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The document explains the operational framework of the Article 6.4 Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), detailing the project lifecycle from prior consideration to credit issuance. It identifies key reporting documents, such as Project Design Documents (PDD) and the Sustainable Development Tool, and directs users to data sources like the UNEP Article 6 Pipeline and UNFCCC platforms. The guide also outlines accountability pathways, including a global grievance mechanism and an appeals process for stakeholders to report harms or challenge registration decisions.

The paper examines the conceptual and political challenges of implementing Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, highlighting diverging interpretations of its scope and the systemic barriers facing developing countries. It proposes a working definition that encompasses all financial flows and integrates equity and national circumstances to support future progress assessments, starting with a framework to be applied in Germany.

The document defines essential carbon market terminology, including the distinction between cap-and-trade and compliance markets, the mechanics of carbon credits and budgets, and specific regulatory frameworks like the EU's CBAM and the ICAO's CORSIA.

Carbon Market Watch recommends that Zambia's 2025 Carbon Market Regulations include more robust quantitative criteria for greenhouse gas uncertainty, mandatory independent grievance processes, and a minimum activity longevity of 100 years for land-use projects to ensure climate-relevant timescales. The organization also advocates for mandatory benefit-sharing for all activities affecting local communities and the adoption of high-quality methodology labels, such as Article 6.4 or ICVCM's CCP, over CDM or VCS standards.

The report evaluates the Article 6 carbon market rules finalized at COP29. It finds that Article 6.2 provides a weak, decentralized framework with significant loopholes in additionality, permanence, and accountability. Article 6.4 is rated more robust due to its centralized Supervisory Body and structured transparency, though it still lacks sufficient safeguards for land rights and permanence. The author argues that the current framework is not robust enough to ensure high-quality carbon credits and warns developed countries against using these markets to meet their NDCs.

The report argues that the Korean Emissions Trading Scheme (K-ETS) is undermined by a reliance on low-quality international carbon credits, which lead to over-crediting and depressed carbon prices. Using the EU ETS as a benchmark, the authors demonstrate how the EU phased out international credits to prioritize domestic reductions. A specific analysis of cookstove projects eligible for K-ETS finds they likely overestimate emission reductions by a factor of 18.3. The report also highlights systemic issues with hydropower and gas leak reduction projects, including lack of additionality and environmental harm. It recommends that South Korea ban international credits from the K-ETS, strengthen emission caps, and avoid using unreliable bilateral cooperation projects under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement to meet its 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).

The document analyzes the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, focusing on the distinctions between the bilateral/multilateral trades of Article 6.2 and the UN-overseen global market of Article 6.4. It highlights critical loopholes, including the risk of double counting in aviation offsetting (CORSIA), the lack of oversight for Article 6.2 trades, and the potential for 'junk' credits from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to transition into the new system. The author argues for stricter authorization processes, mandatory transparency, and a 'firewall' between carbon markets and the new climate finance package being negotiated at COP29.

The policy brief contends that carbon markets are a flawed mechanism that fails to provide real climate finance, instead allowing Global North polluters to avoid direct emission reductions while potentially harming Global South communities.

The report highlights a surplus of approximately 829 million carbon credits in the voluntary carbon market (VCM), with renewable energy (RE) projects accounting for 35% of all project types. It argues that large-scale, grid-connected RE projects are generally non-additional because they are economically feasible without carbon credit revenues. The document traces this issue back to lax methodologies from the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), specifically methodology ACM0002, which has been adopted by VCM standards like Verra and Gold Standard. The report also notes human rights concerns, including forced displacements linked to large hydroelectric dams. Furthermore, it observes a trend of anonymous retirement for 89.9% of RE credits, suggesting buyers are aware of their low quality but purchase them due to low cost. The report warns that the transition of CDM projects to the Paris Agreement's Article 6 mechanism risks flooding new markets with low-quality credits.

The proposal requests USD 613,699.15 over 18 months to address critical capacity gaps in Nigeria's National Designated Authority (NDA). Key objectives include establishing a coordination mechanism, developing a GCF country program, creating a monitoring and evaluation framework, and drafting two project concept notes for mitigation and adaptation. The project will be implemented by the Nigerian Incentive-Based Risk-sharing System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL) in collaboration with the NCCC.

The document explains the distinction between cap-and-trade systems (ETS) and baseline-and-credit mechanisms, detailing the evolution from Kyoto Protocol markets to the Paris Agreement's Article 6. It critiques carbon offsetting for enabling greenwashing and failing to reduce absolute emissions, while highlighting the specific shortcomings of CORSIA and REDD+. The guide advocates for a shift toward a 'climate contribution' approach where credits are cancelled without offsetting claims to support global climate action.

The GCF Readiness Strategy 2024–2027 reorients capacity-building support by streamlining five previous objectives into three, with a significant shift in funding priority toward pipeline development. The strategy introduces a four-year planning cycle to replace annual caps, providing a total estimated budget of USD 501.5 million. It establishes two primary modalities: a country support modality offering up to USD 7 million per country (including specific allocations for NAPs and LDCs/SIDS) and a DAE support modality providing up to USD 1 million per entity to strengthen direct access programming.

The document provides a detailed overview of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, distinguishing between the bilateral/multilateral trading of Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) under Article 6.2 and the UN-supervised global carbon market under Article 6.4. It highlights critical concerns regarding double counting, the lack of oversight in Article 6.2, the risks associated with transitioning legacy Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, and the potential for 'emissions avoidance' to undermine environmental integrity. The guide outlines key priorities for COP28, including the need for stricter reporting rules, a code of conduct for confidentiality, and the establishment of independent grievance processes.

Carbon Market Watch opposes the inclusion of emission avoidance in Article 6.4 and 6.2, warning that inconsistently defined avoidance activities could lead to the issuance of 'hot air' credits and potentially increase overall emissions.

The report evaluates grievance mechanisms across various carbon market standards and funds, using UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as a benchmark. It finds that most voluntary carbon market (VCM) standards have opaque or insufficient mechanisms, while the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Gold Standard provide more robust models. The authors recommend that the Article 6.4 mechanism prioritize accessibility, transparency through public repositories, independence, and the ability to provide binding remedies, including the power to overturn Supervisory Body decisions.

The document provides a detailed breakdown of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, distinguishing between the bilateral trading of Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) under Article 6.2 and the UN-overseen global carbon market under Article 6.4. It highlights critical risks such as double counting, the potential for 'junk' credits transitioning from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and the lack of transparency in reporting. The guide also argues against the inclusion of avoided emissions and short-lived carbon storage as bases for credits, while advocating for mandatory cancellation rates to ensure overall mitigation in global emissions.

Carbon Market Watch argues against the use of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) toward NDCs and the inclusion of emission avoidance in Article 6.4, while calling for a highly transparent mechanism registry and the mandatory application of corresponding adjustments to ensure overall mitigation in global emissions (OMGE).

Carbon Market Watch argues that 'averaging accounting' for single-year NDCs creates a risk of double counting that should be addressed through the ex-post cancellation of Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs). The organization advocates for a 'public' default status for all Article 6 information and a transparent, machine-readable infrastructure for the Centralised Accounting and Reporting Platform (CARP). Additionally, it strongly opposes allowing 'emission avoidance' to qualify for ITMOs, citing poor definitions and the risk of crediting fossil fuel infrastructure.

Carbon Market Watch argues that Parties should prioritize domestic mitigation over carbon credits and recommends strict transparency, science-based definitions for removals, and the establishment of an independent grievance body for Article 6 mechanisms.

The evaluation assesses the performance of the Sumber Solar Power Plant (SPP) in Govisumber aimag, Mongolia. The project, funded by a USD 8.65 million GCF loan and USD 8.9 million in equity, was completed in 2018 and became operational in March 2019. The evaluation concludes that the programme's results were "Satisfactory," noting that the SPP reduced 29,722 tCO2eq of greenhouse gas emissions between 2019 and 2020 and produced 35,076 MWh of electricity. Despite the project's technical success and alignment with Mongolia's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets, the evaluation highlights shortcomings in gender mainstreaming and the lack of a formal Theory of Change. The programme closed prematurely in December 2020 due to the project developer refinancing the loan with a lower-interest arrangement from their co-investor.