Strengthening SADC’s maritime security architecture

The report finds that SADC's maritime security governance is fragmented, with a significant disconnect between blue-economy rhetoric and actual security planning. While the 2022 Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) represents a normative advance over the 2011 strategy, its implementation remains uneven and under-resourced. Regional coordination is primarily driven by external funding and bilateral initiatives, such as South Africa's Operation Copper, rather than formal SADC mechanisms. The report highlights a structural paradox where SADC's most ocean-dependent members—the island states—are the least embedded in its collective security frameworks, preferring partnerships with the Indian Ocean Commission and external powers like India, France, and the EU.

• There is a significant disconnect between the promotion of the blue economy and actual security planning, which limits political support from departments other than infrastructure and defence.
• SADC's internal resourcing is weak, leading to a reliance on external funding for most capacity-building efforts, including exercises and information sharing, which creates sustainability risks.
• The 2022 Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) is a normative improvement over the 2011 strategy by shifting from a narrow focus on piracy to a multidimensional approach including environmental management and the blue economy, though implementation is uneven.
• Operation Copper, while often presented as a SADC mandate, is actually a nationally funded South African initiative that lacks formal linkage to the IMSS and shared regional financing or command.
• SADC's maritime governance is hindered by institutional fragmentation, where maritime issues are buried deep within defence structures and lack direct representation at high political levels.
• Regional Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) remains an aspirational goal; current systems are fragmented across multiple external and commercial platforms, leading to information gaps and inconsistent interpretations.
• SADC island states (Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, and Comoros) are institutionally distant from SADC's mainland-focused agenda, preferring the Indian Ocean Commission and external partnerships.
• Land-linked SADC members are highly vulnerable to disruptions in maritime corridors, yet their engagement in regional maritime governance is largely symbolic due to limited operational capacity.

APA

Walker, T. (2025). Strengthening SADC’s maritime security architecture. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1766043191470-sar-65.pdf

Chicago

Walker, Timothy. Strengthening SADC’s maritime security architecture. Institute for Security Studies, 2025. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1766043191470-sar-65.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Walker |first1=Timothy |title=Strengthening SADC’s maritime security architecture |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=December 2025 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1766043191470-sar-65.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{walker2025strengthening, author = {Walker, Timothy}, title = {{Strengthening SADC’s maritime security architecture}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2025}, month = dec, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1766043191470-sar-65.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }