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The document examines the vulnerability of Arabica coffee in Uganda's Bududa District to climate variability and projected climate change. It compares 'Business as Usual' (BAU) with 'Climate Smart Agriculture' (CSA) scenarios, finding that CSA—which includes tree planting, mulching, and trench construction—offers a higher Internal Rate of Return (IRR) than BAU under both current and future conditions. The study suggests that combining CSA with institutional support could sustain coffee cultivation, though it notes that estimates are preliminary and require further research and piloting.

The study finds that climate change, characterized by rising temperatures and decreasing rainfall, will likely cause significant economic losses in the Mpanga river catchment, particularly in the energy sector. Annual costs for the energy sector are estimated between US$25 million and US$98 million by 2030-2035, while the water supply sector in the Rushango area may face annual losses of US$45,000 to US$79,000. Adaptation measures, including water resource regulation and energy diversification, are considered high priorities as they only need to offset between 2.8% and 32.8% of estimated losses to be economically justified.

The document estimates that water demand in Uganda will increase from 408 million cubic meters per year in 2010 to 3,963 million cubic meters per year by 2050. Under climate change scenarios and assuming no new investments beyond current plans, unmet demand is projected to rise to 1,651 million cubic meters per year, with an expected annual cost of approximately US$5.5 billion by 2050. The analysis highlights that the Lake Victoria, Albert Nile, and Lake Kyoga watersheds will face the largest economic losses. Historical drought data shows significant impacts, with events in 2005-6 and 2010-11 causing losses of US$250 million and US$1,174 million respectively. The report concludes that priority adaptation programmes focusing on water use efficiency, supply for agriculture and industry, and Integrated Water Resources Management are likely to generate high returns on investment.

The policy brief emphasizes that water security is a prerequisite for growth and development in Africa, noting that climate variability can significantly reduce GDP. It advocates for a strategy of 'no/low regret' investments—those that provide returns regardless of the climate scenario—to address the 'adaptation deficit' and minimize risks. The document calls for cross-sectoral coordination, increased investment in water management, and the exploitation of specialized climate adaptation funding, such as the potential Green Climate Fund, to build long-term resilience.

The document examines the economic risks of deforestation in Aceh, specifically linking palm oil expansion on peatlands to increased flooding and potential 'stranded assets'. It argues that increasing agricultural productivity for palm oil and rice can meet government production targets while reducing the need for land conversion and protecting the Leuser Ecosystem.

The report argues that the proposed 1.2 GW Karpowership gas power plants are not aligned with a least-cost investment pathway for South Africa. Drawing on a study by Meridian Economics and the CSIR, it finds that the grid should prioritize rapid renewable energy build-out and storage, with new gas capacity not being economically optimal until the mid-2030s. The document concludes that commissioning these plants by 2022 would create an unnecessary economic burden for ratepayers and that the procurement process (RMIPP) was biased against renewable energy options.

South Africa's Critical Minerals and Metals Strategy aims to maximise the economic value of its vast mineral reserves—including PGMs, manganese, and vanadium—by shifting from raw ore exports to local beneficiation and high-tech manufacturing. The strategy identifies a specific list of high, moderate-to-high, and moderate criticality minerals and proposes six pillars of intervention: geoscience mapping, value addition, R&D, infrastructure/energy security, financial instruments, and regulatory harmonisation. It emphasizes the need to overcome domestic bottlenecks in energy and logistics, foster regional integration within Africa, and navigate geopolitical tensions, particularly China's dominance in the supply chain, to secure a role in the global green energy transition.

The document details the environmental and social costs of coal-power generation in South Africa, specifically focusing on the Kusile power station. It highlights that water-related externalities for Kusile range from R0.95 to R1.86 per kWh, driven largely by water use in generation and mining. The text argues that the Draft Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2016 misrepresents the total cost of coal by ignoring these externalities. It further notes that coal mining and power generation consume 3% and 2% of South Africa's water respectively, with severe regional impacts in the Upper Olifants. The report emphasizes the long-term costs of acid-mine drainage and the disproportionate health and water-security burdens placed on poor communities, concluding that a decarbonised energy future would require four times less water by 2050 and create more jobs than the coal-reliant base case.

The document examines how fuel subsidies in the EU fishing fleet incentivise overfishing, increase greenhouse gas emissions, and provide a competitive advantage to environmentally damaging, fuel-intensive fishing methods like trawling. It argues that removing these subsidies—estimated at €1 billion to €1.5 billion annually—would promote energy efficiency, support fish stock recovery, and benefit small-scale fishers, who currently receive less support than large-scale and distant-water fleets.

The Canadian Climate Institute outlines a proposed framework to integrate oil and gas projects into the Sustainable Finance Action Council's (SFAC) climate investment taxonomy. To maintain scientific credibility and avoid 'greenwashing,' the report argues that only decarbonization projects within existing facilities should be eligible for the 'transition' label. It proposes a three-step eligibility process: general corporate requirements (net-zero targets), project-specific requirements (existing facility status and emission intensity alignment with 1.5°C pathways), and 'do no significant harm' criteria. A key proposal is a 50% threshold for downstream Scope 3 emissions to identify projects where demand-side risk is the primary transition risk. The report emphasizes that new oil and gas installations must be excluded to prevent carbon lock-in and align with global net-zero goals.

The report analyzes the challenges of decarbonizing Canada's critical minerals sector, noting that while Canada currently has a low-carbon advantage due to clean electricity grids, this edge may erode as other nations transition. It identifies three primary barriers: a lack of market demand for low-carbon minerals (no 'green premium'), fragmented supply chain infrastructure hindering traceability, and supply-side hurdles including the slow commercialization of electric ultra-class haul trucks and limited access to low-carbon power for off-grid mines. The author recommends a policy toolkit including the integration of emissions intensity into support programs, funding for R&D in technologies like direct lithium extraction, and the maintenance of large-emitter trading systems.

The report examines how carbon pricing and policy credibility influence private sector investment in low-carbon technologies. It argues that while carbon prices provide a necessary signal, the lack of long-term policy certainty often leads firms to adopt 'carbon ignorant' strategies or delay investment. The analysis highlights the role of capital costs, the importance of a predictable policy trajectory, and the necessity of combining carbon pricing with complementary policies to drive a systemic energy transition.

Peru's emissions are projected to triple by 2050, driven by economic growth and energy demand. While the country has established mitigation plans and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), implementation is hindered by financial, regulatory, and knowledge barriers. Significant potential exists in renewable energy, forestry, and waste management, though the energy sector is currently dominated by natural gas. The report suggests that SECO can support Peru through capacity building for market mechanisms, financing marginal abatement cost studies, and promoting specific technologies like solar water heaters and energy-efficient industrial equipment.

The document examines Azerbaijan's transition from a fossil-fuel-dependent economy to one incorporating renewable energy, highlighting the role of COP29 as a catalyst for climate ambition. It identifies key risks, such as the economic reliance on oil rents and the potential for renewables to merely supplement rather than replace hydrocarbons. The author recommends developing a targeted energy transition strategy, protecting vulnerable groups from subsidy removals, and increasing private sector competition to ensure a just and sustainable transition.

The briefing argues that while the transition away from fossil fuels is accelerating due to economic costs, clean energy opportunities, and geopolitical drivers, significant gaps remain in production and emissions. It highlights the vulnerability of fossil-fuel-dependent nations and the need for a 'globally just transition' supported by redirected finance, debt relief, and stronger governance to avoid economic disruption and systemic financial risks.

The document analyzes Nigeria's struggle to balance its economic reliance on oil and gas with climate ambitions. It highlights the risk of 'carbon lock-in' through policies like the Petroleum Industry Act and the fiscal vulnerability of sub-national governments. It proposes shifting from a natural-resource-dependent model to one based on high-value manufacturing and services, leveraging renewable energy and critical minerals like lithium. Key recommendations include developing multi-sectoral transition policies, securing international climate finance, and implementing social protections for displaced workers and the Niger Delta region.

Trinidad and Tobago is transitioning from an economy where energy products account for approximately 37% of gross domestic output toward a low-carbon model. The country currently relies on 100% natural gas for power generation but has set a target of 30% renewable energy production by 2030 and a conditional 15% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 from a 2013 baseline. The briefing argues that integrating renewables would allow the state to divert natural gas to downstream petrochemical production, increasing revenue and lowering the carbon footprint compared to combustion. Key obstacles include low electricity tariffs (0.055 USD/kWh) that deter renewable investment and the risk of punitive measures from the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on petrochemical exports. The authors recommend a comprehensive decarbonisation roadmap incorporating distributional, procedural, and recognitional energy justice to protect vulnerable populations and ensure equitable participation.

The Willis Transportation Outlook examines how transport infrastructure serves as a primary driver of global economic development and wealth creation. It highlights a shift in aviation and trade growth toward Asia and the Middle East, while developed nations like the UK struggle with political instability and aging infrastructure. The document emphasizes the transition toward 'intelligent mobility'—using smart data and connectivity to reduce congestion—and the urgent need for climate-resilient infrastructure to withstand extreme weather. It also explores innovative funding models like Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the role of China's investment in African transport networks.

The assessment examines the paths to renewable energy penetration in India, finding that wind and solar energy now offer higher returns and lower risk than coal and natural gas. It further indicates that achieving the 175 GW renewable energy target could create between 2 million and 4.5 million jobs in the wind and solar sectors by 2042.

The document highlights how inadequate road infrastructure and complex regulations in Brazil increase transportation costs and reduce investor interest. It specifically notes that improving road infrastructure could reduce transportation costs by 54% and compares the efficiency of Santarém Port against Santos Port for grain exports.