African Agency and Chinese Power: The Case of Djibouti

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Djibouti leverages its strategic position at the Bab el Mandab strait to maintain agency despite a highly asymmetrical relationship with China. While China has become a primary creditor and infrastructure provider through the Belt and Road Initiative, Djibouti manages this influence by hosting multiple foreign military bases and diversifying its economic partnerships with the US, France, and Saudi Arabia. President Ismail Omar Guelleh has recently worked to reduce China's dominance by renegotiating loans and postponing projects to avoid excessive debt distress.

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  • Djibouti's agency is significantly enhanced by its strategic geographical location and the resulting competition between great powers, which provides the country with a 'balance of power' and greater room for manoeuvre.
  • China has established substantial leverage in Djibouti through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the 2017 opening of a naval base, becoming the country's main trade partner and source of infrastructure funding.
  • The country has faced severe debt distress due to Chinese loans, with public debt increasing from 50% to 104% of GDP between 2014 and 2018, primarily driven by the water pipeline, railway, and Doraleh Multipurpose Port projects.
  • To mitigate over-dependence on China, President Guelleh has implemented a strategy of diversification, including renegotiating loan terms with the Exim Bank, working with the IMF, and seeking funding from Saudi Arabia and European partners.
  • Djibouti hosts seven distinct military presences, including the US (Camp Lemonnier), France, China, Japan, Italy, Germany, and Spain, which allows it to maintain a non-aligned and flexible foreign policy.
  • The government has actively resisted Chinese dominance in specific instances, such as refusing Chinese military requests to move a European-funded desalination plant and postponing Chinese-funded airport projects.

Cite the original document

APA
CABESTAN, J.-P. (2020). African Agency and Chinese Power: The Case of Djibouti. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Policy-Insights-93-cabestan.pdf
Chicago
CABESTAN, JEAN-PIERRE. African Agency and Chinese Power: The Case of Djibouti. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2020. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Policy-Insights-93-cabestan.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=CABESTAN |first1=JEAN-PIERRE |title=African Agency and Chinese Power: The Case of Djibouti |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=October 2020 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Policy-Insights-93-cabestan.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{cabestan2020african, author = {CABESTAN, JEAN-PIERRE}, title = {{African Agency and Chinese Power: The Case of Djibouti}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2020}, month = oct, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Policy-Insights-93-cabestan.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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