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The document estimates that in 2016, 1.35 billion children lived in conflict-affected countries, with 357 million living in 'conflict zones' defined as within 50 km of a lethal conflict event. Asia has the highest absolute number of affected children, while the Middle East has the highest proportional risk. The number of children in conflict zones has increased by over 50% since the 1990s, with nearly half living in high-intensity conflict zones in 2016. The authors highlight a critical lack of systematic data on direct harms like killing and maiming, urging increased investment in data collection and targeted policy interventions.

The document provides a mapping of children living in conflict settings, distinguishing between those in conflict-affected countries and those in 'conflict zones' (within 50km of fighting). In 2017, approximately 1.8 billion children lived in conflict-affected countries, while 420 million lived in conflict zones. Asia has the highest absolute number of affected children, but the Middle East has the highest proportion relative to its population. The report also notes a rise in the number of children in conflict zones since 2000 and discusses the severe impact of the denial of humanitarian access, particularly in South Sudan, Yemen, Syria, and the Central African Republic.

The document identifies a significant gap in the implementation of the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), noting that as of April 2017, 128 UN member countries had not yet implemented it. The failure to adopt these rules is primarily linked to low regulatory capacity and low GDP per capita, with striking deficiencies in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. To address this, the brief recommends strengthening institutional capacity, fostering regional collaboration, aligning GHS with overall national chemicals strategies, and linking implementation to the UN Agenda 2030 and occupational health and safety commitments.

The document analyzes climate change as a 'threat multiplier' that exacerbates global instability and poses direct risks to U.S. military infrastructure and operations. It details how the Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies like the DHS and CIA integrate climate risk into planning, focusing on issues such as mass migration, water scarcity, and the opening of the Arctic. The brief also outlines specific energy and resilience initiatives across the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, while noting the tension between military adaptation needs and Congressional fiscal priorities.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) views climate change as a "threat multiplier" that amplifies existing global instabilities such as poverty and political tension. The document outlines critical risks including mass population displacement, water scarcity leading to potential "weaponization of water," and shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Arctic due to sea ice loss. Domestically, climate change threatens the readiness of DOD's vast real estate portfolio, valued at approximately $850 billion. The briefing details adaptation and mitigation efforts across the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, while noting the inconsistent nature of Congressional support for climate-security policies.

The author contends that archetypal enemies and exhortations to violence exist across various holy texts, including the Koran and the Bible. While noting that terrorism can stem from diverse psychological or social factors, the text emphasizes that some individuals use religion to legitimize violence. The author asserts that religious leaders have a responsibility to promote critical reading of scriptures and engage in interfaith dialogue to counter extremist interpretations and foster a society based on trust and equality.

The text analyzes the strategic objectives of the Islamic State (IS) in Europe—escalation, creating insecurity, and exploiting social divisions—and argues that restrictive anti-terrorism laws actually support these goals by fueling islamophobia and eroding civil liberties. It contends that IS is often portrayed as more cohesive and powerful than it is, noting that its core leadership consists of pragmatists from the Ba'ath party rather than global jihadists. The author advocates for a progressive response that rejects the 'clash of civilizations' narrative, opposes racial profiling, and views the expansion of civil rights for minorities as the most effective way to delegitimize IS and ensure genuine security.

The research finds that economic growth is the strongest driver of reduced international migration, while there is no discernible direct relationship between hunger levels or agricultural productivity alone and migration flows. The authors argue that to reduce migration, investments must move beyond farm-level productivity to create broader economic opportunities and off-farm activities in rural areas.

The study examines how fragmented climate policies, where some regions implement carbon taxes while others do not, lead to 'carbon leakage'—the relocation of emissions to non-participating regions. It distinguishes between industrial carbon leakage (ICL), driven by fossil fuel price changes, and terrestrial carbon leakage (TCL), driven by land-use changes. The findings indicate that TCL is the dominant form of leakage until 2050, primarily due to deforestation in non-participating regions as food and bioenergy production shift away from participating areas. The research concludes that the total leakage rate decreases as the size of the climate coalition increases, but even the most inclusive fragmented scenarios fail to limit global temperature rise to below 2°C by 2100.

The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) helped MTN develop the Situational Awareness and Integrated Response (SAIR) system, an open-source informatics tool used to gather intelligence and manage security in volatile markets across Africa and the Middle East.

The document argues that protecting minority rights is a prerequisite for lasting stability and a key element of a security-oriented foreign policy. It examines various power-sharing models—inclusion, portioning, and restrictions—concluding that rights-based restrictions on power are most effective for long-term peace. Case studies on Iraq, Syria, and Myanmar illustrate how the lack of minority protections can exacerbate conflict dynamics and how democratic transitions via majority-rule elections can paradoxically increase the vulnerability of minorities, such as the Rohingya.

The report examines how stakeholders in Swedish forestry perceive climate change risks and opportunities. It finds that while some anticipate increased growth, others fear storm damage and pests. Adaptation is driven by personal experience of extreme weather and trust in advisers, but hindered by distrust of climate science and conflicting views on effective management strategies. The document emphasizes the need for user-oriented, interactive communication between researchers and practitioners to foster adaptation.

The document analyzes conflict data from 1960 to 2015, noting that while global fatalities from armed conflict generally decline relative to population, Africa maintains a disproportionately high conflict burden. It distinguishes between the 'capacity deficit' in sub-Saharan Africa and the 'inclusion deficit' in the MENA region as primary drivers of instability. The author argues that while violent Islamist extremism receives significant media attention, it accounts for a smaller portion of total political fatalities compared to other forms of violence, such as riots and non-state conflict.

The briefing examines the correlation between climate and political violence, noting that while conflicts cluster in dry and tropical zones, there is little evidence that climatic variability directly causes state-based violent conflict. Instead, the authors argue that climate change may increase conflict risk indirectly through three primary causal mechanisms: forced migration, food insecurity, and economic shocks. These effects are not universal but depend on 'scope conditions' such as poverty, poor governance, and political instability. The document concludes that the security challenges posed by climate change are essentially development challenges, and that investing in adaptation and good governance is critical to preventing a growing gap between stable, wealthy societies and those caught in a poverty and instability trap.

The author contends that for BRICS to be perceived as a force for positive global change rather than just a new set of dominant powers, it must move beyond narrow self-interest. The paper proposes an inclusive agenda centered on four key challenges: rising inequality, the finite nature of the Anthropocene age (climate change and sustainable development), the rise of identity-based radicalism, and the tension between state sovereignty and global public goods. The author suggests that by leading on these issues, BRICS can build collective soft power and a more legitimate global compact.

The document analyzes international mediation as a tool for peacemaking, noting that while it has become more common since the Cold War—particularly for interstate conflicts—it is underutilized in civil wars. It highlights a geographical bias toward Europe and the Middle East and a trend toward the regionalization of mediation through organizations like the African Union and ECOWAS. While mediation significantly increases the likelihood of short-term settlements, the authors find no evidence of consistent long-term positive effects on durable peace.

The document defines a Green foreign policy as a holistic approach that prioritizes human rights, democracy, and environmental sustainability over narrow economic interests. It advocates for the reform of international organizations like the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions to increase transparency and representation for the Global South. The framework emphasizes the strengthening of international law, specifically the International Criminal Court, and supports restrictive weapons export policies and UN-mandated military interventions. It also calls for a development agenda that links environmental sustainability with social inclusion and conflict prevention through the 'Responsibilities to Protect' (R2P) framework.

The report argues that climate change acts as a "threat multiplier" in fragile states, exacerbating existing conflict drivers like poverty and weak governance. It proposes a framework for "climate-resilient peacebuilding" based on six principles, including integrated context analysis and a forward-looking approach to planning. The document identifies specific entry points for integration across five peacebuilding dimensions: basic safety and security, political processes, basic services, government functions, and economic revitalization. It also reviews existing international guidance, noting that while some tools integrate climate risks, many others lack this perspective, suggesting that practitioners should integrate climate resilience into existing resources rather than creating new toolkits.

The policy brief examines the 'special partnership' between Russia and Turkey, noting that while they disagree on the Syrian civil war, they share autocratic political instincts and a mutual desire to curtail US interventionism. The author argues that Russia can boost its Middle Eastern role through joint initiatives with Turkey, leveraging the personal chemistry between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While energy ties—specifically natural gas pipelines and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant—provide a foundation, the document suggests that the leaders' shared 'contrarian' tendencies and need for foreign policy victories are primary drivers for potential cooperation in Northern Syria and the South Caucasus.

The Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance conducted a Phase 2 analysis of seven climate finance instruments based on four criteria: actionability, innovativeness, catalytic potential, and transformative impact. Following this assessment, four instruments—the Agricultural Supply Chain Adaptation Facility, Climate Development & Finance Facility, Energy Savings Insurance, and Long-term Currency Swap—were selected to move into Phase 3 for detailed financial modeling and implementation planning. The report details the goals and analytical findings for all seven instruments, including those focused on renewable energy, energy efficiency, and agricultural resilience, while highlighting the need for public sector support and donor capital to mitigate risks and catalyze private investment.