A Sole Purpose Doctrine for NATO Nuclear Forces: Examining Unilateral Declarations

The document explores using unilateral declarations to reduce nuclear risks, specifically proposing a 'sole purpose' doctrine for NATO nuclear forces—limiting their role to deterring or responding to nuclear attacks. It analyzes the legal nature of such declarations, historical precedents like the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and five potential pathways for NATO to implement this shift, ranging from high-level statements to the removal of forward-deployed gravity bombs. The authors note that such a move would require deep alliance consensus and would be complicated by current tensions with Russia, which views tactical nuclear weapons as a "competitive advantage."

• Unilateral declarations can serve as effective risk reduction tools by creating standing precedents, catalyzing other states to adopt similar commitments, and pressuring peers to respond in-kind without formal treaty negotiations.
• A 'sole purpose' doctrine for NATO would prioritize the strategic mission of deterring and responding to nuclear attacks, thereby limiting the role of tactical nuclear weapons, which are considered inherently destabilizing because they lower the threshold for nuclear use.
• The authors propose a long-term roadmap of five measures to implement a sole purpose doctrine: a high-level declaration, updated U.S. nuclear weapons employment guidance, maximizing B61 gravity bomb yields to signal strategic intent, removing dual-capability from aircraft, and the total removal of forward-deployed gravity bombs from Europe.
• Implementing a sole purpose doctrine faces significant hurdles, including the need for consensus within the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the risk that allies—especially those bordering Russia—might fear a weakened ability to defend their territorial integrity.
• Russia is unlikely to reciprocate such measures in the current security environment, as President Vladimir Putin has described tactical nuclear weapons as a "competitive advantage" essential for influencing the threat calculations of adversaries.
• The removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe could be interpreted as a signal of weakened commitment to the alliance and might negatively impact the nonproliferation regime in countries facing acute nuclear threats, such as Japan or South Korea.

APA

Parthemore, C., & Moulton, J. (2023). A Sole Purpose Doctrine for NATO Nuclear Forces: Examining Unilateral Declarations. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2023/10/19/a-sole-purpose-doctrine-for-nato-nuclear-forces-examining-unilateral-declarations/

Chicago

Parthemore, Christine, and John Moulton. A Sole Purpose Doctrine for NATO Nuclear Forces: Examining Unilateral Declarations. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2023. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2023/10/19/a-sole-purpose-doctrine-for-nato-nuclear-forces-examining-unilateral-declarations/.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Parthemore |first1=Christine |last2=Moulton |first2=John |title=A Sole Purpose Doctrine for NATO Nuclear Forces: Examining Unilateral Declarations |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=19 October 2023 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2023/10/19/a-sole-purpose-doctrine-for-nato-nuclear-forces-examining-unilateral-declarations/ |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{parthemore2023sole, author = {Parthemore, Christine and Moulton, John}, title = {{A Sole Purpose Doctrine for NATO Nuclear Forces: Examining Unilateral Declarations}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2023}, month = oct, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2023/10/19/a-sole-purpose-doctrine-for-nato-nuclear-forces-examining-unilateral-declarations/}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }