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The report details systemic gender discrimination in African households, highlighting the prevalence of child marriage, the disproportionate burden of unpaid care work on women, and legal and cultural barriers to equal divorce and inheritance rights.

The document analyzes the potential benefits of increased education spending in Africa by 2043. It finds that an 'Education scenario' would significantly boost GDP, reduce extreme poverty, and improve health outcomes, particularly in lower-income regions, while creating a 'human capital dividend' that accelerates economic growth.

The research finds that an aggressive reduction in gender inequality would significantly increase Africa's GDP, GDP per capita, and human development indices by 2043. The most substantial economic gains are projected in the service sector and in regions with currently high gender gaps, such as North and West Africa. Socially, the Gender scenario is forecast to lift millions out of extreme poverty and reduce the number of stunted children by 6 million compared to the Current Path.

The document forecasts that achieving full gender equality by 2043 would significantly boost Africa's economy, increasing GDP by US$1 trillion compared to the current path and lifting 80 million more people out of extreme poverty. The most substantial gains are projected for North Africa and specific countries like Egypt and Nigeria, though the extent of the benefit depends on a country's economic structure and population growth.

The document outlines a simulated agricultural revolution in Africa based on eight interventions: increasing crop yields, expanding irrigation, increasing water withdrawal, protecting forests, improving supply chains, enhancing rural road access, and increasing per capita calories. The scenario predicts that by 2043, average crop yields will reach 7 tons per hectare (a 37% increase over the 'Current Path') and irrigated land will grow to 17.4 million hectares. It emphasizes the role of these interventions in reducing food loss and waste—projected to drop to 19.4% by 2033—and improving rural accessibility to 69%. The model balances agricultural expansion with forest protection, aiming to save 30 million hectares of forest land by 2043 compared to the Current Path forecast.

The report explores how a differentiated global carbon tax—where rates are based on a country's income classification—could reduce fossil fuel emissions and foster economic growth in Africa. Under the 'Sustainable Africa' scenario, the African economy is projected to be 58% larger by 2050 than the 'Current Path', with significant reductions in extreme poverty and near-total electricity access, despite a larger economy. The document also highlights Africa's potential as a carbon sink through reforestation and land management to attract investment and carbon credits.

The report argues that the abrupt closure of USAID in 2025 has had catastrophic short-term effects on funding-dependent newsrooms in Africa, leading to mass layoffs and a decline in investigative capacity. It highlights the role of Internews as a primary implementer of these projects and warns that the loss of funding increases the risk of 'media capture' by political actors, the 'juniorisation' of newsrooms as senior staff leave, and a shift toward commercial rather than public service reporting. The author concludes that the resulting vacuum in public accountability work may accelerate democratic backsliding in fragile states.

The report highlights how Africa's infrastructure deficit, particularly in roads and aviation, increases transport costs and hinders investment. It notes a significant funding gap and a failure to implement regional air transport agreements, while acknowledging the role of China's Belt and Road Initiative in recent infrastructure development.

The document examines the diverse nature of Africa's manufacturing sector, noting that most countries remain outliers with low manufacturing shares of GDP. It highlights a trend of 'premature deindustrialization' in low-income countries and the significant role of Chinese private enterprises in meeting domestic demand. While most of the continent relies on raw material exports, a few countries like Eswatini and South Africa show higher industrial competitiveness.

The report details a strategic scenario for Africa to improve health and demographic outcomes by 2050. Key interventions include increasing modern contraceptive use to 75% in sub-Saharan Africa and 85% in North Africa, reducing mortality for the top five disease types by 20 percentage points, and expanding safely managed water and sanitation access. The scenario also targets a 20% reduction in under-five stunting in 39 countries. These improvements require an additional US$18.9 billion in health spending continentwide, with infrastructure spending peaking at US$4.7 billion per annum in 2037. The model is based on empirical benchmarks from countries like Ethiopia, Malawi, Ghana, and Kenya, and mirrors historical progress in South America and South Asia.

The report finds that while the percentage of Africans living in extreme poverty has declined since the 1990s, the absolute number of poor people continues to rise due to rapid population growth. Africa is projected to miss the 2030 SDG goal of eliminating extreme poverty, with several countries likely to maintain poverty rates above 50% by that date. The document attributes these challenges to high inequality, over-reliance on natural resources, and bad governance, noting that Sub-Saharan Africa carries the largest global burden of extreme poverty.

The Manufacturing scenario projects a structural economic transformation for Africa by 2043, increasing the manufacturing sector's GDP share to 18.1% and adding US$282.8 billion to the continent's total GDP. This shift is expected to generate 34.6 million additional jobs, primarily unskilled roles in agro-processing and services, while increasing government revenue by US$81.6 billion. The scenario forecasts a reduction in extreme poverty, lifting 19.11 million more people out of poverty by 2043 than the Current Path, and predicts a long-term decrease in income inequality through the expansion of the middle class.

The document examines the risks of incorporating arbitration, specifically investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), into the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (UN FCITC). It contrasts ISDS with mandatory binding arbitration (MBA) and the mutual agreement procedure (MAP), highlighting structural flaws in ISDS such as high costs, inconsistent decision-making, and 'regulatory chill'. Drawing on the prolonged reform efforts of UNCITRAL Working Group III, the brief warns that adopting complex arbitration mechanisms can lead to institutional lock-in and asymmetric influence in negotiations. It recommends that the UN FCITC include safeguards, such as carve-out clauses, to protect fiscal sovereignty and discourage the use of ISDS for tax disputes.

This report analyzes the role of risk mitigation and transfer instruments in utility-scale renewable energy investments across East Africa, utilizing six case studies from Burundi, Djibouti, Uganda, and Kenya to identify how these tools facilitate the transition from project development to financial close.

The research paper examines the increasing role of GCC countries—primarily the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—as major investors in Africa's energy transition and infrastructure. It identifies food security and economic diversification away from hydrocarbons as the primary drivers for Gulf states. While highlighting significant projects in renewable energy and mining, the paper warns that the current focus on large-scale, export-oriented developments may sideline local community needs and climate adaptation priorities unless African policymakers actively steer investments toward local beneficiation and regional integration.

The study finds a substantial disconnect between African climate commitments (NDCs) and national development blueprints (NDPs), with NDCs focusing on climate-centric sectors like energy and forestry while NDPs prioritize economic growth, finance, and the private sector. This 'parallel policy framework' is driven by institutional fragmentation, where NDCs are often externally funded and led by environment ministries, whereas NDPs are domestically anchored and led by economic planning ministries. The authors recommend a 'whole-of-government' approach to embed climate goals into national budgets and development strategies to maximize socio-economic co-benefits.

The report examines the role of risk mitigation and transfer (RMT) instruments in supporting utility-scale wind and solar projects in East Africa. Through six case studies, it finds that while RMT tools—such as political risk insurance, guarantees, and blended finance—are essential for reaching financial close, risks remain high due to macroeconomic instability, currency volatility, and utility financial strain. The analysis highlights a 'start-stop cycle' in countries like Kenya, where rapid deployment led to overcapacity and subsequent government moratoriums on new contracts. Conversely, the GET FiT program in Uganda is presented as a successful model of systematic de-risking through transparent procurement and institutional support.

Global Energy Monitor reports that 216 GW of proposed green hydrogen projects in 11 African countries are primarily designed for export to Europe, despite a lack of established markets, funding, and infrastructure. The analysis highlights a disconnect between these massive, often hypothetical projects and the urgent need for domestic electrification, noting that 61% of prospective utility-scale wind and solar projects in Africa are earmarked for hydrogen. While small-scale distributed solar and wind projects have successfully improved energy access, the large-scale hydrogen push risks creating stranded assets and depleting local water resources without providing significant local economic value.

The report examines eight innovative financial instruments—including the Adaptation Benefit Mechanism, biodiversity credits, carbon taxes, carbon trading, credit guarantees, debt-for-nature/climate resilience swaps, pooled investment funds, and sovereign green/sustainability-linked bonds—to bridge the climate finance gap in developing countries. It identifies common barriers such as limited institutional capacity, lack of robust project pipelines, and underdeveloped local capital markets. The document emphasizes that while these instruments can signal a government's commitment to climate action, their success depends on a supportive enabling environment characterized by effective leadership, clear taxonomies, and robust climate data. For least developed countries (LDCs), the report suggests a phased approach, first strengthening basic financial and legal prerequisites before focusing on 'climate investability'. It concludes with specific recommendations for donors and development partners to provide technical assistance, anchor investments, and pilot projects to scale up private sector mobilization.

The document examines the evolution of National Youth Policies (NYPs) in Africa, noting a steep increase in adoption that peaked in 2020. While these policies frequently address education, employment, and health, they often neglect youth political participation and face significant implementation gaps. Adoption is driven more by political and institutional factors, such as democracy and administrative capacity, than by demographic needs.