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Climate finance for emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) surpassed USD 1 trillion in 2023, with 80% mobilized domestically. Mitigation finance dominates, accounting for 92% of flows (USD 979 billion), while adaptation finance reached USD 48 billion. China is the primary driver, providing 64% of total EMDE flows. Significant gaps remain, with annual mitigation needs estimated at USD 3.86 trillion. The report recommends strengthening domestic enabling environments, improving the quality of international finance, and increasing data transparency to scale investment.

Colombia saw a significant increase in solar and wind capacity to approximately 9% of its electricity matrix in 2024, driven primarily by solar expansion. While the government aims to establish 20,000 energy communities by 2026 and has approved substantial future capacity (13.5 GW solar and 2.8 GW wind for 2023-2033), the sector faced a nearly 70% drop in investment between 2022 and 2023. The transition is further complicated by the suspension of several major wind projects and the need for approximately USD 92.4 billion to meet long-term National Energy Plan targets.

The document argues that common myths about renewable energy are outdated and unsupported by evidence. It provides data showing that solar and wind are now the cheapest sources of new power generation, with costs falling up to 90% since 2010. It asserts that modern grids can manage intermittency through storage and diversification, and that renewables have significantly lower impacts on wildlife, public health, and waste compared to fossil fuels. Specific case studies, such as the April 2025 Iberian Peninsula blackout, are used to demonstrate that grid instability is often caused by technical planning issues rather than the presence of renewables.

The report finds that while a majority of registered U.S. voters support various clean energy policies and prefer candidates who take action on global warming, the issue remains low in priority for most voters when deciding on congressional candidates. There is strong bipartisan support for policies like soil restoration and renewable energy research, but significant polarization exists regarding the transition from fossil fuels and the Paris Climate Agreement.

The report examines the intersection of Africa's blue economy and climate change, highlighting vulnerabilities in fisheries, maritime transport, and tourism. It argues for a transition toward renewable ocean energy, the expansion of blue carbon initiatives, and the implementation of integrated, regional governance to mitigate economic risks and environmental degradation.

The report examines the intersection of Japan's energy policy and national security, arguing that a faster shift to renewables—potentially reaching 70% of electricity generation by 2035—would mitigate risks associated with fragile fossil fuel supply chains and geopolitical instability. While acknowledging challenges such as China's dominance in clean energy supply chains and cybersecurity risks, the authors contend these are manageable compared to the vulnerabilities of continued fossil fuel dependence. The document recommends greater inter-ministerial coordination between energy, defense, and diplomatic agencies to prioritize renewables as a national security imperative.

The brief contends that the Wind Directive lacks a reasoned basis and ignores the public health, climate, and economic benefits of wind power. It argues that existing permitting frameworks already sufficiently protect wildlife and that the sudden ban on wind permits contradicts the administration's own goals of increasing domestic energy production and its simultaneous efforts to expedite fossil-fuel projects.

International climate finance for Brazil grew by 84% between the 2019–2020 and 2021–2022 biennia, reaching an average of US$ 5.1 billion per year. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, specifically solar and wind power, and was characterized by a shift toward commercial financing instruments. While Western Europe, led by France, was the largest regional provider, the AFOLU sector—responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions—received only 11% of the total finance. Public institutions provided 58% of the funds, with multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) playing a dominant role, while private finance grew fourfold to reach 42% of the total.

International climate finance for Brazil averaged US$ 5.1 billion per year in 2021–2022, an 84% increase from the 2019–2020 period. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, particularly solar and wind power, and a significant rise in private capital from commercial financial institutions. While Western Europe was the largest regional provider, the report highlights a stark imbalance in sectoral allocation: the AFOLU sector, responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions, received only 11% of total finance. The majority of funds were earmarked for mitigation (80%) and delivered via commercial debt and equity, while grants and concessional finance declined by 43%.

International climate finance to Brazil averaged R$ 26.6 billion per year in 2021–2022, an 84% increase from 2019–2020. Growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, specifically solar and wind power, and a significant rise in private commercial financing. While Western Europe, led by France, was the primary source, the AFOLU sector—responsible for most of Brazil's emissions—received only 11% of total funding, mostly through public multilateral sources.

China is advancing a 1.3 TW pipeline of utility-scale solar and wind projects, with operating capacity reaching 1.4 TW by 2025. The country has become a global leader in offshore wind, growing its capacity to 42.7 GW by March 2025. While offshore wind is being used to decarbonize coastal industries and produce green hydrogen, the sector faces challenges from the 2021 phaseout of national subsidies and competition from ongoing coal and gas developments. The report suggests adopting hybrid auction mechanisms and centralized marine spatial planning to ensure sustainable growth.

The June roundup highlights a decline in oil production investment and a surge in clean energy spending, with solar investment nearly equaling oil production spending. It analyzes the resilience of oil markets despite conflict in the Middle East, the acceleration of peak oil demand due to electric vehicle adoption in China, and various national policy shifts in the UK, Canada, and the US. Additionally, it reports on 'world first' projects in hydrogen blending and carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the US and Norway.

The document outlines the technical framework for the Europe Electricity Interconnection Data Tool, detailing how Ember maps Bidding Zones to countries and calculates key metrics like Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) and variable RES penetration. It specifies the use of ENTSO-E and TYNDP 2024 data to provide current (2024) and future (2030, 2040) snapshots of European grid characteristics, including 'Reference', 'Projects', and 'Needs' scenarios for grid expansion.

The report argues that Japan's continued reliance on imported liquefied natural gas (LNG), as outlined in its 7th Strategic Energy Plan, creates significant geopolitical security risks and threatens its 2050 net-zero target. It recommends a five-step acceleration of decarbonisation, focusing on grid modernisation, domestic renewable energy expansion, and methane abatement in the LNG supply chain.

The report examines Japan's Green Transformation (GX) strategy, highlighting the risks of continued reliance on imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) amidst geopolitical instability. It advocates for a shift toward domestic renewables, grid modernization, and aggressive methane emission reductions to ensure energy resilience and climate leadership.

As of May 2025, China's operational solar and wind capacity reached 1.4 billion kW, surpassing fossil fuel capacity for the first time in Q1 2025. The country leads globally in planned and under-construction projects, with over 1.3 billion kW in the pipeline. While offshore wind represents only 9% of total wind capacity, China accounts for 49% of global cumulative offshore installations as of March 2025. The document highlights the role of coastal provinces like Jiangsu and Guangdong in driving this growth and suggests transitioning from local to national-level policies and adopting international bidding models to ensure long-term stability and technical innovation.

China is advancing a 1.3 TW pipeline of utility-scale solar and wind projects, with operating capacity reaching 1.4 TW by 2025. While solar and onshore wind are expanding rapidly, particularly in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, offshore wind has emerged as a global powerhouse, accounting for 50% of global capacity. However, the offshore sector faces challenges from the 2021 phaseout of national subsidies and competition from planned coal and gas capacity in coastal provinces. The document argues for a transition from provincial development to a coordinated national policy framework incorporating hybrid auction mechanisms and robust spatial planning.

The Petrogandaprisen 2025 identifies numerous instances of the oil industry's influence in Norway, categorizing nominees into eight areas: education for children and youth, sports, public festivals, campaigns, media and public debate, research, art and culture, and health and humanitarian work. The document argues that companies like Equinor, Vår Energi, and Aker BP use sponsorships and partnerships to create a positive image, target young audiences, and obstruct climate action. Specific examples include Equinor's sponsorship of the First Lego League and the Festspillene i Bergen, Vår Energi's funding of regional sports halls, and Aker BP's 'Rebels' marketing campaigns. The report also criticizes the role of media outlets like NRK and Dagens Næringsliv, as well as research institutions and humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross, for facilitating or ignoring the industry's impact on the climate crisis.

The Petroganda Prize 2025 long list identifies various entities and campaigns in Norway that the publisher, Klimakultur, views as 'petroganda'. The document categorizes these nominees into eight areas: children and youth education, sports, folk festivals, campaigns, media and public debate, research, arts and culture, and health and humanitarian work. It specifically highlights how companies like Equinor, Vår Energi, Aker BP, and Gassco sponsor science centers, sports teams, and art festivals to create a narrative of being 'part of the solution' to the climate crisis. The document argues that these partnerships allow the fossil fuel industry to influence young people and the public, effectively masking the environmental and health damages caused by oil and gas production.

The document outlines a new energy security framework for Central and Eastern Europe, emphasizing the transition to clean energy to reduce vulnerabilities associated with fossil fuel imports and geopolitical instability. It advocates for the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, the establishment of a grid security framework to counter hybrid warfare, and the expansion of the EU single energy market through harmonized permitting and increased interconnectivity. Additionally, it calls for the EU to adopt an incentive-based investment approach, similar to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, to maintain global competitiveness and avoid reliance on non-EU financing.