximum environmental and social risk category of medium risk (category B/I-2). The assessment found that Helvetas fully meets most fiduciary, environmental, social, and gender standards, though it partially meets basic fiduciary standards due to gaps in internal audit quality assessment and the public disclosure of investigative guidelines. Helvetas is recommended for accreditation provided it meets specific conditions regarding the publication of its investigation terms of reference and the delivery of an external quality assessment of its internal audit function.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz during the Iran war has triggered a global energy crisis, causing Brent crude to reach USD 138/barrel and spiking natural gas prices, particularly in Asia. This disruption has led to increased food and fertiliser prices, slowed global GDP growth, and strained national budgets through increased fossil fuel subsidies. In response, 26 countries and regions have implemented clean energy measures, with Asia leading in both vulnerability to supply shocks and the acceleration of clean technology investments and deployments.

The document outlines the procedural steps for verifying climate resilience in investments, detailing how to apply global and local thresholds to adapting measures and how to conduct investment-level assessments for adapted and enabling activities. It emphasizes the use of science-based climate projections, the identification of material climate impacts, and the prevention of maladaptation.

The paper argues that the armed organization to which a person belongs is the most powerful predictor of whether they become a perpetrator of conflict-related sexual violence. Using datasets like SVAC and ACLED, it finds that while state forces have historically been more frequent perpetrators, there is a recent trend of increasing reports involving rebel groups. The author identifies key organizational risk factors, such as forced recruitment and child soldiering, which use sexual violence as a socialization tool for group cohesion. Conversely, restraint is linked to strong internal governance, such as electoral leader selection and ideological norms. The paper suggests that policy interventions should target organizational structures and use risk factors as early warning indicators rather than focusing solely on individual perpetrators.

The document argues that legal recognition of rivers as entities with personhood rights is a catalyst for transforming environmental governance, but it is insufficient on its own to ensure ecological or social outcomes. Drawing on cases from Bangladesh and Colombia, the brief identifies critical implementation gaps, including a lack of operational clarity, fragmented governance, and the marginalization of local community knowledge. It recommends that effective river governance requires clearly defined legal obligations, coordinated institutional leadership, inclusive multi-stakeholder participation, and integrated social and ecological health indicators, all supported by long-term financial resourcing.

The report finds that granting legal personhood to rivers is a symbolic starting point that often fails to produce material ecological recovery due to fragmented governance, anthropocentric interpretations, and the marginalization of local knowledge. In Bangladesh, a state-led guardianship model lacks enforcement power and community representation, while Colombia's shared guardianship model incorporates biocultural knowledge but remains constrained by financial limitations and sectoral fragmentation.

The report highlights a growing 'e-mobility divide' where the Global North adopts high-value lithium-ion systems while the Global South relies on affordable but toxic lead-acid batteries. It identifies critical failures in traceability and international governance, specifically within the Basel Convention, which allow for 'waste colonialism' and hazardous informal recycling. The authors argue for mandatory extended producer responsibility, the creation of regional recycling hubs, and the integration of informal workers into formal systems to ensure a just energy transition.

In 2025, global coal capacity additions reached 97.4 GW, the second-highest on record, primarily driven by China and India, even as global coal-fired electricity generation declined by 0.6%. The report highlights a decoupling where coal is increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation, as wind and solar displace coal. While China and India dominate new development, coal activity elsewhere is shrinking and becoming more isolated. However, net capacity outside China rose by 5 GW due to a slowdown in retirements and rebounds in India.

The document examines 'technological leapfrogging' in Africa, focusing on how decentralised renewable energy, mobile finance, and artificial intelligence can overcome infrastructure deficits. It presents a 'Large Infrastructure and Leapfrogging' scenario projecting significant GDP growth and poverty reduction by 2050, while providing policy recommendations to address structural bottlenecks in skills, financing, and regulation.

The document examines how frontier technologies enable developing countries, particularly in Africa, to bypass costly traditional infrastructure. It highlights the use of drones for precision agriculture in Mozambique and medical logistics in Rwanda, as well as the application of the Internet of Things for water safety in Bangladesh and the increasing accessibility of small-scale satellites for urban planning and land-use monitoring.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as coal plants increasingly serve as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record-high new capacity is being offset by the rapid expansion of wind and solar energy. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, significant expansion continues in China and India, which together account for 95% of global coal capacity under construction. In the US and EU, energy security concerns and government interventions have delayed planned retirements of coal units.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting new demand despite record coal plant commissioning. Globally, the number of countries proposing new coal plants dropped to 32. In Indonesia, coal expansion continues through 'captive' plants for nickel and aluminium industries, reaching 20 GW, while national energy plans (RUKN and RUPTL) are criticized for maintaining fossil fuel dependency and lacking a clear phase-out roadmap despite official net-zero commitments.

In 2025, global coal power capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants act as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This gap is most prominent in China and India, where record-high completions coexist with falling generation due to rapid wind and solar expansion. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, and Latin America reached a state of no new proposals, some regions like the US and EU delayed planned closures due to energy security and political intervention. South Korea has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out, contrasting with Japan's more gradual approach focused on ammonia co-firing and efficiency improvements.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as new plants in China and India are increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Latin America and the Caribbean achieved a status of 'No New Coal Plants' in 2025, though several countries, including Brazil and Chile, experienced setbacks in their decommissioning schedules.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants are increasingly used as backup reserves rather than primary energy sources. This divergence is most acute in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling generation due to the rise of wind and solar power. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects declined from 38 to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Regionally, Latin America reported no new projects, while Russia and Kazakhstan continue to integrate coal into their long-term energy security strategies despite international financing constraints and sanctions.