Briefer: Russian Nuclear Weapons and Belarus—NATO Should Continue to Stand Steady

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The briefing recommends that NATO avoid reactive expansions of its nuclear arsenal or mirroring Russia's suspension of the New START Treaty following Putin's announcement to operationalize tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. The authors argue that NATO's current deterrence is sufficient and that overreacting would play into Russian narratives of NATO aggression. Key recommendations include continuing transparency regarding B61-12 deployment, prioritizing the reduction of tactical nuclear weapon risks, and strengthening crisis communication channels with Russia to prevent accidental escalation.

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  • NATO should maintain its current 'stern yet restrained' tone and avoid mimicking Russian aggression, as the alliance's nuclear deterrence remains secure regardless of whether tactical nuclear weapons are moved into Belarus.
  • The United States should continue to meet its responsibilities under the New START Treaty, including data transmissions and adhering to numerical limits, despite Russia's February 21, 2023, announcement that it was suspending implementation.
  • There is an urgent need to prioritize the curtailment of risks associated with tactical nuclear weapons, which have seen a reversal of Cold War-era reductions over the last decade.
  • The deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus contradicts the 1993 ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by Belarus as a non-nuclear weapon state.
  • Russia's actions regarding Belarus and the New START Treaty are characterized as diversionary tactics intended to mask the failures of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine and to attempt to weaken NATO unity.

Cite the original document

APA
Facini, A., Gower, J., Moulton, J., Parthemore, C., & Shah, S. V. (2023). Briefer: Russian Nuclear Weapons and Belarus—NATO Should Continue to Stand Steady. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2023/03/28/briefer-russian-nuclear-weapons-and-belarus-nato-should-continue-to-stand-steady/
Chicago
Facini, Andrew, John Gower, John Moulton, Christine Parthemore, and Sahil V. Shah. Briefer: Russian Nuclear Weapons and Belarus—NATO Should Continue to Stand Steady. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2023. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2023/03/28/briefer-russian-nuclear-weapons-and-belarus-nato-should-continue-to-stand-steady/.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Facini |first1=Andrew |last2=Gower |first2=John |last3=Moulton |first3=John |last4=Parthemore |first4=Christine |last5=Shah |first5=Sahil V. |title=Briefer: Russian Nuclear Weapons and Belarus—NATO Should Continue to Stand Steady |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=28 March 2023 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2023/03/28/briefer-russian-nuclear-weapons-and-belarus-nato-should-continue-to-stand-steady/ |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{facini2023briefer, author = {Facini, Andrew and Gower, John and Moulton, John and Parthemore, Christine and Shah, Sahil V.}, title = {{Briefer: Russian Nuclear Weapons and Belarus—NATO Should Continue to Stand Steady}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2023}, month = mar, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2023/03/28/briefer-russian-nuclear-weapons-and-belarus-nato-should-continue-to-stand-steady/}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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