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The paper argues for a rapid increase in non-fossil energy production to mitigate climate vulnerability in Africa. It highlights the potential for renewables to reach 750 GW by 2030 and the role of nuclear and hydropower, while noting that fossil fuel sectors remain primary drivers of foreign direct investment. The authors model an 'Energy Policy scenario' for 2050 that increases production across solar, wind, nuclear, and hydro, potentially reducing the number of Africans without electricity by 184 million.

The report examines how national investment laws handle dispute prevention, management, and settlement (DPMS). It finds that while most laws include DPMS provisions—particularly in Africa and Asia—the use of international arbitration, especially through 'advance consent,' exposes states to significant financial risks. The authors advocate for prioritizing national courts and non-adjudicative mechanisms, providing a structured framework for states to reform their investment laws based on specific national policy problems rather than generic international standards.

The report examines how national investment laws handle the prevention, management, and settlement of disputes between investors and states. Based on an analysis of 167 laws, it finds that while dispute resolution is a common feature—particularly in Africa and Asia—the use of international arbitration and 'prior consent' clauses exposes states to significant financial and regulatory risks. The authors argue that states should prioritize national courts and administrative reviews over parallel arbitration systems and strongly recommend against including unilateral prior consent to international arbitration in national legislation.

Zambia, the world's 10th-largest copper producer, seeks to diversify its economy by moving beyond raw mineral exports. While the country has strong midstream capacity, refining and downstream manufacturing remain limited. The report identifies critical bottlenecks, most notably unreliable electricity and high logistics costs, and recommends a phased strategy: first scaling smelting and refining to capture immediate revenue, then building the infrastructure and skills necessary for high-value manufacturing. It emphasizes that Zambia's low-carbon energy mix is a strategic advantage for attracting global buyers seeking sustainable copper.

The report argues that the AfCFTA is essential for Africa to overcome a colonial legacy of exporting primary goods and importing manufactured equipment. It highlights that while official intra-African trade is low (14.8% in 2021), informal trade is significantly higher due to high formal costs. The AfCFTA aims to formalise trade, develop regional value chains, and prioritise industrialisation in sectors like agri-business and pharmaceuticals to enhance global competitiveness and economic stability.

The report examines Africa's history of 'premature deindustrialisation' and proposes a strategic shift toward manufacturing to drive structural transformation. It models a scenario where increased investment in R&D, infrastructure, and labour participation leads to significant GDP growth, the creation of millions of jobs, and a substantial reduction in extreme poverty by 2043.

The report examines the state of manufacturing in Africa, noting that the continent's share of global manufacturing output fell to less than 2% by 2023. It highlights a trend of premature deindustrialisation, where economies shift to services before establishing a robust industrial base. To counter this, the document identifies key drivers for growth, including the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), green industrialisation, and the adoption of digital manufacturing technologies like AI and 3D printing. It also details specific infrastructure projects, such as the Musompo SEZ in the DR Congo, aimed at moving the continent up the value chain from raw mineral export to high-value production.

The AfCFTA faces significant implementation hurdles due to the extreme economic disparity between member states, which may lead to 'winners and losers' where advanced economies benefit while least developed countries (LDCs) face initial welfare losses. Key challenges include the loss of critical tariff revenues for some governments, weak institutional capacities in LDCs, and limited commitment to the free movement of labour. To mitigate these risks, the agreement employs special and differential treatment, granting LDCs and a specific 'Group of 6' (G6) longer phase-out periods for tariff liberalisation, though the authors argue that additional support from the AU Secretariat and private finance is necessary to bridge the development gap.

The document outlines a projected economic transition for Africa by 2043, moving from raw commodity exports to a more balanced profile of manufactured goods and services. It emphasizes the role of urbanisation as a catalyst for growth, provided it is supported by resilient infrastructure. The 'Combined scenario' predicts a strategic rebalancing where manufacturing gains GDP share and agriculture becomes more commercialised and productive, despite a declining share of total GDP. Key enablers include ICT, renewable energy investment, and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The document outlines a forecasting scenario for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) using the International Futures (IFs) platform. It details the specific interventions used to simulate the agreement's impact—including import tax reductions and productivity increases—and specifies the tariff phase-out timelines for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), non-LDCs, and the G6 countries. The authors characterize the scenario as an optimistic forecast that depends on political commitment and stakeholder engagement.

The report analyzes gender dynamics in Zambia's agricultural sector to support a project targeting 100,000 smallholder farmers. It identifies significant gaps in women's access to land, credit, and insurance, noting that while women provide 55% of agricultural labor, they face systemic barriers due to patriarchal norms and limited decision-making power. The analysis details the legal framework, including the 2023 National Gender Policy, and highlights the disproportionate impact of climate shocks on women, who represent 56.7% of the country's poor.

In 2025, African nations faced a fragmented global order characterized by US strategic retrenchment and intensifying competition over critical minerals. The year was marked by the first G20 summit on African soil in South Africa, which pushed for reforms in sovereign credit rating practices and international financial support. While some states like Nigeria and Kenya increased domestic resource mobilization to counter US aid cuts, others in the Horn of Africa became focal points for geopolitical rivalry involving Israel and Gulf Arab states. Additionally, the Lobito Corridor emerged as a key site for US and EU efforts to counter Chinese dominance in critical mineral supply chains, though this development is accompanied by governance risks in the DRC and Zambia.

In 2025, African states navigated a multipolar landscape marked by a transactional US approach under the second Trump administration, which led to aid cuts and a push for domestic resource mobilisation in countries like Nigeria and Kenya. The AU-EU partnership faced skepticism over the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), while South Africa's hosting of the G20 Summit resulted in the G20 Africa Engagement Framework and proposals to reform sovereign credit rating practices. Geopolitical competition intensified in the Horn of Africa, exacerbated by Israel's recognition of Somaliland, and along the Lobito Corridor, where the US and EU compete with China to secure critical mineral supply chains and midstream processing capacity.

The report examines Africa's green technology transition in 2025, highlighting how tightening global trade rules, such as the EU's CBAM and the uncertainty surrounding AGOA, alongside the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, have created economic pressures. It details multilateral outcomes from COP30, including the Belém Package's goal to triple adaptation finance by 2035, and continental efforts like the African Single Electricity Market and the goal to mobilise $50 billion annually for climate solutions. The text emphasizes the critical need for affordable decarbonisation finance and measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) capacity to prevent the marginalisation of African firms.

The report examines Africa's green tech transition in 2025, highlighting the challenges posed by the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, and the expiration of AGOA. It details continental efforts to mobilize $50 billion annually for climate solutions and the progress toward an African Single Electricity Market, while noting the emerging role of AI in climate action and the need for a just transition to prevent the marginalization of smaller firms.

The report examines how Africa is trapped in a cycle of debt and fossil fuel dependency, which disproportionately harms women and girls. It argues that the global financial architecture forces African nations into austerity and resource extraction, leading to 'petro-masculinity' and systemic gender-based violence. The authors advocate for a 'feminist decolonial green economy' and a Fossil Fuel Treaty to enable a just transition through debt cancellation and redistributive finance.

The report outlines six key takeaways from participatory climate vulnerability assessments conducted in nearly 100 communities across Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe between 2024 and 2025. It emphasizes the need to integrate community knowledge with scientific data, involve local governments to institutionalize adaptation, and manage expectations during overlapping crises. The document argues that these assessments are foundational for locally led adaptation by linking local insights with climate projections to understand risks across diverse social groups and ecosystems.

Russia is attempting to leverage historical liberation-era ties and anti-Western rhetoric to maintain influence in Southern Africa, but faces significant constraints. While it maintains security cooperation and diplomatic links with several SADC members, its economic footprint remains modest, accounting for barely 1% of the region's external trade in 2024. The document highlights a gap between Moscow's symbolic gestures—such as debt forgiveness and limited grain shipments—and tangible developmental results, noting that sanctions and economic weakness hinder its ability to compete with China, the EU, and the US.

The case study argues that productive use of renewable electricity (PURE) requires more than infrastructure, necessitating trust, capacity development, and appropriate financing. In Guatemala, technical assistance and financing for agricultural and commercial equipment helped young women increase revenue by over 30%. In Zambia, a solar-powered agro-processing hub utilizing zero-cost lease agreements for milling entrepreneurs showed a 38% margin based on energy cost savings compared to diesel. These findings suggest that risk-sharing and technical support are essential for scaling productive loads, insights which are being applied to future initiatives in Haiti.

The briefing identifies critical areas of focus for the 2026 Mining Indaba, specifically the impact of US, EU, and Chinese geopolitics on critical minerals, the struggle to establish domestic mineral value chains in Africa, the role of transport infrastructure like the Lobito Corridor, the viability of regional battery value chains between the DRC and Zambia, and the potential for engagement between the main event and the civil society-led Alternative Mining Indaba.