CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD: SHARED TRENDS, DIFFERENT PRIORITIES

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The document analyzes the similarities and differences between China's engagement with Africa via the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and with Arab states via the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). It finds that while China–Arab relations are characterized by deeper economic and energy ties, China–Africa relations are more robust in terms of cultural diplomacy, people-to-people exchanges, and military engagement. The author highlights how China uses Africa as a testing ground for foreign policy initiatives and notes potential frictions in the Horn of Africa where Chinese and Gulf state interests overlap.

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  • China's relations with Africa serve as a model and testing ground for its broader foreign policy toward developing countries, leading to the creation of 'forum diplomacy' through FOCAC, which was later replicated with the CASCF and other regional groups.
  • Economic ties between China and Arab states are significantly larger than those with Africa, driven largely by China's dependence on crude oil imports from OPEC members.
  • China's engagement in Africa is more advanced in terms of public diplomacy and cultural exchange, evidenced by a higher density of Confucius Institutes and a more sophisticated media presence compared to its relations with Arab states.
  • China's security interests in the Arab world are primarily focused on intelligence gathering and stability to protect the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and manage domestic concerns regarding its Muslim population in Xinjiang.
  • In contrast to the Middle East, China's military presence in Africa is more visible and diverse, including the establishment of its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017.
  • Competing economic and strategic interests between China and Gulf states (such as the UAE) have led to friction in the Horn of Africa, specifically regarding port management and concessions in Djibouti.

Cite the original document

APA
BENABDALLAH, L. (2018). CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD: SHARED TRENDS, DIFFERENT PRIORITIES. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Policy-Insights-67.pdf
Chicago
BENABDALLAH, LINA. CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD: SHARED TRENDS, DIFFERENT PRIORITIES. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2018. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Policy-Insights-67.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=BENABDALLAH |first1=LINA |title=CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD: SHARED TRENDS, DIFFERENT PRIORITIES |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=November 2018 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Policy-Insights-67.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{benabdallah2018chinas, author = {BENABDALLAH, LINA}, title = {{CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD: SHARED TRENDS, DIFFERENT PRIORITIES}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2018}, month = nov, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Policy-Insights-67.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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