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The 2018 peace agreement and subsequent trilateral alliance between Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia have resolved historical conflicts but introduced new instabilities. The alliance has exacerbated internal tensions in Ethiopia and Somalia, specifically fueling the conflict in Tigray and tensions in Jubaland. Furthermore, the exclusive nature of this bloc has created distrust among other regional actors like Kenya and Djibouti and threatens to undermine the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) by duplicating its integration efforts.

The guide argues that water and food security decisions must be accompanied by social analyses to identify and protect vulnerable groups based on sex, ethnicity, income, and race. It outlines the core objectives of social analysis, such as ensuring inclusivity in decision-making and protecting customary rights to land and water. The text illustrates potential negative impacts through scenarios, including the increased burden on women in Malawi and the marginalization of pastoralists in the Sahel. It further warns that irrigation projects in Bangladesh and Pakistan can divert domestic water to farms, and that large-scale infrastructure, such as India's UKP dam, can cause mass displacement. To support these analyses, the document lists resources from organizations like the World Bank, FAO, and UNDP, and provides a framework of critical questions regarding who benefits from and who is adversely impacted by development projects.

Djibouti leverages its strategic position at the Bab el Mandab strait to maintain agency despite a highly asymmetrical relationship with China. While China has become a primary creditor and infrastructure provider through the Belt and Road Initiative, Djibouti manages this influence by hosting multiple foreign military bases and diversifying its economic partnerships with the US, France, and Saudi Arabia. President Ismail Omar Guelleh has recently worked to reduce China's dominance by renegotiating loans and postponing projects to avoid excessive debt distress.

The document examines how COVID-19 exposes weaknesses in global institutions and threatens Africa through economic shocks, reduced development aid, and a retreat from multilateralism. It highlights the risk of increased trade protectionism and the potential for climate goals to be sidelined. The author advocates for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the creation of a continental climate finance fund, and a proactive African role in reforming global governance to mitigate these risks.

The report examines the GRP's approach to fostering an environment where failure is viewed as a learning opportunity rather than a cause for penalty. Through case studies of seven projects, it highlights the importance of trust, flexible targets, and adaptive management in refining resilience solutions. Key recommendations include designing projects for 'probe-sense-respond' cycles and establishing clear failure thresholds to avoid wasting investment on ineffective pilots.

The document examines the design, selection, implementation, and scaling of Challenge Funds (CFs) specifically for resilience building. It compares GRP's operational experience with a broader literature review of various international CFs, such as the African Enterprise Challenge Fund and the Global Innovation Fund. Key findings emphasize the need for clear definitions of resilience, the value of multi-stage application processes to support local innovators, and the necessity of long-term strategies to move innovations beyond the 'valley of death' toward sustainable scale. The report concludes with specific recommendations for future resilience-focused challenges, highlighting the importance of adaptive management and robust, long-term impact evaluations.

The Red Sea is a complex geopolitical environment characterized by state-to-state rivalries, external military presence, and a perceived gap in maritime management. While shipping has remained largely undisrupted, threats persist from the war in Yemen, piracy, and violent extremist organizations. The report argues that existing regional organizations like IGAD and the AU have limited mandates or internal challenges, suggesting that new cooperative mechanisms should start with narrow mandates, prioritize information sharing, and include all relevant littoral and non-littoral stakeholders to avoid duplication and respect national sovereignty.

The document examines how climate change and unsustainable land management drive desertification and food insecurity in Africa, while highlighting sustainable land management practices and the necessity of integrated governance and gender-inclusive policies to build resilience.

The document analyzes the similarities and differences between China's engagement with Africa via the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and with Arab states via the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). It finds that while China–Arab relations are characterized by deeper economic and energy ties, China–Africa relations are more robust in terms of cultural diplomacy, people-to-people exchanges, and military engagement. The author highlights how China uses Africa as a testing ground for foreign policy initiatives and notes potential frictions in the Horn of Africa where Chinese and Gulf state interests overlap.

The document outlines five critical factors for building climate-resilient water infrastructure: effective communication of risks, inclusive stakeholder engagement, strategic use of entry points, adopting a systemic approach beyond individual projects, and building institutional capacity. It draws on case studies from Colombia, Africa, Mozambique, St. Vincent, and Nepal to demonstrate how these factors mitigate the risks associated with long-lived infrastructure and climate uncertainty.

The paper analyzes the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) of Ethiopia, which prioritizes domestic security and development over external concerns. While this approach has supported economic growth and regional mediation roles, the author argues it has led to strategic vulnerabilities, including a failure to secure sea access and an underestimation of threats from Eritrea and Egypt. The document recommends a more proactive, opportunity-based diplomatic approach to enhance regional trade and security.

The paper analyzes the relationship between China and Ethiopia, highlighting how Ethiopia's 'developmental state' model and strategic location in the Horn of Africa make it a key partner for China. It details Chinese investments in infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications, while noting that China's political influence is constrained by Ethiopia's strong national pride and centralized power structures. The document also explores China's increasing role in regional stability through the African Union and IGAD.

The document analyzes Ethiopia's rapid economic growth and human development progress since 1991, while highlighting persistent gaps in basic service access and agricultural productivity. Using the International Futures (IFs) forecasting system, it compares a 'Current Path' forecast against various intervention scenarios, concluding that an integrated approach across agriculture, education, health, and governance is necessary to reach lower-middle-income status by 2025.

The report examines Qatar's strategic engagement in the Horn of Africa, driven by a desire for international significance and regional autonomy from Saudi Arabia and Iran. It highlights a highly centralised, personalised decision-making process led by the emir, which often bypasses formal diplomatic institutions. While Qatar has successfully mediated between Eritrea and Djibouti, its efforts in Darfur are characterised as a failure due to a lack of contextual understanding and political leverage. The document details Qatar's use of financial wealth, military alliances with the US and Turkey, and the Al Jazeera network as primary instruments of influence.

The author contends that traditional attempts to control water through artificial solutions have created vulnerabilities that are now being exposed by a changing climate. The document advocates for a 'resilience mindset' in water management, particularly within humanitarian and development funding, moving away from short-term recovery toward long-term capacity for communities to thrive despite recurrent water challenges. This approach emphasizes the use of predictive models, early warning systems, and the integration of indigenous knowledge. To implement this, the Global Resilience Partnership (GRP) has focused on the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and South and Southeast Asia, and has launched a Water Window Challenge with a $10 million commitment from the Z Zurich Foundation to fund innovative flood-resilience solutions.

The document examines youth radicalisation in Africa as a complex phenomenon driven by a combination of 'push' and 'pull' factors. It argues that while religious ideology is often used as a justification, the actual drivers are frequently rooted in political repression, systemic corruption, socio-economic exclusion, and weakened family structures. The paper emphasizes that responses must be nuanced and evidence-based, moving beyond a 'one size fits all' approach to address specific local and structural vulnerabilities.

The document analyzes the dynamics of youth radicalization in Africa, arguing that it is a complex process driven by a combination of 'push' and 'pull' factors rather than a single cause. It highlights how government repression, corruption, high youth unemployment, and social exclusion create vulnerabilities that extremist groups like ISIS, Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram exploit. The paper emphasizes that while religion is often used as a justification, the root causes are frequently socio-political and economic. It also examines the role of gender, noting that while most recruits are male, women's participation is increasing, often driven by different motivations or forced coercion.

Somaliland is described as a rare success story of stability and democracy in the Horn of Africa, though this progress is considered fragile. The report highlights critical weaknesses in its political system, specifically the chronic delay of presidential and parliamentary elections, and the influence of clan politics on governance. It identifies the lack of international recognition as a primary internal tension and warns of the growing influence of Salafism. Externally, the report notes ongoing border disputes with Puntland and the existential threat posed by the Somali Federal Government's refusal to accept Somaliland's independence.

The report analyzes how the internal conflict in South Sudan has become an arena for regional power struggles. It details the competing interests of Uganda and Sudan, the security concerns of Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the economic and hydropolitical motivations of Kenya and Egypt. The author argues that these external interventions, particularly the military involvement of Uganda and the proxy interests of Sudan, have regionalized the crisis and undermined the mediation efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The report argues that climate change acts as a "threat multiplier" in fragile states, exacerbating existing conflict drivers like poverty and weak governance. It proposes a framework for "climate-resilient peacebuilding" based on six principles, including integrated context analysis and a forward-looking approach to planning. The document identifies specific entry points for integration across five peacebuilding dimensions: basic safety and security, political processes, basic services, government functions, and economic revitalization. It also reviews existing international guidance, noting that while some tools integrate climate risks, many others lack this perspective, suggesting that practitioners should integrate climate resilience into existing resources rather than creating new toolkits.