The Cyber-Biosecurity Nexus: Key Risks and Recommendations for the United States

The document examines 'cyber-biosecurity' risks, where advances in automation, synthetic biology, and the proliferation of high-containment labs create vulnerabilities that malicious actors can exploit. It highlights threats such as the manipulation of genomic data, cyber attacks on medical devices, and the targeting of agricultural infrastructure. To mitigate these risks, the author recommends designating the bioeconomy as critical infrastructure, passing comprehensive health privacy laws, strengthening oversight of gain-of-function research, and implementing stringent screening protocols for gene synthesis providers.

• Technological trends are increasing cyber-biosecurity risks, including the democratization of synthetic biology through lower costs for DNA sequencing and synthesis, and the rise of cloud laboratories that allow remote experimentation and 'de-skilling' of research.
• Global biosecurity is strained by the proliferation of high-containment facilities; nearly 60 such facilities are now operational, yet only 25% of countries with BSL-4 labs score highly on best practice indicators for biosafety and biosecurity.
• Cyber attack vectors are diversifying to include biological targets, such as the use of DNA to embed malware for 'buffer overflow attacks' and the targeting of agricultural systems, which saw a 607% increase in cyber attacks from 2019 to 2020.
• The United States faces critical vulnerabilities in its healthcare and biotech sectors, with healthcare cyber threats accounting for 24.5% of all hacks and pharmaceutical organizations reporting high rates of database exposure.
• Specific high-risk vulnerabilities include the potential for malicious genomic engineering where tampered DNA bypasses screening software, and the exploitation of medical devices like insulin pumps and pacemakers.
• The author argues that U.S. governance of genomic data is weak because current law does not recognize human genomic data as personally identifiable information, and industrial genomic data has limited protections.

APA

Olvera, A. (2023). The Cyber-Biosecurity Nexus: Key Risks and Recommendations for the United States. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/54-Cyber-Biosecurity-Nexus.pdf

Chicago

Olvera, Abi. The Cyber-Biosecurity Nexus: Key Risks and Recommendations for the United States. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2023. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/54-Cyber-Biosecurity-Nexus.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Olvera |first1=Abi |title=The Cyber-Biosecurity Nexus: Key Risks and Recommendations for the United States |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=14 September 2023 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/54-Cyber-Biosecurity-Nexus.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{olvera2023cyberbiosecurity, author = {Olvera, Abi}, title = {{The Cyber-Biosecurity Nexus: Key Risks and Recommendations for the United States}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2023}, month = sep, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/54-Cyber-Biosecurity-Nexus.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }