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The policy brief examines the 'special partnership' between Russia and Turkey, noting that while they disagree on the Syrian civil war, they share autocratic political instincts and a mutual desire to curtail US interventionism. The author argues that Russia can boost its Middle Eastern role through joint initiatives with Turkey, leveraging the personal chemistry between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While energy ties—specifically natural gas pipelines and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant—provide a foundation, the document suggests that the leaders' shared 'contrarian' tendencies and need for foreign policy victories are primary drivers for potential cooperation in Northern Syria and the South Caucasus.

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  • Russia views a partnership with Turkey as its primary mechanism for increasing its influence in the Middle East, especially as a way to demonstrate that Western attempts to isolate Russia following the Ukraine crisis are ineffective.
  • Energy cooperation serves as a political foundation, with Russia planning to expand the Blue Stream pipeline to facilitate Turkey's goal of becoming a European 'gas hub' and minimize Russian gas transit through Ukraine.
  • The personal relationship between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a significant asset, driven by shared autocratic instincts and a mutual tendency to act as 'contrarians' or 'spoilers' against US leadership.
  • Despite their partnership, Russia and Turkey maintain fundamentally different positions on the Syrian war: Russia supports the Bashar al-Assad regime, while Turkey has sought its dismantling.
  • Both nations share an interest in curtailing US interventionism and may find common ground in limited, symbolic joint operations in Northern Syria to expose the failures of the Obama administration.
  • Turkey's approach to Kurdish issues is complex; while it has engaged with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq for oil and security reasons, it remains opposed to Kurdish groups in Syria.
  • Russia maintains economic stakes in Iraq through oil projects like Qurna-2 (Lukoil) and Badra (Gazprom Neft), though it remains generally disengaged from the region's Kurdish political problems.

Cite the original document

APA
Baev, P. K. (2015). Partnership of Contrarians. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/3b0697af-63dd-4548-ace7-aa7b7f3661f7/Baev - Partnership of Contrarians PRIO Policy Brief 2-2015.pdf?inline=true
Chicago
Baev, Pavel K. Partnership of Contrarians. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2015. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/3b0697af-63dd-4548-ace7-aa7b7f3661f7/Baev - Partnership of Contrarians PRIO Policy Brief 2-2015.pdf?inline=true.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Baev |first1=Pavel K. |title=Partnership of Contrarians |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=2015 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/3b0697af-63dd-4548-ace7-aa7b7f3661f7/Baev - Partnership of Contrarians PRIO Policy Brief 2-2015.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{baev2015partnership, author = {Baev, Pavel K.}, title = {{Partnership of Contrarians}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2015}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/3b0697af-63dd-4548-ace7-aa7b7f3661f7/Baev - Partnership of Contrarians PRIO Policy Brief 2-2015.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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