Future (im)perfect? Mapping conflict, violence and extremism in Africa

Report an error

Summary

AI-generated

This summary is written by a language model reading the source document. It is not the publisher's words and is not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment

The document analyzes conflict data from 1960 to 2015, noting that while global fatalities from armed conflict generally decline relative to population, Africa maintains a disproportionately high conflict burden. It distinguishes between the 'capacity deficit' in sub-Saharan Africa and the 'inclusion deficit' in the MENA region as primary drivers of instability. The author argues that while violent Islamist extremism receives significant media attention, it accounts for a smaller portion of total political fatalities compared to other forms of violence, such as riots and non-state conflict.

Key insights

AI-generated

These insights are written by a language model reading the source document. They are not the publisher's words and are not a substitute for the original.

Learn more about AI enrichment
  • Africa's share of global armed conflict is significantly higher than its share of the global population; by 2014, Africa had 16% of the world's population but 52% of the world's armed-conflict incidents.
  • The vast majority of political violence fatalities in Africa are concentrated in a few countries. In 2014, nine countries accounted for 92% of total fatalities, with the highest burden per 100,000 people found in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Libya, and Somalia.
  • Africa and the Middle East exhibit higher levels of 'non-state conflict'—violence between armed groups not involving the government—than any other global region.
  • Instability in sub-Saharan Africa is primarily driven by a lack of governance capacity (the ability to mobilize revenue and control territory), whereas the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is characterized by a deficit in political and economic inclusion.
  • Past conflict is the strongest statistical indicator of future conflict, creating a 'conflict trap' that is difficult to break without significant international intervention.
  • Violent Islamist extremism is often amplified by social media and news coverage, but its actual contribution to fatalities is lower than other forms of political violence. In countries most affected by Islamist extremism between 2010 and 2014, these groups were responsible for approximately 24% of total political violence deaths.

Cite the original document

APA
Cilliers, J. (2015). Future (im)perfect? Mapping conflict, violence and extremism in Africa. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper287-1.pdf
Chicago
Cilliers, Jakkie. Future (im)perfect? Mapping conflict, violence and extremism in Africa. Institute for Security Studies, 2015. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper287-1.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Cilliers |first1=Jakkie |title=Future (im)perfect? Mapping conflict, violence and extremism in Africa |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=October 2015 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper287-1.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{cilliers2015future, author = {Cilliers, Jakkie}, title = {{Future (im)perfect? Mapping conflict, violence and extremism in Africa}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2015}, month = oct, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper287-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

Full text

Collected · Record updated