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The document explores using unilateral declarations to reduce nuclear risks, specifically proposing a 'sole purpose' doctrine for NATO nuclear forces—limiting their role to deterring or responding to nuclear attacks. It analyzes the legal nature of such declarations, historical precedents like the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and five potential pathways for NATO to implement this shift, ranging from high-level statements to the removal of forward-deployed gravity bombs. The authors note that such a move would require deep alliance consensus and would be complicated by current tensions with Russia, which views tactical nuclear weapons as a "competitive advantage."

The Council on Strategic Risks condemns the atrocities committed by Hamas against civilians in Israel, echoes the support of world leaders for the Israeli people, and notes the rising trend of global antisemitism.

The document examines 'cyber-biosecurity' risks, where advances in automation, synthetic biology, and the proliferation of high-containment labs create vulnerabilities that malicious actors can exploit. It highlights threats such as the manipulation of genomic data, cyber attacks on medical devices, and the targeting of agricultural infrastructure. To mitigate these risks, the author recommends designating the bioeconomy as critical infrastructure, passing comprehensive health privacy laws, strengthening oversight of gain-of-function research, and implementing stringent screening protocols for gene synthesis providers.

The report details a scenario exercise where experts simulated the collapse of ecosystems in a fictional Southeast Asian state to explore the resulting security risks. The exercise demonstrated a feedback loop where ecological failure—specifically the collapse of fisheries and agriculture—triggered food insecurity, mass migration, and internal conflict. This instability led to a political shift from a semi-democratic system to an authoritarian state, as ruling elites prioritized self-preservation and stability over ecological restoration. The findings suggest that preventing ecological disruption is significantly more effective than attempting restoration during a security crisis, and the report recommends integrating ecological security into global security frameworks and investing in early governance stability.

The Center for Climate and Security (CCS) submitted recommendations for the First National Nature Assessment (NNA1), which is scheduled for completion in 2026. CCS advocates for expanding the assessment's geographic scope to include ecosystems near US installations abroad and broadening the analysis of nature-based solutions, food and water security, and human migration. Specifically, CCS suggests including unprotected nature and anthropogenic ecosystems in hazard aversion analysis, conducting benefit-cost comparisons between nature-based and synthetic solutions, and examining the impact of international ecological changes on US supply chains.

The report details a scenario exercise involving a fictional Southeast Asian state, Khomland, to explore the security implications of ecological collapse. The simulation demonstrates a feedback loop where ecosystem degradation—specifically the collapse of fisheries and agriculture—drives food insecurity and mass migration, which in turn fuels political conflict and the consolidation of authoritarian power. Key findings highlight that restoration is significantly more difficult than prevention and that political elites often weaponize crisis management to maintain power. The document concludes with recommendations for international and regional bodies to prioritize ecological security, invest in governance stability, and deploy nature-based solutions to build societal resilience.

Following the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius, a delegation of young leaders from the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) proposed three strategic priorities for the alliance: moving beyond token youth engagement toward substantive decision-making, integrating Indigenous Peoples' traditional knowledge into high-level climate security dialogues, and leveraging new NATO documents to push member states toward deeper climate mitigation and adaptation efforts.

The report identifies a critical policy gap where climate change, food insecurity, and national security are often addressed in silos. It argues that while the U.S. intelligence and military communities recognize these as top security concerns, current interventions remain focused on immediate humanitarian aid rather than long-term community resilience. The document recommends scaling up R&D, synchronizing agricultural emission cuts with food supply needs, and integrating geopolitical risks into strategic military and government planning to prevent global instability and conflict.

The report examines the history and risks of tactical nuclear weapons, arguing that their perceived utility in battlefield scenarios is outweighed by the danger of lowering the nuclear threshold and triggering unpredictable escalation. It details the rise of these weapons during the Cold War and their subsequent decline through treaties like the INF Treaty and unilateral actions such as the U.S. Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. The authors warn that current geopolitical tensions and debates over new capabilities, such as the U.S. SLCM-N, threaten to reverse this progress. The document recommends that the P5 nations and the United Nations establish pathways to freeze or reduce tactical nuclear arsenals to maintain global strategic stability.

The briefing details the FY2024 budget requests for U.S. biodefense, highlighting significant increases in pandemic preparedness funding for HHS and the launch of new initiatives like the Public Health Emergency Fund. It notes a mixed trend in the Department of Defense, where some biosecurity research programs are ending while others receive increases. The document also examines international biosecurity efforts through the State Department and DTRA, while noting budget cuts to the Biological Threat Reduction Program.

The document defines 'biotic eruptions' as population or biomass explosions of species driven by human alterations to the environment or the introduction/removal of species. These eruptions can lead to irreversible state shifts in ecosystems, such as harmful algal blooms (HABs) or Arctic greening, which disrupt food security and economic stability. The author argues that these ecological disruptions can cascade into social instability and conflict, particularly in regions with weak governance. Case studies on Lake Victoria and China illustrate how biodiversity loss and invasive species like the fall armyworm exacerbate vulnerabilities. The briefing recommends restoring keystone species, reducing nutrient pollution, and diversifying food systems to enhance security resilience.

Finland's integration into NATO and its role as the host of the rescEU CBRN strategic reserve are presented as critical enhancements to European security. The paper highlights Finland's 'comprehensive security approach' and its long-standing leadership in biosecurity, chemical weapons non-proliferation, and nuclear safety as assets that bolster the alliance's deterrence capabilities, particularly given Finland's 1,340 km border with Russia.

The document argues that the 'polycrisis'—a state of complex, compounding environmental risks—requires a new category of leadership capable of managing chaotic conditions. Based on research with approximately thirty senior UK defense personnel, the authors identify three core strengths of military leadership: baseline capabilities (physical/mental resilience, values-based leadership, and storytelling), constant rehearsal (simulations and wargaming), and the 'Mission Command' operational concept. The briefing suggests that civilian leaders can adopt these methods to close the 'imagination gap' and maintain agency during environmental destabilization, while also calling for the defense sector to better integrate sustainability into its own doctrine.

The U.S. Department of Defense announced on June 22, 2023, that the final remnants of chemical weapons at the Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado have been destroyed. This process involved the destruction of 780,000 mustard agent-filled munitions. The U.S. now has only one remaining site, the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky, where destruction is ongoing. The author argues that this compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) serves as a critical signal against the use of such weapons, contrasting U.S. actions with the illegal use of chemical weapons by Syria and Russia.

The document outlines the interconnected risks of climate change, food insecurity, and national security, specifically focusing on how these factors drive instability in the Horn of Africa. It argues that food insecurity acts as both a byproduct and a driver of conflict, creating opportunities for violent extremist organizations like al-Shabab to gain influence. Using Ethiopia as a case study, the briefing highlights the impact of drought, floods, and interstate disputes over resources, while noting that the U.S. national security strategy recognizes global food systems as being under threat from climate events and geopolitical conflicts.

The document defines water weaponization as the exploitation of the human need for water by deliberately rendering it scarce or insecure. It applies a six-category matrix—Strategic, Tactical, Coercive, Unintentional, Psychological Terror, and Extortion/Incentivization—to the Russia-Ukraine war. Key findings include Russia's draining of the Kakhovka Reservoir, which threatens the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power station, and the use of water denial in cities like Mariupol and Mykolaiv. Ukraine is also noted for strategic water denial in Crimea (2014) and tactical flooding in the Demydiv region. The authors argue for the expansion of U.S. climate finance for water adaptation, the use of the International Court of Justice to prosecute water infrastructure destruction as war crimes, and the integration of water management into the Global Fragility Act.

The Council on Strategic Risks commends the G7 nations for their 2023 Hiroshima Vision, which prioritizes risk reduction, transparency, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons over entering a new nuclear arms race.

The report assesses the escalating risk of catastrophic biological threats driven by the democratization of biotechnology and climate change. It highlights that future pandemics could be orders of magnitude more lethal than COVID-19, whether through natural emergence, laboratory accidents, or deliberate use. The authors argue that current U.S. biodefense spending is insufficient, representing less than 1% of the defense budget. They propose a "10+10 over 10" investment plan—$20 billion annually for ten years—focusing on pathogen-agnostic defensive tools, strengthened international norms, and improved deterrence through preparedness. The report concludes that such investments are highly cost-effective compared to the trillions of dollars in potential economic losses and millions of lives at risk.

The document examines the implications of India's discovery of 5.9 million tons of lithium in Jammu and Kashmir, arguing that while it could bolster India's energy independence and EV goals, it risks exacerbating internal communal tensions and international conflict with Pakistan. It highlights environmental threats to the Chenab River watershed and suggests that the U.S. should promote global mining governance, technological alternatives like sodium-ion batteries, and demand-reduction policies to mitigate these risks.

The briefing recommends that NATO avoid reactive expansions of its nuclear arsenal or mirroring Russia's suspension of the New START Treaty following Putin's announcement to operationalize tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. The authors argue that NATO's current deterrence is sufficient and that overreacting would play into Russian narratives of NATO aggression. Key recommendations include continuing transparency regarding B61-12 deployment, prioritizing the reduction of tactical nuclear weapon risks, and strengthening crisis communication channels with Russia to prevent accidental escalation.