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The document analyzes the U.S. response to the 2022 monkeypox outbreak, noting that while biodefense preparations for smallpox provided essential vaccines and therapeutics, the actual rollout was hampered by insufficient testing, vaccine supply shortages, and regulatory hurdles. It highlights the risk of the virus becoming endemic in the U.S. and recommends increased funding for biodefense and health security.

The document analyzes how climate change interacts with socio-political fragility in Papua New Guinea, highlighting risks such as food insecurity, illegal logging, and escalating tribal violence. It argues that these stressors, combined with geopolitical competition from China, threaten regional security. The author recommends that the U.S. provide technical assistance for renewable energy, establish a climate data platform, and support local NGOs and military disaster response capacity to mitigate these risks.

The Inflation Reduction Act is framed as a national security win that reduces U.S. carbon emissions, enhances energy resilience against fossil fuel volatility, and lowers the cost of clean energy technologies for global partners. It specifically supports Department of Defense decarbonization goals in aviation and heavy industry while strengthening U.S. geopolitical influence relative to China.

The document examines the critical intersection of WASH services, climate change, and global health security, illustrating how water scarcity and infrastructure failure exacerbate disease transmission and political instability. It highlights specific instances in West Africa, India, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo where the lack of basic water services in healthcare facilities increased vulnerability to Ebola and other health crises. The author advocates for the U.S. Government to leverage its global water and climate strategies to promote sector-inclusive policies and funding that prioritize prevention over response.

The report argues that military decarbonization is essential for both climate mitigation and operational effectiveness, as fossil fuel dependency creates strategic vulnerabilities. It highlights the lack of a standardized emission measurement methodology, noting that while 'standard operations' (buildings and administration) are relatively easy to green, 'non-standard operations' (heavy weaponry and combat mobility) present significant technological hurdles. The document evaluates the current efforts of NATO and the EU, suggesting that NATO can lead through standardization and normative influence, while the EU can leverage its legislative power and financial instruments like the European Defence Fund. It concludes with recommendations for EU-NATO coordination to avoid duplication and accelerate the transition to clean military power.

This briefing outlines the evolution of climate change integration within the US National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) between 2017 and 2021. It details a progression from the initial declaration of climate change as a national security threat to specific mandates for installation resilience, Arctic security strategies, intelligence community coordination, and the assessment of climate impacts on operational warfighting capabilities.

The briefing outlines three primary risks of reintroducing nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) to the U.S. Navy: operational complications and costs, the 'discrimination problem' where adversaries cannot distinguish nuclear from conventional strikes, and the risk of incentivizing other states to pursue similar capabilities, thereby lowering the threshold for nuclear use.

The report analyzes the evolution of biological weapons threats from the 1940s to the 2010s, noting a shift from battlefield utility to 'gray zone' and asymmetric warfare. It argues that the COVID-19 pandemic acts as a 'game changer' that could either drive nations toward biological weapons as a low-cost deterrent or catalyze a new era of international cooperation. The authors identify critical gaps in U.S. policy, including an over-emphasis on bioterrorism over state-based threats and declining biodefense funding, recommending a 'deterrence by denial' strategy and increased international collaboration.

The case study examines the potential cascading effects of a successful attack on the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP). It argues that the destruction of such infrastructure triggers a chain of risks: immediate power loss for up to 370,000 end users, a shift toward environmentally damaging backup energy sources like biomass, and the failure of critical environmental management systems. Furthermore, a dam breach would cause catastrophic flooding for over 5 million people along the Dnieper River and potentially release contaminants from industrial sites like the Prydniprovsky Chemical Plant into the water system.

The Council on Strategic Risks warns that a lack of dedicated funding in a March 2022 government spending package threatens U.S. domestic health and international vaccine distribution. The author asserts that without additional funds, the U.S. will face depleted monoclonal antibody supplies, reduced testing capacity, and a diminished ability to support the USAID Global VAX program. Furthermore, the document highlights that low vaccination rates in low-income countries (13%) increase the risk of new variants and allow geopolitical rivals like China to strengthen ties with developing nations through vaccine diplomacy.

The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) expressed support for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) during its 2022 Preparatory Committee meetings, warning that norms against weapons of mass destruction are weakening while biological threats rise. CSR proposed new initiatives to strengthen the BWC, including the creation of a rapid response force for emerging biological events and mechanisms to manage the risks associated with the global expansion of high-containment biological laboratories.

The report examines the security implications of climate change in the South and East China Seas, focusing on the interplay between regional political cohesion and food prices. It presents four scenarios—ranging from high cooperation and low prices to high fragmentation and food insecurity—to illustrate potential risks, including social unrest, the failure of governance, and increased Chinese maritime aggression. The analysis emphasizes that climate change acts as a threat multiplier, exacerbating existing geopolitical tensions and socio-economic inequalities in Southeast and East Asia.

The report assesses the climate security landscape of the Levant, focusing on the interplay between governance, cooperation, and technology. It identifies severe heatwaves, rainfall reduction, and water scarcity as primary physical risks. Through four scenarios, the authors argue that while large-scale projects require stable governance and cross-border agreements, the widespread availability of small-scale adaptive technologies could provide a critical resilience pathway for populations in states with poor or predatory governance.

The authors argue that the seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and threats to the Chernobyl site demonstrate the extreme dangers of nuclear facilities in conflict zones. They suggest the United States must develop a strategy to provide alternatives to Russian nuclear exports, monitor how these events affect global public perception of nuclear energy's role in climate mitigation, and adopt a more holistic approach to risk assessment that incorporates extreme climate projections and converging security threats.

The document examines how the Ukraine crisis intersects with climate security, emphasizing the need to accelerate the clean energy transition to neutralize Russia's fossil fuel leverage. It details the ecological degradation in Ukraine, including risks to nuclear sites and ecosystems, and warns of global food insecurity due to disruptions in wheat, maize, and sunflower oil exports. Finally, it assesses Russia's own vulnerabilities to permafrost melt and Arctic ice loss, noting that the conflict hinders necessary international climate cooperation.

The report evaluates the Biden Administration's efforts to prioritize climate security across four pillars: leadership, risk assessment, international partnerships, and resilience/prevention. While it notes significant progress in high-level leadership and the publication of risk analyses, it argues that the U.S. must move from planning to execution, specifically by increasing funding for resilient infrastructure, improving climate forecasting, and mainstreaming climate security within the State Department and military engagements.

The report examines how the decline of pollination and seed dispersal services threatens global food security, economic stability, and political order. It highlights that while global production tonnage may only drop by 5-8%, the impact is acute for pollinator-dependent nations and critical for nutritional health. The document also warns that seed dispersal failure undermines forest integrity and carbon sinks, potentially destabilizing fragile states where populations are highly dependent on forest resources.

The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) addresses the Russian invasion of Ukraine, emphasizing the convergence of the conflict with existing ecological, nuclear, and biological security crises. The organization highlights specific risks such as the seizure of the Chernobyl site, the potential for offensive biological weapons, and the geopolitical implications of a melting Arctic and dependence on Russian wheat.

The briefing analyzes the proposed return of U.S. nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) from a Japanese security perspective. It argues that the capabilities once sought by Japan—such as low yield, stealth, and survivability—are already provided by other modernized U.S. assets, including the W76-2 low-yield SLBM warhead, B61-12 bombs, and long-range stand-off (LRSO) missiles. The author concludes that nuclear SLCMs would be a duplicative capability with low marginal benefit, especially given China's increasing anti-access and anti-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

The report analyzes the evolution of biological weapons threats from the 1940s to the 2010s, noting a shift from battlefield utility and strategic deterrence toward hybrid warfare and assassination tools. It argues that the COVID-19 pandemic acts as a 'game changer' that could either trigger a new era of proliferation or foster unprecedented international cooperation. The authors propose three future scenarios: one where bioweapons become a key component of deterrence, one where the world pivots toward collective biosecurity, and a hybrid world of ambiguous threats driven by disinformation. The report concludes that U.S. policy must rebalance its focus from bioterrorism to state-based threats and increase funding for biodefense.