How effective are Article 6 carbon market rules?

The report evaluates the Article 6 carbon market rules finalized at COP29. It finds that Article 6.2 provides a weak, decentralized framework with significant loopholes in additionality, permanence, and accountability. Article 6.4 is rated more robust due to its centralized Supervisory Body and structured transparency, though it still lacks sufficient safeguards for land rights and permanence. The author argues that the current framework is not robust enough to ensure high-quality carbon credits and warns developed countries against using these markets to meet their NDCs.

• The Article 6.2 framework is characterized as weak and scoring poorly across most evaluation criteria, leaving environmental integrity largely to the discretion of participating countries.
• Article 6.4 is generally more robust than Article 6.2 due to its centralized governance by a Supervisory Body, although it still fails to adequately ensure permanence and equity.
• Double counting risks persist in both frameworks due to implementation loopholes, specifically the 'averaging' approach for single-year NDCs and flexibility in modifying ITMO authorisations.
• Article 6.2 is severely lacking in additionality standards, as it does not define how additionality should be demonstrated, creating risks that low-quality credits enter the system.
• The transition of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects into Article 6.4 risks flooding the market with 'junk credits' because these projects are exempt from new methodology requirements.
• Quantification under Article 6.2 is severely lacking because there is no binding requirement to set rigorous baselines or address leakage effectively.
• Permanence safeguards are severely lacking in Article 6.2 and insufficient in Article 6.4, with the latter's buffer pool and monitoring requirements containing critical ambiguities.
• Transparency in Article 6.2 is hindered by the ability of countries to report vague information and invoke 'confidentiality' to block public disclosure of trade agreements.
• Accountability in Article 6.2 is severely lacking because the UN technical expert review team has a limited mandate and cannot assess the actual quality or integrity of the credits.
• Article 6.4 provides a more structured accountability framework through third-party validation by Designated Operational Entities (DOEs), though a conflict of interest exists as developers choose their own verifiers.
• Equity in Article 6.2 is severely lacking, with no minimum standards for benefit sharing or mandatory safeguards to prevent social and environmental harm.
• While Article 6.4 includes equity mechanisms like the 2% cancellation for overall mitigation (OMGE) and a 5% transfer to the Adaptation Fund, it still lacks sufficient protections for land rights and accessible grievance processes.

APA

Carbon Market Watch (2025). How effective are Article 6 carbon market rules? https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/cmw_art6_report-final_.pdf

Chicago

Carbon Market Watch. How effective are Article 6 carbon market rules? 2025. https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/cmw_art6_report-final_.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Carbon Market Watch |title=How effective are Article 6 carbon market rules? |date=July 2025 |url=https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/cmw_art6_report-final_.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{carbonmarketwatch2025how, author = {{Carbon Market Watch}}, title = {{How effective are Article 6 carbon market rules?}}, institution = {Carbon Market Watch}, year = {2025}, month = jul, url = {https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/cmw_art6_report-final_.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }