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In 2025, solar and wind power expanded fast enough to outpace global electricity demand growth for the first time over a sustained period. Solar growth accelerated in Africa and Central Europe, while BRICS nations now generate over half of global solar power. The rise of 'electrotech'—led by China—and falling battery costs are enabling fossil-free baseload power and supporting the energy demands of AI and data centres.

The document analyzes the strategic role of BRICS+ countries in the global critical minerals market, focusing on the potential for African members to move up the value chain and the complex dynamics of their cooperation with the European Union.

The document argues that a 'window of opportunity' has opened for Africa due to the convergence of China's domestic push for renewable energy leadership and US-China geopolitical tensions. While the US has retreated from climate leadership and scaled back African assistance, China is pivoting toward 'small is beautiful' project financing and green industrialization as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and FOCAC commitments. To maximize these opportunities, the brief recommends that African nations implement rigorous strategic planning, professionalize project pipelines, adopt innovative mixed-financing models to reduce sovereign debt, and pursue regional energy integration through frameworks like the Southern African Power Pool.

The research paper examines the increasing role of GCC countries—primarily the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—as major investors in Africa's energy transition and infrastructure. It identifies food security and economic diversification away from hydrocarbons as the primary drivers for Gulf states. While highlighting significant projects in renewable energy and mining, the paper warns that the current focus on large-scale, export-oriented developments may sideline local community needs and climate adaptation priorities unless African policymakers actively steer investments toward local beneficiation and regional integration.

The Lobito Corridor, anchored by the Benguela Railway, aims to move beyond mineral exports to foster value addition in mining, battery production, and agro-processing. However, a stark duality exists between the modern logistics provided by the Lobito Atlantic Railway (LAR) consortium for large-scale exports and the dilapidated state of the Caminho de Ferro de Benguela (CFB) passenger rail, which hinders small and medium enterprises (SMEs). While some value-adding ventures like Pensana Plc and Flying Swans exist, they are heavily dependent on state facilitation, suggesting that private sector dynamism alone is insufficient to achieve industrial diversification.

The People's Summit declaration identifies the capitalist mode of production and transnational corporations as the primary drivers of the climate crisis. It rejects market-based 'false solutions' and calls for a transition based on popular sovereignty, the recognition of ancestral knowledge, and the redistribution of wealth from the Global North to the Global South. The document emphasizes the intersection of climate action with feminism, anti-imperialism, and the protection of indigenous territories.

The Peoples’ Summit declaration identifies the capitalist mode of production and transnational corporations as the primary causes of the climate crisis. It rejects market-based 'false solutions' and the current model of multilateralism, calling instead for a 'just, sovereign and popular transition.' Key demands include the demarcation of indigenous lands, popular agrarian reform, the end of fossil fuel exploitation, and the redirection of military spending toward climate repair. The document emphasizes feminist justice, the recognition of ancestral knowledge, and the need for international climate finance to bypass institutions like the IMF and World Bank to address the socio-environmental debt owed to the global South.

The People's Summit declaration argues that the capitalist mode of production and transnational corporations are the root causes of the climate crisis and environmental racism. It rejects market-based 'false solutions' and the current multilateral system, calling instead for the recognition of ancestral knowledge, the protection of indigenous territories, and a sovereign, popular energy transition. The document demands the end of fossil fuel extraction, the redistribution of wealth from the global north to the south as socio-environmental debt, and the implementation of agroecology and feminist care work as central to planetary survival.

The report details the disproportionate risks faced by women environmental and human rights defenders (WEHRDs) in Africa, including gender-based violence, criminalization, and digital surveillance. It highlights a significant gap between the actual violence experienced and official data, which often underreports attacks against women. Through country spotlights on Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria, the document illustrates how patriarchal norms and corporate-state collusion exacerbate the vulnerability of WEHRDs. It concludes with recommendations for African states and international donors to implement gender-responsive protection frameworks, end the criminalization of activism, and provide flexible, long-term funding for women-led grassroots initiatives.

The report finds that SADC's maritime security governance is fragmented, with a significant disconnect between blue-economy rhetoric and actual security planning. While the 2022 Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) represents a normative advance over the 2011 strategy, its implementation remains uneven and under-resourced. Regional coordination is primarily driven by external funding and bilateral initiatives, such as South Africa's Operation Copper, rather than formal SADC mechanisms. The report highlights a structural paradox where SADC's most ocean-dependent members—the island states—are the least embedded in its collective security frameworks, preferring partnerships with the Indian Ocean Commission and external powers like India, France, and the EU.

The report argues that the African Union Commission's reform, which reduced commissioners from eight to six, has led to institutional imbalances where crisis response overshadows conflict prevention. It highlights a significant funding gap for the new structure, costing an additional US$53 million. The document also analyzes the rise of military coups, attributing them to 'democratic subversions' such as the removal of term limits, and discusses the strain on Africa's humanitarian system due to conflict and climate shocks.

The document details Physicians for Human Rights' (PHR) multipronged approach to documenting conflict-related sexual violence, focusing on the use of standardized forensic medical forms, multisectoral collaboration, and digital tools like MediCapt. It argues that integrating medical-legal evidence with survivor-centred care reduces retraumatization and strengthens the evidentiary base for prosecutions. The paper highlights successful applications of this model in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Kenya, and Ethiopia, emphasizing that capacity development for health and legal professionals is essential for translating clinical data into legal accountability.

The handbook traces G20 engagements with Africa from 2008 to 2025, noting a transition from ad hoc initiatives to structured partnerships, culminating in the African Union's permanent membership in 2023. While identifying successes in rural youth employment and financial inclusion, it highlights persistent implementation gaps in infrastructure and climate finance. The document maps G20 outcomes against AU Agenda 2063, finding strong alignment with economic integration but gaps in peace and institutional capacity. It also details South Africa's 2025 G20 presidency priorities, focusing on solidarity, equality, and sustainability through specific task forces on inclusive growth, food security, and AI.

The document examines the tension between Africa's potential as a clean energy leader and the restrictive nature of unilateral trade instruments like the EU's CBAM. While Africa possesses significant renewable energy potential and 30% of global critical mineral reserves, the paper argues that CBAM could reduce collective GDP by 0.91% (approximately USD 25 billion) and limit fiscal space for green R&D. It suggests that African nations leverage their strategic mineral advantages, utilize the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to eliminate 97% of internal tariffs, and push for more structured discussions on trade restrictions within the UNFCCC and WTO.

The document identifies a significant divergence between climate and development policy in Africa, noting that NDCs focus on sectoral mitigation while NDPs prioritize economic growth and poverty alleviation. It warns that aggressive energy transitions to reach net-zero by 2050 could reduce cropland availability by 31%, potentially undermining the agricultural sector which employs 60% of the continent's workforce. Financially, the brief highlights a massive gap, with climate finance requirements for Africa projected at $2.7 trillion by 2030, nearly equaling the continental GDP.

The report analyzes climate adaptation projects in Afghanistan, the DRC, Haiti, the Horn of Africa, Mexico, Myanmar, and Papua New Guinea. It finds that while insecurity often leads to risk-averse site selection and implementation delays, projects that integrate conflict-climate nexus analysis and prioritize bottom-up, community-led approaches can mitigate conflict and foster peace. The authors recommend flexible implementation, holistic monitoring and evaluation, and the explicit inclusion of conflict mitigation in project objectives to avoid maladaptation and 'backdraft'.

Africa faces the challenge of decarbonizing industries while expanding industrial capacity, despite its low contribution to global emissions. The continent possesses significant assets for the clean energy transition, including cobalt reserves in the Democratic Republic of Congo, solar potential, and coastal deserts suitable for green hydrogen. To move beyond simple resource extraction, the document emphasizes the need for innovation ecosystems connecting startups, research hubs, and policymakers. It highlights existing technological momentum in Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Morocco, suggesting that a targeted policy mix can enable entrepreneurs to develop green technologies for both local and global markets.

The report analyzes the competition between China and Western powers (US and EU) for Africa's critical minerals, specifically focusing on the Lobito and TAZARA corridors. It argues that African nations can avoid 'extractivism' by coordinating regional processing hubs and leveraging the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to build a domestic e-mobility value chain.

The report examines climate adaptation in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, the Horn of Africa, Mexico, Myanmar, and Papua New Guinea. It finds that while instability often leads to risk-averse site selection and implementation delays, projects that integrate conflict-sensitivity and community-led approaches can mitigate these challenges and potentially contribute to peacebuilding. The analysis highlights the necessity of flexible implementation, the use of fragility assessments, and the importance of addressing root causes of vulnerability to avoid maladaptation and 'backdraft'—unforeseen negative spillover effects.

The document examines the challenges facing ECOWAS in its peacekeeping efforts, particularly the lack of formal integration with the AU and UN. It highlights how the ambiguous application of the AU's subsidiarity principle and the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have strained regional security. To address these issues and access UN-assessed funding under Resolution 2719, the paper recommends formalising the division of labour between ECOWAS and the AU and increasing ECOWAS's direct engagement in global peace operations planning.